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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent essays. Chapter 1, “The Effect of Mortgage
Securitization on Foreclosure and Modification,” assesses the impact of mortgage securi-
tization on foreclosure and modification. My primary innovation is using the freeze of
private mortgage securitization in the third quarter of 2007 to instrument for the probability
that a loan is securitized. I find that privately securitized mortgages are substantially
more likely to be foreclosed and less likely to be modified. Chapter 2, “Disagreement and
Liquidity,” analyzes how disagreement between investors affects the relationship between
trading, liquidity, and asymmetric information. Traditional models predict that asymmetric
information should destroy trade and liquidity. In contrast, I document empirical evidence
that asymmetric information increases trading volumes in stock, corporate bond, and option
markets. To resolve this puzzle, I propose a model of overconfident disagreement trading in
which private information enhances trading and liquidity. Chapter 3, “Is Real Interest Rate
Risk Priced? Theory and Empirical Evidence," asks whether investors demand compensation
for holding assets whose returns covary with real interest rate shocks. Empirically, there is
little evidence that real interest rate risk is priced in the cross section of stocks or across asset
classes. Theoretically, interest rate risk can be positively or negatively priced depending on
whether interest rate changes are due to time preference shocks or consumption growth
shocks.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Mortgage Securitization
on Foreclosure and Modification
1.1 Introduction
Since the start of the financial crisis, 4.4 million U.S. homes have been foreclosed, inflicting
losses on mortgage investors, causing turmoil in the lives of mortgagors, and damaging
surrounding communities. Roughly half of these foreclosures stemmed from privately
securitized mortgages, prompting policy makers and economists to worry that securitization
impedes mortgage modification and leads to unnecessary foreclosures. Unfortunately,
evaluating the impact of securitization on foreclosures is challenging because securitization
is an endogenous decision, and securitized mortgages likely differ from mortgages held on
bank balance sheets even after controlling for observable characteristics.
I estimate the causal effect of securitization on foreclosure and modification by exploiting
the sudden and unexpected freeze of private mortgage securitization in the third quarter of
2007.1 Jumbo mortgages originated shortly before the freeze were disproportionately stuck
1Purnanandam (2011) also documents and exploits loans being stuck on bank balance sheets in 2007.
Purnanandam exploits cross sectional differences in bank exposure to originate-to-distribute lending to estimate
the impact of securitization on origination quality. In contrast, I exploit time series variation in loan origination
to estimate the impact of securitization on mortgage servicing.
1
on bank balance sheets even though many of them were intended for private securitization
at the time they were originated. Because the freeze was unanticipated, loans originated
shortly before the freeze are similar to loans originated earlier in 2007. I further control for
changes to the lending environment over time using a difference-in-differences methodology
with non-jumbo loans, which are primarily securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
were unaffected by the private securitization freeze.
The results are striking. Relative to portfolio loans held directly on bank balance sheets,
private securitization increases the probability of foreclosure initiation within six months of
a mortgage’s first serious delinquency by 8.0 ppt (12% of the mean foreclosure initiation
rate). Similarly, securitization increases the probability of foreclosure completion by 4.7
ppt (35% of the mean) and decreases the probability of modification by 3.6 ppt (69% of
the mean). My instrumental variables (IV) strategy is critical for estimating these effects.
For foreclosure initiation and completion, IV estimates are twice as large as corresponding
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. These results suggest that securitization significantly
exacerbated the foreclosure crisis and needs to be considered in any policy response. Taken
at face value, they imply that over 500,000 of the 4.4 million foreclosures experienced since
the start of the financial crisis were caused by securitization.
In part motivated by the high foreclosure rates of privately securitized mortgages,
the federal government enacted the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
in February of 2009 to incentivize modifications and make modification practices more
uniform across mortgages. My methodology does not provide a way to test whether
HAMP succeeded in reducing foreclosures, but I can test the uniformity of foreclosure and
modification practices across securitized and portfolio loans before and after HAMP. I find
that private securitization increased foreclosure probability and decreased modification
probability throughout the 2007 to 2011 time period, suggesting that HAMP did little to
make foreclosure and modification practices more consistent across securitized and portfolio
loans.
In addition to their relevance for foreclosure policy, these results speak to the debate
2
about securitization more generally. The tradeoffs of securitized financing include liquidity
creation, increased availability of financing, decreased lending standards, and securitiza-
tion’s role in the financial crisis.2 Securitization’s impact on how assets are managed has
received less attention but is also important, especially where management practices have
externalities, as they likely do in the case of foreclosures (cf., Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak,
2011).
Securitization’s impact on foreclosures and modifications illustrates one of the central
precepts of corporate finance: separation of ownership and control matters. The importance
of ownership structure and managerial incentives is universally accepted as a basic premise.3
Yet, empirical applications remain controversial. Are managers of public companies over-
paid? Do compensation and governance provisions affect firm performance? Are private
firms managed better than public firms? These questions are unsettled because empirical
identification is often difficult if not impossible. My setting offers a rare laboratory for
well-identified assessment of the effects of adding a layer of delegated management through
securitization.
Similarly, mortgage securitization is a good example of incomplete contracts. The
incomplete contracts theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
is well-established, but empirical research with actual contract details is rare. Mortgage
securitization is a good setting for analyzing incomplete contracts because the relationship
between the parties is clear (mortgage trusts passively own the mortgages, and servicers
manage them) and the contracts are publicly disclosed.
The institutional details of mortgage servicing (described in Section 5) suggest that
current loans and pending foreclosures are mechanical to service whereas loss mitigation
(including modification) for delinquent loans involves significant discretion. In the language
2Gorton and Metrick (2011) address liquidity creation and the financial crisis. Loutskina (2011), Loutskina
and Strahan (2009), and Mian and Sufi (2009) address financing availability. Keys, et al. (2010) and Rajan, Seru,
and Vig (2012) address loan quality.
3The idea that incentives matter is as old as economics itself. Modern applications to managerial incentives
date to at least Jensen and Meckling (1976).
3
of Grossman and Hart (1986), loss mitigation decisions represent non-contractible residual
rights. These residual rights are universally held by mortgage servicers, effectively making
the servicer the “owner” of a mortgage even though the trust holds the legal title and
most of the cash flow rights.4 The disconnect between control and marginal cashflows
creates two problems. First, servicers have an incentive to underinvest in loss mitigation.
Second, when servicers do pursue loss mitigation, they may employ practices that enhance
servicing income at the expense of principal and interest payments to the trust. This is
essentially a multitasking problem, akin to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Efforts to limit
the underinvestment problem by incentivizing loss mitigation would be expensive and
would exacerbate the multitasking problem.
In my examination of securitization contracts, I find that servicing agreements do little to
overcome the underinvestment problem. Servicers are required to follow accepted industry
practices, but servicing agreements provide no explicit incentives for loss mitigation. The
agreements actually do the opposite. By universally reimbursing foreclosure expenses
but not loss mitigation expenses, servicing agreements create an extra incentive to pursue
foreclosure instead of loss mitigation. Ex-post renegotiation is precluded by trust passivity
and investor dispersion (as in Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Thus, incomplete servicing
contracts have real effects. Privately securitized loans are modified less and foreclosed more
than they would be if they were held as portfolio loans. Contractual modification restrictions
likely account for some of this bias, but they are too rare and insufficiently binding to explain
the full bias. Most of securitization’s impact on foreclosures and modifications comes from
misaligned incentives.
1.2 Existing Evidence
Posner and Zingales (2009) were early advocates of the view that securitization impedes
loan modifications and causes foreclosures. Three previous studies test this hypothesis by
4Grossman and Hart (1986) define ownership as control of residual rights.
4
regressing foreclosure and modification probability on securitization status using OLS or
logit regressions. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) consider mortgages originated in 2005
and 2006 that became seriously delinquent, defined as a delinquency of at least 60 days.
Compared to portfolio mortgages, privately securitized mortgages had foreclosure rates that
were 4-7 ppt higher after controlling for observable loan characteristics.5 Using a similar
approach, Agarwal, et al. (2011) estimate that privately securitized mortgages that became
seriously delinquent in 2008 were 4.2 ppt less likely to be renegotiated within 6 months
relative to comparable portfolio mortgages.6 In contrast, Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen
(2011b) find that differences in twelve-month loan modification rates between privately
securitized mortgages and comparable portfolio mortgages were small for mortgages that
were originated after 2004 and became seriously delinquent by September of 2007.7 The
conflicting results of these papers appear to be mainly a function of the outcome variables
and samples analyzed.8
The main limitation of the existing evidence is that causal interpretation requires the
assumption that securitization status is randomly assigned conditional on observed loan
characteristics. This is a problematic assumption because origination and securitization
are endogenous decisions, and both are made based on a larger set of information than
the observed characteristics econometricians can control for, thereby introducing omitted
variable bias.
Can we at least determine the direction of the bias? The answer is no. First, privately
securitized loans could be lower or higher quality than observably similar portfolio loans.
5See Table 3 of Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010).
6See Table 3, Panel A of Agarwal et al. (2011).
7Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) estimate that if anything, privately securitized loans were modified
slightly more frequently (0.6 to 2.1 ppt) than portfolio loans. See Panel B of their Table VI.
8Securitization has a larger impact on foreclosure than it does on modification. I find this in my analysis,
and Agarwal, et al. (2011) find the same thing in their Appendix A. This explains why Piskorski, Seru, and
Vig (2010) find large foreclosure effects while Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) do not find significant
modification effects in a largely equivalent sample. Agarwal, et al. (2011) focus on a later time period than the
other two papers, which may explain why their modification results differ from Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen
(2011b).
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Originator adverse selection and screening moral hazard push in the direction of securitized
loans being lower quality.9 On the other hand, mortgage backed security (MBS) sponsors
also have access to unobserved information, which they could use to select higher quality
loans.10 Second, the impact of loan quality on foreclosure and modification decisions
conditional on delinquency is ambiguous. Some quality dimensions favor foreclosure,
while others favor modification or inaction. For example, borrower resilience discourages
foreclosure because a resilient borrower is likely to regain his financial footing and repay
his mortgage. By contrast, borrower reliability encourages foreclosure because a reliable
borrower must have suffered a large shock before becoming delinquent on his loan.
The existing literature recognizes the potential bias presented by unobserved quality. Yet,
all three papers discussed above ultimately adopt causal interpretations of their evidence
for or against securitization affecting servicing decisions. Their first rationale for a causal
interpretation is that conditioning on serious delinquency mitigates the unobserved quality
problem. Market participants may have unobserved information about the probability
of delinquency or loan quality conditional on delinquency. If unobserved information is
solely about the probability of delinquency, conditioning on delinquency gets rid of the
problem. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that unobserved information is solely,
or even primarily, about delinquency probability. There is actually good reason to believe
the opposite because FICO scores (which are one of the most important observable quality
measures) predict only the probability of a negative credit event, not the losses associated
with the event. The second rationale the papers advance is that their results are similar
for high quality loans (e.g., loans with high FICO scores and full income documentation),
9Using evidence from credit score cutoffs, Keys, et al. (2010) propose that originators employ less diligent
screening for loans that are likely to be securitized. Bubb and Kaufman (2013) question the credit score cutoff
evidence. Purnandam (2010) finds that banks with higher exposure to originate-to-distribute lending were stuck
holding loans intended for securitization when securitization froze in 2007 and subsequently suffered higher
delinquency rates and charge offs, consistent with securitization decreasing loan origination quality.
10Jiang, Nelson, Vytlacil (2010) present evidence that screening moral hazard is more than offset by selection
of higher quality loans for securitization. The selection is in part facilitated by information that emerges during
the time period between origination and securitization. Similarly, Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012) show that
for prime loans default risk is lower for GSE securitized loans than for portfolio loans.
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which should have less potential for unobserved quality differences.11 Though not clearly
documented, smaller unobserved quality differences for high quality loans seem likely on
an unconditional basis. However, the relevant unobserved difference is quality conditional
upon delinquency, and this could be just as large for high quality loans as for low quality
loans.
Finally, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) analyze a quasi-experiment for securitization
status. They note that early payment default (EPD) clauses require some originators to buy
back loans that become delinquent within 90 days of securitization. Loans that become
delinquent shortly before and after this 90-day threshold differ in their probability of
remaining securitized but are otherwise similar. The authors exploit this discontinuity by
comparing loans that became delinquent shortly before 90 days and were bought back and
kept by the originator to loans that became delinquent shortly after 90 days and remained
securitized. Importantly, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig do not use instrumental variables or fuzzy
regression discontinuity tools. Instead, they directly compare the two groups described
above. This contaminates the plausibly orthogonal variation in securitization probability
(timing of delinquency relative to the 90 day threshold) with endogenous decisions (whether
the loan is bought back by the originator and whether it remains on the originator’s balance
sheet). Because repurchases are based on factors other than delinquency status (for example,
a loan could unobservably violate another representation or warranty) and originators
decide whether to retain or re-securitize repurchased loans, the resulting comparison is
subject to omitted variable bias. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig argue that repurchase decisions
are less endogenous than securitization decisions, but it is not clear this is the case. Adelino,
Gerardi, and Willen (2011a) discuss this issue more fully and argue that early payment
default is not a good instrument even if it is implemented using traditional tools.
11Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) and Agarwal, et al. (2011) use high quality loans as a robustness test.
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) avoid this approach and argue that unobserved heterogeneity may actually
be greater for loans that appear to be high quality because these loans were not securitized by the GSEs for
some unobserved reason.
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1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Loan Performance Data
My data on mortgage loans comes from Lender Processing Services (LPS).12 The dataset
consists of detailed monthly data on individual loans provided by large mortgage servicers,
including at least seven of the top ten servicers. As of 2007, the dataset included 33 million
active mortgages, representing approximately 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Importantly,
the dataset spans all mortgages serviced by the participating servicers, including portfolio
loans, loans securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Government Sponsored Entities,
GSEs), and privately securitized loans.
My analysis focuses on first lien loans originated between January and August of 2007.
To avoid survivor bias, I only consider loans that enter the LPS dataset within four months
of origination. I drop government sponsored loans like VA and FHA loans because these
loans may have different servicers requirements and incentives. To eliminate outliers and
focus on reasonably typical prime (or near prime) loans I further restrict the sample to loans
with origination FICO scores between 620 and 850, origination loan-to-value ratios of less
than 1.5, and terms of 15, 20, or 30 years that are located in U.S. metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) outside of Alaska and Hawaii. Finally, I drop a small set of loans that are at
some point transferred to a servicer that doesn’t participate in the LPS data because the data
doesn’t always reveal how delinquencies were ultimately resolved for these loans. Other
than my exclusion of low FICO score loans and inclusion of GSE loans, these restrictions are
largely consistent with Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010), Agarwal, et al. (2011), and Adelino,
Gerardi, and Willen (2011b). The resulting sample consists of 1.9 million loans.
Table 1.1 describes the sample. It includes 264,000 jumbo loans (i.e., loans over $417,000,
which are not eligible for GSE securitization)13 and 1.6 million non-jumbo loans. As of six
months after origination, 70% of the jumbo loans were privately securitized. Almost all
12LPS data was previously known as McDash data.
13The conforming loan limit in 2007 was $417,000 in all states except Alaska and Hawaii, which are excluded
from my sample.
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Table 1.1: Data Summary
Data comes from LPS. The sample consists of first-lien conventional loans originated between January and
August of 2007 that enter the dataset within 4 months of origination, have orgination FICO scores between 620
and 850, have origination loan-to-value ratios of less than 1.5, have terms of 15, 20, or 30 years, are located
in U.S. MSAs outside of Alaska and Hawaii, and are not transferred to a non-LPS servicer. Jumbo loans are
larger than the GSE conforming limit ($417K). Portfolio loans are not securitized. Privately securitized loans are
securitized in non-GSE mortgage backed securities. GSE loans are predominantly FHLMC and FNMA but also
include some GNMA and Federal Home Loan Bank loans. Delinquency is 60+ day delinquency. Foreclosure
initiation is the referral of a mortgage to an attorney to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Foreclosure completion
is identified by post-sale foreclosure or REO status. Modifications are identified based on observed changes to
loan terms. Redefault is a return to 60+ day delinquency after a modification cures an initial delinquency.
Baseline Sample Full Sample
All Loans (Delinquent in First Year) (Delinquent Before 2012)
Jumbo Non-Jumbo Jumbo Non-Jumbo Jumbo Non-Jumbo
Number 263,544 1,644,346 15,985 61,242 93,379 425,543
Size (mean) $691,219 $210,294 $653,155 $230,861 $650,601 $230,892
FICO (mean) 733 726 700 686 712 699
LTV (mean) 0.73 0.72 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.79
Ownership
Portfolio 27.4% 9.2% 33.2% 16.4% 25.4% 11.3%
Private Security 70.2% 9.4% 63.8% 18.6% 71.5% 15.9%
GSE 1.7% 80.9% 1.6% 64.5% 2.2% 72.4%
Delinquency
Within 1 year 6.1% 3.7%
Within 5 years 36.4% 26.6%
Foreclosure Initiation
Within 6 months 69.5% 60.1% 48.8% 49.9%
Within 1 year 80.7% 72.2% 60.7% 62.1%
Within 3 years 90.3% 86.2% 78.9% 78.9%
Foreclosure Completion
Within 6 months 13.5% 12.4% 5.7% 6.6%
Within 1 year 36.9% 29.3% 17.9% 18.4%
Within 3 years 58.1% 54.7% 36.9% 42.0%
Modification
Within 6 months 5.2% 3.0% 7.1% 7.3%
interest decrease 0.4% 0.6% 2.4% 4.7%
term extension 0.2% 0.7% 2.7% 3.5%
principal decrease 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3%
principal increase 4.8% 2.2% 3.6% 2.9%
Within 1 year 8.5% 6.3% 13.6% 15.5%
Within 3 years 12.3% 13.9% 23.5% 26.5%
Redefault
Within 1 year 71.5% 73.2% 30.2% 27.5%
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of the rest (27%) were held as portfolio loans. By contrast, 81% of non-jumbo loans were
securitized by the GSEs. Delinquency is common in both sub-samples. 6% of jumbo loans
became seriously (60+ days) delinquent within 1 year, and 36% became seriously delinquent
within five years. Similarly, 4% of non-jumbo loans became seriously delinquent within 1
year and 27% became seriously delinquent within 5 years.
All of my analysis is conditional on mortgages becoming seriously delinquent, which I
define as delinquencies of at least 60 days. I split the sample based on when a loan first
became seriously delinquent. The baseline sample consists of loans that became seriously
delinquent within twelve months of origination. I use the twelve month delinquency cutoff
to focus on a time period before significant government intervention in the mortgage
market.14 The baseline sample has 16,000 jumbo loans and 61,000 non-jumbo loans. The
full sample, which consists of all loans that became seriously delinquent before the end
of 2011, has 93,000 jumbo loans and 426,000 non-jumbo loans. The jumbo and non-jumbo
loans clearly differ in size. Jumbo loans also tend to have slightly higher FICO scores.
Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are almost identical across jumbo and non-jumbo loans.
Identifying delinquencies is straight-forward because LPS includes data on payment
status. Consistent with previous studies, I use the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA)
definition of 60+ day delinquency. Foreclosures are also identified in the LPS data. I
consider both foreclosure initiation, the referral of a loan to an attorney for foreclosure,
and foreclosure completion, indicated by postsale foreclosure or real estate owned (REO)
status. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) and Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) study
foreclosure completion, which has the nice property of being a final resolution. On the
other hand, foreclosure initiation is a more direct servicer decision and is more common
within my six-month window of analysis. As reported in Table 1.1, in the baseline sample
foreclosure is initiated within six months of first serious delinquency for 70% of jumbo
loans and completed for 14%. Foreclosure rates are slightly lower for non-jumbo loans and
14The twelve month cutoff combined with a six month analysis window ends the analysis in February of
2009, before the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was implemented.
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decrease over time, driving down foreclosure rates in the full sample.
Identifying loan modifications is more complicated because they are not directly recorded
in the LPS data. Nonetheless, modifications can be imputed from month-to-month changes
in interest rates, principal balances, and term lengths. For example, an interest rate reduction
on a fixed rate mortgage must be due to a mortgage modification. My algorithm for
identifying loan modifications, described in Appendix A, is essentially the same as the
algorithm employed by Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b). Broadly, I consider two
(potentially overlapping) types of modifications: concessionary modifications that reduce
monthly payments by decreasing interest rates, decreasing principal balances, or extending
loan terms; and modifications to make loans current by capitalizing past due balances. The
loan modification algorithm looks for evidence of either of these patterns.
A limitation of the loan modification algorithm is that it does not identify modifications
that do not change interests rates, term to maturity, or principal balances. In particular, it
does not capture temporary payment plans or principal forbearance. In order to work, the
algorithm requires monthly data on interest rates, term to maturity, and principal balances.
This is universally available for interest rates and principal balances. Monthly term to
maturity data, on the other hand, is only available for about half of the loans in my sample.
I limit my modification analysis to these loans.
In my baseline jumbo sample, 5.2% of seriously delinquent jumbo loans were modified
within six months. These modifications were overwhelmingly principal-increasing as
opposed to concessionary. In the full sample, the six-month jumbo modification rate was
7.1% and included interest rate reductions (2.4%), term extensions (2.7%), and principal
increases (3.6%).
1.3.2 Instrumental Variables Methodology
I exploit the sudden and unexpected freeze of private mortgage securitization in the third
quarter of 2007 to identify private securitization. Loans originated shortly before the freeze
are similar to loans originated earlier in the year but were significantly less likely to be
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securitized. My identification strategy is analogous to Bernstein’s (2012) instrument for
public ownership. Bernstein exploits the fact that NASDAQ returns shortly after an IPO
announcement are uncorrelated with firm prospects but predict whether the IPO will be
completed. In both Bernstein’s setting and my own, ownership structure is endogenous but
is influenced by effectively random shocks to related asset markets.
Purnanandam (2011) also documents and exploits loans being stuck on bank balance
sheets in 2007. Using bank-level call report data, Purnanandam shows that banks with heavy
exposure to originate-to-distribute lending were stuck holding loans that were intended for
sale. These banks subsequently suffered higher delinquency rates and charge offs than other
banks, consistent with originate-to-distribute loans being lower quality than other loans.
In contrast, I exploit time series variation in securitization rates by loan origination month
to control for origination quality differences and estimate the impact of securitization on
mortgage servicing.
Mortgage securitization comes in two forms. Most residential mortgages are securitized
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (the Government Sponsored Entities, GSEs). However, not
all mortgages qualify for GSE securitization. A loan may fail to conform to GSE standards
either because it fails their underwriting standards (subprime loans) or because it exceeds
their loan limits (jumbo loans). Starting in the 1990s and growing rapidly in the early 2000s,
liquid private markets arose to securitize subprime and jumbo loans. In 2006, $1.1 trillion
of private mortgage backed securities (MBS) were issued, including $200 billion backed by
jumbo mortgages.15
Private mortgage securitization abruptly halted in the third quarter of 2007 and has
essentially remained frozen since then. Figure 1.1 plots prime securitization volume from
2000 to 2011. Jumbo prime MBS issuance topped $55 billion dollars in quarters 1 and 2
of 2007 then crashed to $38 billion in Q3 and $18 billion in Q4, followed by almost no
issuance after 2007. The private securitization freeze was simultaneous with the August
2007 collapse of asset-backed commercial paper, previously a $1.2 trillion market that was
15Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.
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Figure 1.1: MBS Issuance
Prime mortgage backed security (MBS) issuance volume by quarter. Private issuance is plotted on the left axis.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSE) issuance is plotted on the right axis.
heavily invested in MBS. Both freezes were unanticipated and appear to have been caused
by sudden increases in investor apprehension of mortgage backed securities, particularly
subprime MBS.16 Consistent with this view, ABX price indices for AAA subprime MBS
fell below unity for the first time shortly before the market freeze (see Figure 1.2).17 GSE
credit guaranties prevented similar fears in the GSE MBS market, which continued to issue
securities uninterrupted throughout 2007 and the rest of the financial crisis (see Figure 1.1).
I use the August 2007 private securitization freeze as a natural experiment for jumbo
securitization. Because the freeze was unanticipated, it did not affect origination decisions
until after it occurred. This is the exclusion restriction underlying my identification strategy.
To confirm that it is a reasonable assumption, I plot monthly mortgage originations by
16Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) document the collapse of asset backed commercial paper and identify the
July 31, 2007 bankruptcy filing two Bear Stearns hedge funds that invested in subprime mortgages and the
August 7, 2007 suspension of withdrawals at three BNP Paribus funds as the catalysts of the collapse. Calem,
Covas, and Wu (2011) and Fuster and Vickery (2012) discuss the private MBS issuance freeze, which they date
to August 2007 and exploit as a liquidity shock to jumbo lending.
17Markit ABX indices track the prices of credit default swaps on underlying mortgage backed securities. See
Stanton and Wallace (2011) for more information.
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Figure 1.2: ABX Price Index
Daily prices of the Markit ABX.HE.06-1 AAA index, which consists of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on AAA
supbrime MBS issued in the second half of 2005.
month in Figure 1.3. Jumbo originations tracked non-jumbo originations and stayed in
the neighborhood of 30,000 originations per month until August of 2007. Jumbo lending
then dramatically fell in September of 2007 while non-jumbo lending (which was largely
unaffected by private securitization) remained steady. This is exactly the response we would
expect from an unexpected freeze in private securitization. The appendix includes plots of
loan characteristics by origination month. This evidence supports the origination volume
data in Figure 1.3. Loan size, credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and documentation levels
were fairly stable from January to August of 2007, and jumbo and non-jumbo loans followed
similar patterns. Jumbo interest rates tracked non-jumbo interest rates from January to
August of 2007 and then increased in September relative to non-jumbo interest rates.
Though the freeze did not affect pre-freeze origination decisions, it did affect the
probability that these mortgages were securitized. Assembling a pool of loans, selling
them to an MBS sponsor, and closing on an MBS deal often takes a few months. Table 1.2
highlights this lag. Within my sample of January 2007 originations, only 12% of jumbo loans
14
Figure 1.3: Mortgage Originations
Sample loan originations by month and size. Jumbo mortgages are loans over $417K, the conforming limit for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Table 1.2: Securitization by Age for January Jumbo Loans
Data includes all jumbo sample loans that were originated in January of 2007. Age is months since origination.
Loans are added to the LPS data over time and can change ownership. Number of loans and percent of loans
privately securitized is reported by age.
% Privately
Age (months) Loans Securitized
0 12,715 12%
1 18,208 43%
2 19,069 66%
3 20,338 75%
4 21,023 78%
5 21,558 79%
6 21,811 79%
15
Figure 1.4: Securitization Rates by Origination Month
Percent of jumbo sample loans that are privately securitized and percent of non-jumbo sample loans that are
securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) by origination month. Securitization is measured as of
six months after origination.
were privately securitized in their origination month. By two months after origination, 66%
were privately securitized. Private securitization further increased to 79% by six months
after origination.
As 2007 progressed, less and less time was available to securitize new originations before
the freeze. As a result, the probability of securitization dropped dramatically in the summer
of 2007. Figure 1.4 plots private securitization rates six months after origination for jumbo
loans in my sample by origination month. This is essentially the first stage regression for
my identification strategy. Jumbo private securitization rates were around 80% until April
and then started to decline, with dramatic drops in the summer to 65% in June, 54% in July,
and 36% in August. Over this time period, the volume of portfolio loans increased from
6,500 in April to 17,900 in August, consistent with lenders being stuck holding portfolio
loans they had anticipated securitizing. By contrast, non-jumbo GSE securitization rates
remained steady at around 85% throughout 2007.
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My baseline empirical strategy is to estimate equations of the form:
Pr (Yi|Delinquencyi) = α+ γSeci + Xiβ3 + ε i (1.1)
using origination month indicator variables as instruments for private securitization (Seci).
The regression is conditional upon loans becoming seriously delinquent. Yi is an indicator
for foreclosure or modification within six months of first serious delinquency.18 Seci is an
indicator for a mortgage being privately securitized six months after origination. Xi is a
vector of observable loan characteristics including MSA and delinquency month fixed effects.
The implied linear probability model accommodates standard IV regression techniques and
readily incorporates fixed effects without biasing coefficient estimates.19
Strictly speaking, the identification strategy only requires control variables to the extent
that they are correlated with origination month. Delinquency month fixed effects are im-
portant because foreclosure and modification practices changed over time and delinquency
month is correlated with origination month. Other control variables are less important.20
Nonetheless, I include a rich set of observable loan characteristics in Xi to increase equation
(1.1)’s explanatory power and make it more directly comparable to previous studies. I
control for borrower credit worthiness with an indicator for origination FICO scores above
680. I include origination loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as well as an indicator for LTV of exactly
0.8 because mortgages with an LTV of 0.8 are more likely to have concurrent second-lien
mortgages (Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen, 2011b). The loan terms I control for are origination
amount (through its log), origination interest rate, an indicator for fixed rate mortgages,
indicators for term lengths, an indicator for mortgage insurance, and an indicator for option
18I use a six month window so that my baseline analysis ends in February of 2009, before the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) took effect.
19Angrist and Pischke (2009) advocate using linear IV (two stage least squares) even when the outcome and
endogenous regressor are both binary, as they are here. The alternative is to estimate a bivariate probit model,
which requires more restrictive distributional assumptions and cannot accommodate a large number of fixed
effects (e.g., MSA fixed effects) without biasing results. As a robustness check, I estimate bivariate probit models
and find that they produce similar results.
20In the appendix I estimate a version of equation (1.1) without loan characteristics. Results are consistent
with my baseline estimates.
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ARM mortgages. I control for the quality of underwriting with indicators for low income
documentation and no income documentation, and I control for loan purpose with indica-
tors for refinancing, primary residence, and single family homes. I also control for MSA
fixed effects.
Figure 1.5 plots baseline sample first stage and reduced form origination month fixed
effects for equation (1.1).21 Jumbo foreclosure initiation (panel A), foreclosure completion
(panel B), and modification (panel C) origination month fixed effects were fairly constant un-
til April 2007. After April, jumbo foreclosure probability decreased and jumbo modification
probability increased as jumbo private securitization probability (the first stage) decreased.
The IV regressions in the next section add coefficient estimates and standard errors, but the
basic relationships are clear from the reduced form plots. Private securitization increases
the probability of foreclosure and decreases the probability of modification.
One potential concern with this identification strategy is that the mortgage lending
environment may have changed over the course of 2007 resulting in differences between
origination month cohorts even though the securitization freeze was unanticipated. For-
tunately, I have a natural control group that was not affected by the securitization freeze.
Prime non-jumbo loans are predominately securitized by the GSEs, and GSE securitization
was uninterrupted throughout 2007. Figure 1.5 also plots the reduced form of equation
(1.1) for non-jumbo loans. Non-jumbo foreclosure and modification origination month fixed
effects were largely flat over the sample period, suggesting that any changes to the lending
environment between January and August of 2007 did not have a major impact foreclosure
and modification practices.
As a robustness check, I control for origination month fixed effects by estimating
21Figure 1.5 corresponds to the IV regressions reported in Table 1.4. The first stage is identical across the
three regressions except that the modification regression is limited to loans that report term length data. This
results in slightly different jumbo private securitization fixed effects in Panel C.
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Figure 1.5: Reduced Form Regression Fixed Effects
Jumbo fixed effects are from the reduced form of the baseline IV regressions reported in Table 4. Non-jumbo
fixed effects are for identical regressions estimated for non-jumbo loans. All fixed effects are relative to January.
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equations of the form:
Pr (Yi|Delinquencyi) = α+ γSeci + β1 Jumboi + β2NonJumboi ∗ Seci
+OrigMonthiβ3 + Xiβ4 + NonJumboi ∗ Xiβ5 + ε i (1.2)
using Jumboi ∗ OrigMonthi indicator variables as instruments for private securitization
(Seci). As before, Yi is an indicator for foreclosure or modification within six months of
first serious delinquency, and Seci is an indicator for a mortgage being privately securitized
six months after origination. Jumboi is an indicator for jumbo status. NonJumboi ∗ Seci is
the interaction between private securitization and non-jumbo status.22 OrigMonthi is a
vector of origination-month dummy variables. Xi is a vector of the same loan characteristics
and fixed effects included in equation (1.1). Conceptually, equation (1.2) estimates separate
regressions for jumbo and non-jumbo loans except that the origination-month fixed effects
estimated with non-jumbo loans are applied to the jumbo regressions. The reduced form
of equation (1.2) is a difference in differences regression of Yi (foreclosure or modification)
on origination month exploiting differences between jumbo loans (the treated group) and
non-jumbo loans (the control group).
The remaining concern is that something changed between January and August of
2007 differentially in the jumbo lending environment relative to the non-jumbo lending
environment. I cannot fully rule this out, but the overall evidence suggests that jumbo
lending was fairly stable and moved in parallel with non-jumbo lending until August of
2007. Even if there were time-series changes specific to jumbo lending, they are unlikely to
rival the drop in jumbo private securitization from 80% in April to 36% in August.
22Including the NonJumboi ∗ Seci interaction allows for the possibility that private securitization has a
different impact on jumbo and non-jumbo loans. I include this interaction variable directly in the regression
(i.e., without an instrument) even though it is endogenous. This is less of a problem because I am not interested
in the β2 coefficient. In the appendix, I estimate a version of equation (1.2) without NonJumboi ∗ Seci and obtain
larger γ estimates, suggesting that equation (1.2) is a conservative specification.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Baseline Results
I start by estimating the effect of private securitization on foreclosure and modification
in my baseline sample of jumbo loans that became seriously delinquent within one year
of origination. This time period is most directly comparable to previous studies and is
relatively free of government policy interventions. Because the last originations in my
sample are in August of 2007, the twelve-month delinquency window combined with my
six-month analysis window ensures that the last month analyzed is February of 2009, which
is before the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was implemented. Later, I
consider all loans that became seriously delinquent before 2012 to assess whether the effect
of securitization on foreclosure and modification changed over time.
Before implementing my instrumental variables strategy, I first estimate equation (1.1)
with origination month fixed effects using OLS regressions. Coefficient estimates and
standard errors (clustered by MSA) are reported in Table 1.3. After controlling for observable
loan characteristics, seriously delinquent securitized loans are 3.9 ppt more likely to have
foreclosure initiated, 2.2 ppt more likely to have foreclosure completed, and 3.1 ppt less likely
to be modified within six months.23 97% of sample jumbo loans are privately securitized or
held as portfolio loans so the coefficients estimate differences between these two groups.
The samples for the three regressions are identical with one exception. As discussed in the
previous section, I can only consistently identify modifications for loans that report their
term to maturity on a monthly basis. This decreases the modification regression sample size
by about 50%.
Like previous studies, my OLS regressions are not conducive to causal interpretation
23The coefficients are slightly lower than Piskorski, Seru, and Vig’s (2010) 4-7 ppt foreclosure bias estimate
and Agarwal, et al.’s (2011) -4.2 ppt modification bias estimate. Given that I analyze only jumbo loans instead
of all loans and that my sample covers a slightly different time period and uses a shorter analysis window
than Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010), my OLS results are generally consistent with these previous findings. By
contrast my results conflict with the approximately equal modification rates of Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen
(2011b). This is likely due to the sample period since Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) show that the
modification gap between portfolio loans and privately securitized loans grew over time.
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Table 1.3: OLS Regressions
The dependent variables are indicators for foreclosure initiation, foreclosure completion, and modification within
six months of first serious (60+ days) delinquency. All regressions are OLS. Privately securitized is an indicator
for private securitization as of six months after origination. The regressions analyze baseline sample jumbo
loans, which became seriously (60+ days) delinquent within one year of origination. The modification regression
is restricted to mortgages with term length data. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered
(by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, ***
represents 1% significance.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Foreclose Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.695 0.135 0.052
Privately Securitized 0.039*** 0.022*** -0.031***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
FICO >= 680 0.087*** 0.032*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
LTV Ratio 0.630*** 0.046 0.018
(0.051) (0.040) (0.045)
LTV = 80 0.031*** 0.018** -0.008*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
log(Origination Amount) -0.0003 -0.028*** 0.000
(0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
Origination Interest Rate 0.003 -0.001 -0.023***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Fixed Interest Rate -0.095*** -0.067*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
Term = 15 Years -0.180*** -0.049 -0.042***
(0.068) (0.036) (0.013)
Term = 20 Years -0.233 0.008 -0.007
(0.157) (0.107) (0.026)
Insurance -0.091*** 0.010 0.018
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
Refinancing Loan -0.075*** -0.038*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Option ARM 0.009 0.006 0.063***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Single Family Home 0.006 -0.013 -0.018***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
Primary Residence 0.009 -0.001 -0.002
(0.016) (0.011) (0.008)
No Income Documentation 0.0001 0.009 -0.004
(0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
Low Income Documentation -0.085*** -0.027*** 0.005
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No
Observations 15,945 15,945 7,893
Adusted R-Squared 0.083 0.030 0.089
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because securitization status may be correlated with unobserved (and thus omitted) loan
characteristics that explain part of the residual of equation (1.1). As discussed in the previous
section, the direction of the omitted variable bias is theoretically ambiguous. Even assuming
securitized loans are unobservably lower quality, the impact of loan quality on foreclosure
and modification conditional on delinquency could be positive or negative. This ambiguity
is apparent in the OLS control variable coefficient estimates. Some measures of quality
increase foreclosure probability while others decrease it. For example, a high FICO score
increases the probability of foreclosure initiation within six months by 8.7 ppt whereas a
low loan-to-value ratio decreases the same probability (see column (1) of Table 1.3).
Table 1.4 addresses the omitted variable problem by using origination month to in-
strument for jumbo securitization status. Coefficients are estimated using two stage least
squares. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. Control variables are the same as in the
Table 1.3 OLS regression except that origination month is now used as an instrument for
private securitization.
Column (1) reports the first stage regression of private securitization on origination
month.24 As discussed earlier, securitization probability decreased dramatically during
the summer of 2007. The first stage regression shows the same pattern after controlling
for observable loan characteristics. Origination month fixed effects decreased over the
course of 2007 with a particularly sharp decline after April. The August origination month
fixed effect is -69.5 ppt compared to loans originated in January. Origination month is a
powerful predictor for securitization. The within-MSA adjusted R-squared for the first stage
regression is 0.32, and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 396. In short, weak identification is
not a problem.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 1.4 report instrumental variables estimates for equation
(1.1). Conditional on serious delinquency, private securitization increases the six-month
probability of foreclosure initiation by 8.0 ppt and foreclosure completion by 4.7 ppt.
24The reported first stage results use the entire jumbo baseline sample, which is also used for the foreclosure
initiation and foreclosure completion regressions. The modification regression uses a reduced sample and has
slightly different first stage estimates, which are plotted in Figure 1.5.
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Table 1.4: Baseline IV Regressions
The dependent variables are indicators for foreclosure initiation, foreclosure completion, and modification
within six months of first serious (60+ days) delinquency. The regressions estimate linear probability models for
these indicators using origination month indicators as instruments for private securitization status six months
after origination. All observable loan characteristics shown in Table 3 are included as unreported controls. The
regressions analyze baseline sample jumbo loans, which became seriously (60+ days) delinquent within one
year of origination. The modification regression is restricted to mortgages with term length data. The weak
identification test is a Kleibergen-Paap F statistic. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered
(by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, ***
represents 1% significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
Privately Foreclose
Securitized Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.638 0.695 0.135 0.052
Privately Securitized 0.080*** 0.047*** -0.036***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.009)
February Origination -0.048***
(0.015)
March Origination -0.053***
(0.015)
April Origination -0.097***
(0.016)
May Origination -0.171***
(0.021)
June Origination -0.338***
(0.022)
July Origination -0.533***
(0.020)
August Origination -0.695***
(0.019)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No No
Observations 15,945 15,945 15,945 7,893
Adusted R-Squared 0.324 0.082 0.029 0.090
Weak Identification F-stat 396
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Private securitization decreases the six-month probability of modification by 3.6 ppt. The
coefficient estimates are all statistically significant (standard errors range from 0.9 ppt
to 1.6 ppt). Moreover, they are economically large. As percentages of mean rates, the
foreclosure initiation coefficient is 12%, the foreclosure completion coefficient is 35%, and
the modification coefficient is 69%. Comparing columns (2) to (4) of Table 1.4 to Table 1.3
reveals the omitted variable bias of the OLS regressions. For foreclosure initiation and
completion, the IV securitization coefficient estimates are about twice as large as their OLS
counterparts. On the other hand, the OLS and IV estimates are similar for modification. It
appears that unobserved quality differences between securitized and portfolio loans make
securitized loans less likely to be foreclosed without having much effect on modification.
As a result OLS underestimates the causal impact of securitization on foreclosure.
1.4.2 Interpreting the Results
The IV estimates of Table 1.4 estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of private
securitization on foreclosure and modification. The securitization freeze instrument affected
securitization probability for loans that would have been securitized after a delay. The IV
methodology cannot estimate the impact of securitization on non-compliers, in this case
mortgages that never would have been securitized and mortgages that were securitized
quickly enough to avoid the freeze. Is LATE likely to differ from the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) of securitization on all loans? No. First, the instrument is very strong (e.g., the
August first stage fixed effect is -69.5 ppt), suggesting that most mortgages are compliers.
Second, there is no a priori reason to think that speed of securitization is correlated with the
treatment effect. If the treatment effect does vary across loans, the loans and originators
with the smallest treatment effect are likely the most inclined to securitization (because a
smaller treatment effect makes securitization less costly). Thus, if anything LATE is likely
conservative relative to ATE.
The treatment itself is also slightly nuanced in the IV regression. Specifically, the IV
treatment is being stuck holding loans intended for securitization. If pre-planning aids
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portfolio loan servicing or if the entities stuck holding the loans don’t typically engage in
portfolio lending, this treatment is slightly different from a planned changed in securitization
practices. To the extent that it matters, the lack of pre-planning likely decreases an owner’s
ability to differentially service portfolio loans, thereby making the IV estimates conservative.
A final issue of interpretation is how broadly to extrapolate the results. Strictly speaking,
my baseline regressions estimate the impact of private securitization on foreclosure and
modification of jumbo loans originated in 2007 that became delinquent within one year of
origination. In later regressions, I show that similar results also hold for loans that became
delinquent at other times. I focus on 2007 originations solely for identification purposes.
As far as I know, there is nothing special about 2007 origination practices so my coefficient
estimates should be valid for jumbo loans originated at other times. The estimates are
also informative about private securitization of non-jumbo loans (e.g., subprime loans).
Exact magnitudes may differ, but the same basic frictions of private securitization likely
apply there as well. My results are less informative about GSE securitization because GSE
securitization involves different contracts and leaves a single entity (the GSE) with full credit
exposure for the underlying mortgages.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
One difference between my empirical design and that of Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010)
and Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) is that I use a six month analysis window instead
of considering loans for a longer period of time after delinquency.25 The shorter window
is desirable because it ends before HAMP, but it creates the possibility that I am picking
up acceleration or deceleration in foreclosure and modification as opposed to changes to
their ultimate probability. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1.5, Panel A address this concern by
replicating my baseline results with a twelve-month window instead of a six-month window.
The coefficient estimates are consistent with my baseline results. The foreclosure start
25Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) consider all foreclosure actions up to the first quarter of 2008, which could
be as much as three years after a loan becomes seriously delinquent. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) use a
twelve-month analysis window.
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Table 1.5: Robustness Checks
Regressions are the same as columns 2-4 of Table 4 except where noted. Columns 1-3 of Panel A consider
foreclosure and modification within twelve months instead of six months. Columns 4-6 of Panel A analyze only
loans originated between May and July of 2007. Columns 1-3 of Panel B control for originination-month fixed
effects using non-jumbo loans. Columns 4-6 of Panel B estimate bivariate probit models without MSA fixed
effects. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses.
* represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
A. 12-month analysis window and restricted origination-month sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Foreclose Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify Start Foreclose Modify
(12 mos.) (12 mos.) (12 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.)
Mean 0.807 0.369 0.085 0.669 0.109 0.061
Privately Securitized 0.081*** 0.061*** -0.066*** 0.078** 0.042* -0.080***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.035) (0.023) (0.025)
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug May-Jul May-Jul May-Jul
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No No No No
Observations 15,945 15,945 7,893 6,443 6,443 3,259
Adusted R-Squared 0.045 0.072 0.100 0.074 0.017 0.066
B. Non-jumbo origination month control regressions and bivariate probit models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bivarite Bivarite Bivarite
IV IV IV Probit Probit Probit
Foreclose Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify Start Foreclose Modify
(6 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.) (6 mos.)
Mean 0.695 0.135 0.052 0.695 0.135 0.052
Privately Securitized 0.097*** 0.059*** -0.027** 0.068*** 0.041** -0.019
(0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 77,160 77,160 35,934 15,980 15,980 7,931
Adusted R-Squared 0.083 0.037 0.073
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coefficient (8.1 ppt) is almost identical. The foreclosure completion coefficient is somewhat
larger (6.1 ppt compared to 4.7 ppt). The modification coefficient is more significantly larger
(-6.6 ppt compared to -3.6 ppt). The increases are likely due to the higher incidence of
foreclosure completion and modification within the twelve-month window. In short, my
baseline results appear to reflect permanent effects as opposed to changes in timing.
Another potential concern is that the jumbo lending environment changed between
January and August of 2007 or that the securitization freeze was anticipated, particularly
late in the sample. The best evidence against this concern is that the jumbo private
securitization rate stayed stable in the 80-85% range from January to April and then dropped
dramatically to 36% by August without a significant drop in originations until September
(see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). Loan volume would have dropped sooner if the securitization
freeze was anticipated, and other changes to jumbo lending this sudden and large are
unlikely especially after controlling for observable characteristics. Nonetheless, I address
the concern by restricting the sample and estimating origination-month fixed effects with
non-jumbo loans.
The restricted sample focuses on loans originated between May and July of 2007. The
probability of securitization dropped significantly over these three months from 77% in May
to 54% in July, and ending the sample before August reduces the concern that securitization
market changes may have been anticipated at the time of origination. Columns (4) to (6) of
Table 1.5, Panel A show regression estimates for the restricted sample. Standard errors are
larger, but the foreclosure coefficient estimates are nearly identical to my baseline results.
The modification coefficient is larger in the restricted sample (-8.0 ppt compared to -3.6 ppt),
suggesting that my baseline results are conservative.
To explicitly control for changes to the lending environment over time, I estimate
equation (1.2) using interactions between origination month indicator variables and jumbo
status as instruments for private securitization. As discussed earlier, this difference in
differences strategy controls for origination month fixed effects using non-jumbo loans while
using the interacted version of origination month to instrument for jumbo securitization.
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Results are reported in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1.5, Panel B. Foreclosure initiation (9.7
ppt), foreclosure completion (5.9 ppt), and modification (-2.7 ppt) coefficient estimates are
all close to their baseline values.
In Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1.5, Panel B, I report marginal effect estimates from
bivariate probit models. As discussed by Wooldridge (2002), this specification implements
instrumental variables identification while bounding outcome (foreclosure or modification)
and treatment (securitization) probabilities between 0 and 1 with probit functions. To avoid
biases associated with a large number of fixed effects, I drop the MSA fixed effects. The
marginal effects of private securitization on foreclosure initiation (6.8 ppt) and foreclosure
completion (4.1 ppt) are close to my baseline estimates. The modification marginal effect
(-1.9 ppt) is lower than my baseline estimate.
In the appendix, I consider three additional robustness tests: dropping loan characteristic
control variables, estimating equation (1.2) without the NonJumboi ∗ Seci interaction term,
and including mortgages that are transferred to non-LPS servicers. Results are consistent
with my baseline estimates.
1.4.4 Full Sample Results
So far my analysis has focused on my baseline sample of loans that became seriously
delinquent within twelve months of origination. The rationale for starting with this sample
is that it ends the analysis in February of 2009, before significant government intervention
into the mortgage market. The baseline sample time period (primarily 2007 and 2008) also
represents the heart of the financial crisis and was a time when servicers may have been
overwhelmed by a surge in delinquencies.
To assess whether my baseline results are specific to 2007 and 2008, I repeat my analysis
on the full sample of all jumbo loans that became seriously delinquent before 2012. Table 1.6
reports the results. The full sample private securitization coefficient estimates are 12.4 ppt
for foreclosure initiation, 2.8 ppt for foreclosure completion, and -5.1 ppt for modification
(25%, 49%, and 72%, respectively, as a percent of mean rates). Compared to the baseline
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Table 1.6: Full Sample IV Regressions
Regressions are the same as in Table 4 except that the sample is expanded to include all jumbo sample loans that
became delinquent prior to 2012. The dependent variables are indicators for foreclosure initiation, foreclosure
completion, and modification within six months of first serious (60+ days) delinquency. The regressions
estimate linear probability models for these indicators using origination month indicators as instruments for
private securitization status six months after origination. All observable loan characteristics shown in Table
3 are included as unreported controls. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA)
standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents
1% significance.
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.488 0.057 0.071
Privately Securitized 0.124*** 0.028*** -0.051***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No
Observations 93,330 93,330 48,289
Adusted R-Squared 0.119 0.049 0.022
sample (Table 1.4) results, the foreclosure initiation coefficient is larger both in absolute
terms and as a fraction of the mean foreclosure initiation rate. The foreclosure completion
coefficient is lower in absolute terms but is higher as a fraction of the mean foreclosure
completion rate. The modification coefficient is larger on an absolute basis and about the
same size as a fraction of the mean modification rate.
To incentivize mortgage modifications and make modification practices more uniform,
the Obama administration enacted the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
in February of 2009. The program was rolled out over the course of 2009 and was fully
operational by the end of the year. Potential HAMP modifications are evaluated using
a standardized NPV test. If the NPV test indicates that modification is more beneficial
to the lender than foreclosure would be, the servicer employs a four-step waterfall to
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reduce monthly payments to 31% of income by first capitalizing past-due balances, then
reducing interest rates to as low as 2%,26 then extending loan terms to up to 40 years from
the modification date, and then forbearing principal. Servicers receive $1000 of incentive
compensation per HAMP modification and success fees of up to $1000 per year for three
years for performing modifications. Borrowers can also earn up to $1000 in principal
forgiveness per year for five years for keeping modified mortgages current. HAMP does
not override specific contractual restrictions, but it does create safe harbors for servicers
by deeming the HAMP NPV tests to be the appropriate measure of investor welfare and
deeming the waterfall modification methodology to be standard industry practice. HAMP
is a voluntary program, but all major servicers participate, and participating servicers are
required to use HAMP modification guidelines for all qualifying mortgages, whether they
are privately securitized or held as portfolio loans.
HAMP’s efficacy is the subject of an ongoing debate.27 My methodology does not
provide a way to test whether HAMP succeeded in reducing foreclosures, but I can assess
whether it made foreclosure and modification decisions more uniform across securitized
and portfolio loans. Policy makers were particularly concerned about the perceived bias of
securitized loans towards foreclosure and away from modification. Was HAMP successful
at mitigating this bias?
To assess post-HAMP securitization biases, I repeat my empirical strategy on sub-
samples of jumbo loans split by the year in which they became delinquent. Table 1.7 reports
the results. Foreclosure initiation coefficients (Panel A) had no clear trend over time. If
anything, they were higher in 2010 and 2011 after HAMP was implemented, especially
when considered as a fraction of mean foreclosure initiation rates, which declined over time.
Foreclosure completion coefficients (Panel B) declined over time on an absolute basis but
26Interest rate reductions are permanent unless they are reduced below prevailing interest rates, which
establish an Interest Rate Cap. If interest rates are reduced below the cap, they stay at the reduced level for five
years and then are gradually increased to the cap.
27For example, Agarwal, et al. (2012a) argue that HAMP increased modifications but has fallen short of
program goals because of mixed servicer compliance.
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Table 1.7: IV Regressions by Delinquency Year
Regressions are the same as in Table 6 except that the sample is split by the year in which a mortgage first
becomes seriously (60+ days) delinquent. The dependent variables are indicators for foreclosure initiation
(panel A), foreclosure completion (panel B), and modification (panel C) within six months of first serious
delinquency. The regressions estimate linear probability models for these indicators using origination-month
indicators as instruments for private securitization status six months after origination. All observable loan
characteristics shown in Table 3 are included as unreported controls. R-squared statistics are calculated within
MSAs. Clustered (by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5%
significance, *** represents 1% significance.
A. Foreclosure initiation within six months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV IV IV
Deliquency Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean 0.766 0.573 0.460 0.318 0.396
Privately Securitized 0.079*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.167*** 0.085***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.028)
Observations 7,647 27,520 32,514 15,937 9,537
Adusted R-Squared 0.042 0.086 0.088 0.066 0.027
B. Foreclosure completion within six months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV IV IV
Deliquency Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean 0.173 0.064 0.036 0.035 0.048
Privately Securitized 0.062*** 0.038*** 0.013** 0.036*** 0.024**
(0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 7,647 27,520 32,514 15,937 9,537
Adusted R-Squared 0.002 0.032 0.013 0.022 0.031
C. Modification within six months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV IV IV
Deliquency Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean 0.045 0.064 0.068 0.078 0.105
Privately Securitized -0.022* -0.070*** -0.042*** -0.021 -0.072**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.033)
Observations 3,844 13,486 17,787 8,091 4,930
Adusted R-Squared 0.112 0.041 0.026 0.010 0.024
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increased as a fraction of mean foreclosure rates. Modification coefficients (Panel C) had
no trend over time on an absolute basis and decreased moderately as a fraction of mean
modification rates. With the sole exception of modification in 2010, private securitization
increased foreclosure and decreased modification probability by statistically significant
and economically meaningful amounts in all years. In short, there is no evidence that
HAMP mitigated the bias of privately securitized loans toward foreclosure and away from
modification.
Direct comparisons between pre-HAMP and post-HAMP coefficients are somewhat
problematic because it is not clear exactly what the counterfactuals should be. Even aside
from HAMP policy changes, the regressions consider different time periods and the loans
analyzed have different ages. Nonetheless, the fact that the foreclosure and modification
biases persisted after HAMP suggests that HAMP had little impact on them. At the very
least we can conclude that HAMP did not fully eliminate the bias of privately securitized
loans toward foreclosure and away from modification.
1.4.5 Long Term Impact
Private securitization increases the probability of foreclosure and decreases the probability
of modification within six and twelve months of first serious delinquency. Do these effects
also show up in longer term foreclosure and modification probabilities? How large are the
long term effects? What is the total impact of private securitization on foreclosures?
To answer these questions, I estimate the impact of private securitization on foreclosure
and modification over a three-year analysis window. The analyzed sample includes all
jumbo loans that became seriously delinquent before 2010. Table 1.8 reports the results.
Private securitization increases the three-year probability of foreclosure initiation by 8.7 ppt,
increases three-year probability of foreclosure completion by 11.3 ppt, and decreases the
three year probability of modification by 5.9 ppt. As a fraction of mean rates these represent
impacts of 11% for foreclosure initiation, 31% for foreclosure completion, and -25% for
modification.
33
Table 1.8: IV Regressions with a 3-Year Analysis Window (Full Sample)
Regressions are the same as in Table 6 except that the dependent variables are now foreclosure initiation,
foreclosure completion, and modification within three years instead of six months. The sample is jumbo loans
that became delinquent prior to 2010. The regressions estimate linear probability models using origination
month indicators as instruments for private securitization status six months after origination. All observable
loan characteristics shown in Table 3 are included as unreported controls. R-squared statistics are calculated
within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents
5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify
(3 Years) (3 Years) (3 Years)
Mean 0.789 0.369 0.235
Privately Securitized 0.087*** 0.113*** -0.059***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No
Observations 67,780 67,780 35,189
Adusted R-Squared 0.082 0.149 0.085
Since September of 2008, 4.4 million homes have been foreclosed, half of which were
privately securitized.28 If private securitization increased the incidence of foreclosure by 31%,
this means over 500,000 foreclosures are attributable to private securitization. Admittedly,
this is a rough estimate. It requires extrapolation from jumbo private securitization to
private securitization more generally, and it ignores the general equilibrium effects of
curtailing private securitization. That said, 500,000 could actually be a conservative estimate.
Subprime private securitization frictions may be even larger than jumbo frictions, and
curtailing securitization may have increased loan quality, further decreasing delinquencies
and foreclosures.
28Foreclosure data is from the CoreLogic National Foreclosure Report, April 2013. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig
(2011) and Mayer (2009) estimate that half of foreclosure initiations were privately securitized mortgages based
on Federal Reserve reports and private market data.
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1.4.6 Modification Details and Effectiveness
In addition to impacting the probability of modification, securitization also affects how loans
are modified. Some securitized servicing contracts place limits on principal and interest
reductions and modifications and term extensions. Further, servicers of securitized loans
may have an incentive to keep delinquent loans alive longer through principal-increasing
modifications that capitalize past due balances. Finally, servicers of securitized loans may
have less incentive to invest in thoughtful screening and negotiation to give modifications
the best chance of successfully preventing future default.
To assess the impact of securitization on modification terms, I employ my IV regression
strategy on the subset of delinquencies that are modified. For this analysis I include all
jumbo loans that became seriously delinquent before 2012 and were modified within six
months. First, I consider indicators for different types of modifications as my dependent
variables, thereby estimating the probability of a certain type of modification conditional on
there being a modification of some kind. Except for the different sample and dependent
variables, the regressions are identical to my previous IV regressions. Panel A of Table
1.9 reports the results. Securitization increases the incidence of interest modifications and
principal increases, decreases the incidence of term modifications, and has no significant
impact on the incidence of principal decreases.
I also consider how securitization affects net changes to interest rates, term lengths,
principal balances, and monthly payments. Panel B of Table 1.9 reports results for regressions
of net changes on the same variables considered in Panel A. Across all terms, privately
securitized modifications are less concessionary. Even though a higher fraction of privately
securitized modifications involve interest rate decreases, the average interest rate decrease is
39 bps lower for securitized mortgages. Similarly, term extensions and payment cuts are
smaller and principal increases are larger for privately securitized mortgages.
Finally, I compare the effectiveness of securitized and portfolio modifications by ana-
lyzing the probability of redefault (return to 60+ day delinquency) in the twelve months
following modifications that cured delinquencies. Table 1.10 reports the results. In column
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Table 1.9: Modification Details (Full Sample)
All regressions are conditional on loans being modified. The dependent variables in Panel A are indicators for
interest rate modification, term modification, principal decrease, and principal increase. Panel A regressions
estimate linear probability models for these indicators. The dependent variables in Panel B are net changes to
interest rates, term lengths, principal balances, and monthly payments. Private securitization status six months
after origination is instrumented with origination-month indicators. All observable loan characteristics shown
in Table 3 are included as unreported controls. The regressions analyze jumbo loans that became seriously
delinquent before 2012 and are modified within six months of becoming seriously delinquent. The net change
(Panel B) regressions exclude observations with extreme changes (rate changes over 10 ppt, term changes over
20 years, principal changes over 50%, and payment changes over 75%). R-squared statistics are calculated within
MSAs. Clustered (by MSA) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5%
significance, *** represents 1% significance.
A. Type of modification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV IV IV
Interest Term Principal Principal
Modification Modification Decrease Increase
Mean 0.343 0.375 0.058 0.509
Private Security 0.058** -0.427*** -0.021 0.448***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.020) (0.039)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No No
Observations 3,378 3,378 3,378 3,378
Adusted R-Squared 0.642 0.322 0.021 0.244
B. Net changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV IV IV
Interest Term Principal Payment
Change (ppt) Change (mos.) Change (%) Change (%)
Mean -2.792 25.733 0.259 -27.302
Privately Securitized 0.385** -68.693*** 1.573** 4.034**
(0.161) (5.555) (0.717) (2.047)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No No
Observations 3,377 3,052 3,361 3,205
Adusted R-Squared 0.240 0.334 0.028 0.205
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Table 1.10: Modification Effectiveness (Full Sample)
All regressions are conditional on a loan being cured of initial delinquency with a loan modification. The
dependent variable is an indicator for redefault, defined as a return to 60+ day delinquent status within one
year of modification. The regressions estimate linear probability models using origination month indicators
as instruments for private securitization status six months after origination. Indicators for modification type
are included where indicated. All observable loan characteristics shown in Table 3 are included as unreported
controls. The regressions analyze jumbo loans that were cured through modification before 2012 within six
months of becoming seriously delinquent. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA)
standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents
1% significance.
(1) (2)
IV IV
Redefault Redefault
Mean 0.302 0.302
Privately Securitized 0.076** 0.042
(0.034) (0.045)
Interest Decrease -0.094***
(0.027)
Term Increase -0.046
(0.031)
Principal Decrease -0.096***
(0.032)
Principal Increase 0.048*
(0.029)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No
MSA FE Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No
Observations 3,058 3,058
Adusted R-Squared 0.199 0.210
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(1), I estimate an IV regression of redefault on private securitization and standard controls
in the full sample of jumbo loans. Redefault is 7.6 ppt higher for privately securitized loans
(compared to a mean redefault rate of 30%). The difference is partially explained by the
types of modifications employed. Column (2) includes controls for modification type. This
decreases the private securitization coefficient to (a statistically insignificant) 4.2 ppt. Interest
and principal decreases are associated with lower redefault rates. Principal increases are
associated with higher redefault rates.29
1.5 Mechanism
The preceding section established that privately securitized loans are foreclosed more and
modified less than comparable portfolio loans. Why do servicers treat securitized loans and
portfolio loans differently?
Servicing securitized mortgages is a classic principal-agent problem. Securitized mort-
gages are owned by trusts that are explicitly passive (in part for tax reasons) and managed
by third party servicers. Servicing current mortgages is relatively straight-forward. Servicers
bill mortgagors, collect and forward payments, and maintain records. These functions can be
readily standardized and specified in servicing contracts. By contrast, servicing delinquent
loans is highly discretionary. Collection, modification, and foreclosure involve unobservable
actions and loan-specific decisions that are difficult to specify in advance.
As in other principal-agent settings, servicing practices can deviate from investor inter-
ests either because of contract rigidity or because servicer incentives differ from investor
incentives. The most obvious case of contract rigidity is explicit prohibitions of certain
practices, particularly modification. These restrictions are meant to protect investors but
may end up hurting them in some situations. Incentive differences are primarily manifested
in an incentive for servicers to underinvest in practices that could enhance a mortgage’s
value but would be costly to the servicer. Servicers may also have an incentive to not deviate
29These results are qualitatively similar to Agarwal, et al.’s (2011) OLS estimate that redefault is 3.5% higher
for securitized modifications relative to portfolio modifications.
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from default practices. For example, if foreclosure is the default practice for delinquent
loans, servicers may perceive that alternatives invite investor scrutiny and liability risk.
In some principal-agent settings, deviations from the principal’s preferred actions can be
corrected with ex-post renegotiation. This is all but impossible for MBS because dispersed
investors lack the ability and incentive to monitor servicers.30 Amending servicing contracts
is also a difficult process, requiring super-majorities of certificateholders.
Previous discussions have focused mainly on securitization impeding mortgage modifi-
cation, often with an emphasis on contractual modification restrictions, and this spilling over
into increased foreclosure rates. This is an incomplete view of how securitization impacts
delinquent mortgage servicing. Binding contractual restrictions on modifications are rare,
and spillovers from decreased modifications are only part of the bias of securitized loans
towards foreclosure. We have already seen one piece of evidence to this effect. Securitiza-
tion has a larger impact on foreclosure (8.0 ppt for foreclosure initiation and 4.7 ppt for
foreclosure completion) than on modification (-3.6 ppt). If the foreclosure bias was solely a
spillover from modification frictions, it should be smaller than the modification bias.
To better understand how securitization affects mortgage servicing, I examine the
contractual terms of actual servicing agreements and link these terms to loan-level panel
data on modifications and foreclosures. I find that reimbursement policies universally
incentivize foreclosure over modification and other effort-intensive loss mitigation practices.
In contrast, binding modification restrictions are rare and have only moderate impact on
modification rates.
1.5.1 Servicing Practices
Before focussing on frictions associated with servicing securitized loans, it is important to
understand the options available to servicers when dealing with delinquent loans. Foreclo-
sure and modification are not binary responses to delinquency. Servicers also have a wide
30MBS trusts have trustees that theoretically represent the interests of certificateholders, but the actual power
and responsibility of trustees are limited, and servicers can only be removed in exceptional situations. Moreover,
a trustee is just another agent for the underlying investors with its own conflicts of interest.
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range of notification, collection, relief, and loss mitigation options. Securitization has the
potential to bias whether and how all of these options are used.
Fannie Mae’s 2006 Servicing Guide offers a window into the breadth of delinquency
management practices available to servicers. Notification options include late payment
notices, payment reminder notices, reminder phone calls, letters (preferably individually-
written as opposed to form letters), and face-to-face interviews. If communication alone
does not suffice, Fannie Mae has procedures for debt collection by attorneys, acceptance
or rejection of partial payments, referral to counseling agencies, and direct delinquency
counseling. In parallel with these efforts, servicers are to communicate with junior lien-
holders. If a temporary hardship is identified, servicers may offer special relief in the
form of a 30-day grace period, longer forbearance agreement, or repayment plan to pay
past-due balances over time on top of regular monthly payments. With Fannie Mae approval,
servicers can also negotiate more formal “Loss Mitigation Alternatives,” including loan
modifications, short sales, deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, assumptions of mortgages by new
homebuyers, and assignment of mortgages to mortgage insurers.
Choosing among these options requires significant servicer discretion. Optimal practices
depend on loan-specific soft information that is difficult to document and essentially
impossible to contract on ex-ante. Moreover, most delinquency management practices
involve personal interaction with borrowers, which makes them costly and dependent on
unobservable effort. Modification is particularly challenging because it requires servicers to
negotiate new mortgage terms, which have the potential to harm investors.
Levitin and Twomey (2011) contrast foreclosure with other delinquency management
tools. Foreclosure is unique in that once undertaken it involves little discretion and can be
largely outsourced and automated. For example, Levitin and Twomey describe a widely
used software platform that automatically refers mortgages to approved local attorneys once
certain delinquency benchmarks (e.g., 60 days past due) are reached. The software uploads
required documents for the attorneys and generates specific instructions and timelines
without any human contact.
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All servicers face a decision as to how much they should automate delinquent loan
servicing. At one extreme, decisions can be highly formulaic and push most delinquent
borrowers into foreclosure. At the other extreme, servicing can be hands-on with significant
personal interaction and solutions tailored to specific borrower circumstances. The basic
trade-off is servicing cost versus higher recovery rates. Levitin and Twomey (2011), argue
that faced with this tradeoff most servicers chose the scale efficiencies of heavy automation.
They further argue that the tradeoff between automation and hands-on discretion changed
as delinquency rates climbed in 2007 and 2008 but that servicers were ill-equipped to quickly
ramp up non-foreclosure delinquency management capabilities.
Securitization introduces three additional elements into this tradeoff. First, because it
involves less discretion, soft information, and unobservable effort, automation mitigates
principal-agent conflicts. Second, because it is cheaper, securitized servicers will naturally
choose automation. Overcoming the bias towards automation requires costly interventions
such as incentive payments or contractual restrictions of servicer actions. These elements
both make automation more ex-ante efficient for securitized servicing relative to portfolio
servicing. The final element is that servicing agreements are locked in when a deal closes
and are difficult, if not impossible, to alter in response to changing market conditions. Thus,
automation is sticky for securitized servicing even if market conditions change to favor
more hands-on discretion.
1.5.2 Servicing Agreements
Securitized mortgage servicing is governed by servicing agreements, which are incorporated
into more general pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs). To understand how these
agreements operate, I analyze the terms of actual PSAs. My sample consists of all prime
MBS deals between January and August of 2007 that exceeded $1B. 37 deals meet this
criteria, which collectively represent $70B, 48% of total prime MBS issuance during this
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period.31 For deals that involve multiple servicing agreements, I describe the agreement
that is relevant to the most loans. The sample covers nine deal sponsors and seven servicers.
The PSAs give servicers broad authority for managing loans coupled with responsibility
to follow accepted industry practices. Servicers bear most costs of servicing the loans and
are compensated with a servicing fee, which is typically around 25 bps annualized for
prime mortgages. Servicing fees are payable from loan proceeds and (in case of default)
from the trust more generally so they function as a senior interest only strip for the life of
a loan. Servicers also retain late fees and other ancillary fee income. Servicers generally
have discretion to pursue modifications and other loss mitigation alternatives, but they have
little direct incentive to do so because these tools require unreimbursable expenses and may
involve waiving fee income. By contrast, foreclosure expenses are fully reimbursed. As long
as they comply with accepted industry practices, servicers have an incentive to shade their
delinquency management practices away from modification and loss mitigation and toward
foreclosure. This incentive is compounded by the fact that foreclosure is universally specified
as a default practice for delinquent loans, which may make it less risky for servicers from
an investor liability point of view. Some PSAs contractually prohibit certain modifications,
but these restrictions are relatively uncommon.
Table 1.11 summarizes the incidence of specific PSA terms. Sample PSAs universally
require servicers to follow accepted servicing practices, generally defined as the practices of
other responsible mortgage lenders. One source of these practices is Fannie Mae servicing
guidelines, which are explicitly incorporated into 38% of PSAs. 68% of PSAs also require
that loans be serviced equivalently to portfolio loans, and in one case the PSA explicitly
requires that servicing be in the best interest of certificateholders. In other PSAs this is
implicit in general and sometimes an explicit standard for specific servicing decisions.
The PSAs also universally establish a default responsibility to foreclose on sufficiently
31Data on MBS issuance volumes comes from Inside Mortgage Finance. Classifications of individual MBS
deals come from Inside Mortgage Finance and review of prospectuses and rating agency reports for individual
deals. In addition to the 37 deals in my sample, Inside Mortgage Finance identifies another 10 deals as prime
that are described as Alt-A by the ratings agencies.
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Table 1.11: Summary of PSA Terms
The sample consists of all prime non-agency MBS deals in excess of $1B closed between January and August of
2007. 37 MBS deals with a total of value of $70B meet this criteria. These deals represent 48% of total January -
August 2007 prime non-agency MBS volume. For deals with multiple pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs)
(e.g., deals involving multiple originators or servicers), the sample includes the agreements relevant to the most
loans. The sample includes nine sponsors and seven servicers.
Number of Percent of
PSAs PSAs
Representations and Warranties:
Early payment default warranty 0 0%
Loan schedule is accurate 37 100%
Loans are current 31 84%
Loans had only limited past delinquency 22 59%
Servicing:
General servicing responsibilities:
Accepted industry practices 37 100%
Equivalent to portfolio loans 25 68%
Best interest of certificateholders 1 3%
Fannie Mae Servicing Guide 14 38%
Obligation to foreclose 37 100%
Foreclosure reimbursement 37 100%
Obligation to modify 0 0%
Obligation to consider modification 7 19%
Modification reimbursement:
From trust 0 0%
From mortgagor 8 22%
Payment advances:
Must advance delinquent monthly payments 37 100%
If principal or interest deferred, must advance difference 22 59%
Modification restrictions:
Must be in default or default is forseeable 23 62%
Must expect modification value to exceed foreclosure proceeds 8 22%
May not permanently decrease principal or interest rate 8 22%
May not extend term beyond term of certificates 1 3%
May not extend term beyond maturity of last-maturing loan 4 11%
Ammendment:
Without consent:
Cure/correct terms 37 100%
Alter without adversely affecting certificateholders 12 32%
Required consent for other changes:
Overall majority consent 37 100%
Overall supermajority (over 66%) consent 10 27%
Majority or supermajority consent in all affected classes 26 70%
Prohibition on decreasing or delaying payments without universal consent 37 100%
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delinquent loans and provide reimbursement for foreclosure expenses. PSAs allow foreclo-
sure to be postponed or avoided altogether if it is not in the best interest of certificateholders
(for example if modification is more valuable or if hazardous materials make foreclosure
more expensive than the property’s value), but these are always exceptions to the general
rule of foreclosure.
By contrast, modification and other loss mitigation practices are never explicitly required
and are not reimbursed through regular loan payments or by the trust. Instead, servicers
“may” pursue these alternatives and modify loans under certain conditions. The closest the
PSAs come to requiring modification is a term in seven deals that requires the servicer to
“consider” alternatives to foreclosure. In lieu of reimbursement from the trust, servicers
are allowed to charge borrowers a modification fee. This is explicit in 22% of PSAs and
implicit in the other PSAs by virtue of Fannie Mae’s 2006 servicing guide allowing servicers
to charge borrowers a $500 modification fee and some modification-related expenses. 59% of
PSAs also disincentivize modification by requiring servicers to advance deferred or forgiven
principal and interest payments for any modification that alters mortgage payments. These
advances will eventually be reimbursed out of the loan’s future proceeds or from the trust
more generally, but in the mean time they constitute interest-free loans from the servicer to
the trust.32
Of all the terms summarized in Table 1.11, modification restrictions vary the most and
are of most interest. Some of these terms appear to be innocuous. 62% of PSAs explicitly
prohibit principal, interest, or term modifications unless a mortgage is in default or default
is foreseeable. This restriction is unlikely to bind (it certainly does not bind for the seriously
delinquent loans I analyze) and is probably implicit in accepted servicing practices even
where it is not explicitly included. 22% of PSAs require the expected value of modified
loans to exceed the expected value of foreclosure proceeds. This is also unlikely to bind and
is implied by accepted industry practices.
32Servicers similarly advance scheduled principal and interest payments while a loan is in default until the
advances are deemed uncollectable.
44
Binding modification restrictions come in the form of limitations on principal forgive-
ness, interest reductions, and term extensions. 22% of PSAs prohibit modifications that
decrease principal balances or permanently decrease interest rates. 14% of PSAs prohibit
modifications that increase loan maturity beyond the maturity of other loans in the trust or
the maturity of the trusts’ certificates. Because loans in a deal almost always have similar
maturities (typically 30 years), this effectively prohibits term extensions. Importantly, these
restrictions are uncommon compared to the universal incentive differences described above,
and they still permit many kinds of modifications. For example, temporary interest rate
reductions and principal forbearance are permitted under all PSAs.
Finally, amendment is difficult under all of the PSAs. General amendments require at
least a majority approval of certificateholders, and in all but one PSA they require either a
supermajority of certificateholders or a majority vote within each class of affected certifi-
cateholders.33 Moreover, all PSAs expressly outlaw any amendment that would decrease
or delay payments without the universal consent of all certificateholders. Any amendment
inducing modification or other loss mitigation activity over foreclosure would presumably
trigger this prohibition. If a PSA is substantively modified, this would necessitate an 8-K
filing with the SEC. I observed no such filing for any of the 37 deals I investigated.
This is the largest survey of PSA terms that I am aware of and the only one that focuses
on prime MBS. It also describes a wider range of PSA terms than any previous study.
Three other studies survey subprime PSAs with consistent results. Hunt (2009) surveyed 20
subprime deals in 2006 and found that 67% limit modifications to loans in default or where
default is foreseeable or imminent and 10% prohibit modifications altogether. Credit Suisse
(2007) surveyed 31 deals between 2004 and 2007 and found that nearly all PSAs permit
modification of loans in default or where default is reasonably foreseeable and 60% had no
other modification restrictions. A Bear Stearns study described by Bajaj (2007) and Hunt
(2009) surveyed approximately 20 deals and found that 10% of deals prohibit modifications
33Amendments to cure or correct ambiguities and conflicts are allowed without shareholder consent,
and some PSAs (32%) allow more general amendments without consent if they don’t adversely impact
certificateholders.
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and another 40% of deals require ratings agency approval if more than 5% of a loan pool is
changed.
1.5.3 PSA Term Regressions
To assess how modification restrictions affect servicer behavior, I link PSAs to individual
loans in Core Logic panel data.34 For comparability to my earlier analysis, I limit the
dataset to jumbo loans and impose the restrictions described in Section 3.35 As described in
Table 1.12, the linked dataset includes 85,000 loans with an aggregate origination value of
$60B. The loans are similar to the jumbo loans analyzed in Section 4 but are slightly larger
($708K on average compared to $691K) and have slightly higher FICOs (742 compared to
733) and lower LTVs (0.71 compared to 0.73). The linked sample also defaults less than
the earlier sample (1% became seriously days delinquent within 1 year and 21% became
seriously days delinquent within five years compared to 6% and 36%). These differences
likely stem from the linked sample being entirely from prime MBS whereas my earlier
sample included all jumbo mortgages with FICOs above 620. My analysis focuses on 18,000
loans that became seriously delinquent between 2007 and 2011. Foreclosure initiation (51.7%
within six months), foreclosure completion (6.7% within six months) and modification (6.3%
within six months) rates are similar to the previous full jumbo sample. Foreclosure and
modification are defined and identified as before with one significant difference. I cannot
identify term extensions in the Core Logic data. Thus, term modifications are missing from
the PSA-linked data.
Having linked PSAs to individual delinquencies, I regress foreclosure and modification
probability on indicators for PSA terms. Specifically, I regress foreclosure initiation, fore-
closure completion, and modification within six months of first serious delinquency on
34Core Logic mortgage data is similar to the LPS data used for my previous analysis but is limited to
privately securitized mortgages. Unlike LPS, Core Logic contains identifiers for servicers, originators, and deals,
which allows me to link loans to PSAs.
35The only changes are that I no longer require loans to enter the dataset within four months of origination
and I do not require loans to be originated in 2007. Survivor bias is not an issue in the Core Logic data because
all loans enter the dataset when a deal closes.
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Table 1.12: PSA-Linked Loan Sample
Data comes from Core Logic loan data linked to my sample of PSAs from prime non-agency MBS deals closed
between January and August of 2007. The sample consists of jumbo (over $417K) first-lien conventional loans
that have orgination FICO scores between 620 and 850, have origination loan-to-value ratios of less than 1.5,
have terms of 15, 20, or 30 years, and are located in U.S. MSAs outside of Alaska and Hawaii. The delinquent
loan sample includes loans that became seriously (60+ days) delinquent between 2007 and 2011. Delinquency is
60+ day delinquency. Foreclosure initiation is the referral of a mortgage to an attorney to initiate foreclosure
proceedings. Foreclosure completion is identified by post-sale foreclosure or REO status. Modifications are
identified based on observed changes to loan terms.
Delinquent
All Loans Loans
Number 85,036 18,049
Size (mean) $707,542 $671,927
FICO (mean) 742 722
LTV (mean) 0.71 0.75
Ownership
Private Security 100% 100%
Delinquency
Within 1 year 1.1%
Within 5 years 20.9%
Foreclosure Initiation
Within 6 months 51.7%
Within 1 year 60.6%
Foreclosure Completion
Within 6 months 6.7%
Within 1 year 20.6%
Modification
Within 6 months 6.3%
interest decrease 5.4%
term extension
principal decrease 0.0%
principal increase 2.5%
Within 1 year 13.3%
indicators for prohibitions of (1) permanent principal and interest reductions and (2) term
extensions beyond the term of the MBS certificates or other mortgages. As discussed earlier,
these terms vary across PSAs. To the extent that they bind, we should expect them to reduce
modifications and potentially increase foreclosures. The regressions are OLS and include the
same control variables as previous regressions plus servicer fixed effects. The servicer fixed
effects are important because PSA terms vary across servicers and previous studies (e.g.,
Agarwal, et al. (2011) and Agarwal, et al. (2012a)) have demonstrated that servicers employ
different modification and foreclosure practices. One caveat is that within-servicer term
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Table 1.13: PSA Term Regressions
The dependent variables are indicators for foreclosure initiation, foreclosure completion, and modification within
six months of first serious (60+ days) delinquency. All regressions are OLS. The reported independent variables
are indicators for the presence of servicing contract terms. All observable loan characteristics shown in Table 3
are included as unreported controls. The regressions also control for MSA, origination month, delinquency
month, and servicer fixed effects. The regressions analyze sample jumbo loans that became seriously (60+
days) delinquent between 2007 and 2011. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA)
standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents
1% significance.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.517 0.067 0.063
Permanent Principal and Interest 0.137*** 0.075*** 0.001
Reductions Prohibited (0.025) (0.013) (0.011)
Term Extensions Limited 0.110*** 0.039*** -0.020*
(0.028) (0.013) (0.010)
Loan Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Servicer FE Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,049 18,049 18,049
Adusted R-Squared 0.138 0.049 0.034
variation is limited to two servicers. Servicer A has prohibitions of permanent principal and
interest reductions in the seven deals it sponsors but not in the three deals it services for
other sponsors. Servicer B has prohibitions on term extensions in the four deals it sponsors
but not in the three deals it services for other sponsors.
Table 1.13 reports the results. Prohibitions on permanent principal and interest reduc-
tions are associated with increased foreclosure (13.7 ppt for foreclosure initiation and 7.5 ppt
for foreclosure completion) and no change in modification. Prohibitions on term extensions
are associated with increased foreclosure (11.0 ppt for foreclosure initiation and 3.9 ppt for
foreclosure completion) and slightly decreased modification (-2.0 ppt, significant at the 10%
level). Because I am unable to identify modifications that solely extend mortgage terms,
this likely underestimates the full impact of term extension prohibitions on modifications.
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These results are directionally what we should expect. Modification restrictions decrease
modifications and increase foreclosures. However the magnitudes, particularly for mod-
ification, are too small to explain the overall bias of securitized loans toward foreclosure
and away from modification. For example, the -2.0 ppt modification bias applied to the
approximately 14% of securitized loans with this term only explains -0.3 ppt of the -3.6
ppt baseline modification bias for securitized loans. Similarly, the foreclosure coefficient
estimates, combined with the incidence of these terms explain 56% of the foreclosure start
bias and 46% of the foreclosure completion bias.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper’s contribution is threefold. First, I propose a novel instrument for jumbo
securitization and provide the first well-identified assessment of securitization’s impact on
foreclosure and modification rates. Private securitization increases foreclosure probability
(by 8.0 ppt for foreclosure initiation and 4.7 ppt for foreclosure completion) and decreases
modification probability (by 3.6 ppt). Second, I estimate the effect of securitization on
foreclosure and modification over time, including periods before and after government
intervention. Securitization increased foreclosure probability and decreased modification
probability throughout 2007 to 2011, even after implementation of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) in 2009. Third, I identify the mechanisms through which
securitization effects foreclosure and modification, highlighting that incentive differences
are more important than contractual prohibitions and that the foreclosure bias is more than
just a spillover from modification frictions.
The bias of securitized loans towards foreclosure and away from modification helps to
explain why foreclosure is so prevalent. Securitization increases the incidence of foreclosure
completion within three years by 31%. Extrapolated to all privately securitized mortgages,
this adds up to over 500,000 of the 4.4 million foreclosures experienced since the start of
the financial crisis. Securitization does not explain all foreclosures, but many foreclosures
would have been prevented if mortgages had been held directly on bank balance sheets
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instead of being securitized.
The differential treatment of securitized and portfolio loans serves as an example of
how ownership structure can affect how assets are managed. Despite contracts designed
to protect MBS investors from differential servicing treatment, securitized loans were
systematically foreclosed more and modified less. This is an important factor in the
debate about the welfare implications of securitized lending both in the mortgage market
and elsewhere. Previously, most assessments of mortgage securitization have focused on
origination, comparing the benefit of increased funding availability with the cost of lower-
quality underwriting. Sub-optimal servicing is another channel through which securitization
can be harmful and should be considered for both regulatory reforms and improvements to
private contracts.
Finally, a word about welfare. In a first-best world where all loans are optimally managed,
a loan’s ownership status should not affect foreclosure and modification decisions. Thus,
my results reject the hypothesis that mortgage servicing is efficient. However, this does not
mean that eliminating securitization (or correcting its biases) would make servicing perfectly
efficient. Portfolio lending is also subject to principal-agent problems, and externalities
(particularly for foreclosure) could drive a wedge between private and social welfare.
Properly interpreted, my results show the effect of adding a layer of principal-agent conflict
through securitization and highlight a mechanism that has increased foreclosure rates. This
understanding is critical for achieving the policy goal of reducing foreclosures, but it does
not pin down what the policy goal should be. The private and social costs and benefits of
foreclosure and modification remain important topics for future research to address the
broader welfare question.
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Chapter 2
Disagreement and Liquidity
2.1 Introduction
Extensive trading of equities and other informationally sensitive securities is a puzzle.
Standard asset pricing models have no role for trading, and models that consider trading
typically predict that asymmetric information decreases trading and destroys liquidity,
defined as the ability to trade an asset without significantly changing its price. Given the
large potential for asymmetric information in stocks, corporate bonds, and stock options, it
is counterintuitive that these securities are heavily traded in liquid markets. Holmstrom
(2008) highlights this puzzle by comparing money (liquidity) markets to stock markets:
"Markets for liquidity are very different than stock markets. In the stock market, uncertainty
and adverse selection fears are present all the time, but this does not prevent the markets
from functioning.... Differences in beliefs often alleviate adverse selection. Stock markets
thrive on differences in beliefs. Markets for liquidity are killed by them."
Since Akerlof (1970), economists have recognized that asymmetric information has the
potential to destroy trade. To overcome asymmetric information, at least some trade must
be motivated by something other than rationally processed information, otherwise liquidity
will dry up, markets will freeze, and the no-trade prediction of Milgrom and Stokey (1982)
will prevail. Starting with the noisy rational expectations models of Grossman and Stiglitz
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(1980), Hellwig (1980), and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and including virtually all
research on liquidity and market microstructure (most notably Kyle, 1985), this extra trading
has been modeled as exogenous noise.
Traditional asymmetric information models make two basic predictions: (1) Significant
noise trading is necessary to generate trading and liquidity; and (2) asymmetric information
decreases trading and liquidity. Hong and Stein (2007) address the first prediction, noting
that trading volume in traditional models is approximately pinned down by noise (non-
informational) trading volume. For example, in Kyle’s (1985) model exogenous noise trading
represents half of total order flow variance. In my moderate variance calibration of Diamond
and Verreccia’s (1981) model, liquidity trading is 95% of total trading volume. The New York
Stock Exchange has daily volumes in excess of $30B. Liquidity trading of that magnitude
seems implausible. One way out of this problem is to interpret noise trading more generally
and claim that the vast majority of trading is uninformed noise from irrational traders.
While theoretically possible, this is not particularly satisfying. If most trading is exogenously
assumed, we aren’t really left with a model of trading. Moreover, traditional models assume
that noise trading is not just exogenous but also orthogonal to information. This is a
critical assumption, and it is likely invalid if noise trading is driven by disagreement among
market participants. For example, if disagreement comes from overconfidence in private
information, the same trade is at once informative and noise, making noise trading perfectly
correlated with information.
Prediction (2) presents even more fundamental problems. In contrast to traditional
intuition, my empirical work shows that asymmetric information actually increases trading.
I study asymmetric information, turnover, and liquidity of stocks, corporate bonds, and
stock options.1 My analysis establishes three stylized facts: (1) Trade and liquidity are
positively correlated; (2) asymmetric information increases trade and decreases liquidity;
1I proxy for asymmetric information with analyst earnings forecast dispersion and also study periods
around earnings announcements, which likely have elevated asymmetric information. For illiquidity, I use
several measures of bid-ask spreads as well as Amihud’s (2002) illiq = |Return|$Volume measure.
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and (3) high past returns increase trade and liquidity.2 Fact (1) supports the notion that
trade and liquidity reinforce one another. Fact (2) contradicts the prediction of traditional
models that asymmetric information destroys trading. Fact (3) shows that traditional models
leave out something related to past returns.
To resolve the failures of traditional models, I propose that trading is primarily driven
by disagreement. I.e., people trade because they have different beliefs about an asset’s
value. Counterparties essentially make zero-sum bets about asset values, and they do so
fully aware that other parties disagree with them. Disagreement trading has become an
increasingly popular explanation of trading volumes (Hong and Stein, 2007, summarize
this view), but there is little existing research on the relationship between disagreement
and liquidity and virtually none on how disagreement changes asymmetric information’s
impact on trading and liquidity.
In my model of disagreement trading, belief differences stem from overconfident in-
terpretation of private information. The overconfidence bias creates trade and liquidity
even when prices fully reveal the beliefs of other agents. Moreover, because disagreement
stems from private signals, trading and liquidity can increase with asymmetric information.
Formally, I model disagreement trading among ex ante homogenous agents who simultane-
ously serve as informed traders, noise traders, and market makers. Agents are risk averse,
receive endowments of a risky asset, observe private signals about the asset’s value, and
trade the asset with one another in an anonymous public market in which market price
is visible to all agents. Agents are fully rational except for an overconfidence bias, which
causes them to overestimate the precision of their own signals. I consider two versions of
the model, a baseline model in which asset endowments are constant and a general model
in which asset endowments are stochastic. The baseline model is an adaptation of Grossman
2In equity markets, these facts have been partially shown or hinted at before. In particular, Sadka and
Scherbina (2007) show that analyst forecast dispersion (one proxy for asymmetric information) decreases
liquidity; Frazzini and Lamont (2007) show that turnover is elevated around earnings announcements (another
proxy for asymmetric information); and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) show that trading increases
following high returns. I extend these findings to corporate bonds and stock options and show for the first time
that analyst dispersion increases trading, earnings announcements decrease liquidity, and past returns increase
liquidity.
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(1976) with overconfidence. The general model is an adaptation of Diamond and Verrecchia
(1981) with overconfidence.
The baseline model describes an environment in which trading is entirely driven by
disagreement. Because supply is certain and there is no non-informational motive for
trade, prices fully reveal aggregate information (as in Grossman, 1976). Nonetheless,
overconfidence induces agents to disagree and trade, thereby generating liquidity (in
contrast to Grossman, 1976). The model’s main predictions are: (1) Overconfidence increases
trading and liquidity; (2) Private information increases trading and liquidity; and (3) Public
uncertainty decreases liquidity without affecting trading volume.
The prediction that private information increases trade and liquidity conflicts with
traditional intuition. To understand this contrast, I consider a general model that adds non-
informational liquidity trading, modeled through stochastic endowments, to the baseline
model. When some trading is uninformed, increasing private information can destroy
liquidity by increasing the share of informed trade relative to uninformed trade. Private
information increases a trade’s price impact by increasing the probability that the trade
is informed. In the baseline model, all trade is informed so this channel is inoperative.
More generally, the probability that a trade is informed is insensitive to the level of private
information whenever uninformed trade is very large or very small relative to informed
trade. In these settings, traditional intuition fails, and private information increases liquidity
as in the baseline model.
My model explains trade and liquidity in the face of asymmetric information and
conforms to the stylized facts described above. It also generates the additional testable
prediction that stocks with the highest turnover response to asymmetric information should
have the smallest illiquidity response to asymmetric information.3 I test this prediction and
3Asymmetric information consists of both private information and public uncertainty. In the baseline
model private information increases trading, whereas public uncertainty has no impact on it. Thus, asymmetric
information changes with a larger trading impact are more likely to be driven by changes to private information.
Private information enhances liquidity, whereas public uncertainty reduces it. Thus, asymmetric information
should have the least negative impact on liquidity (and may even enhance it) when it has the most impact on
trading.
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find that it is true in the data.
In the next section, I review related literature. Section 3 presents empirical analysis
supporting the stylized facts introduced above. Section 4 introduces, solves, and derives
comparative statics for the baseline model. Section 5 presents the general model, includ-
ing comparative statics and numerical examples of how overconfidence and asymmetric
information affect trading and liquidity. Derivations and proofs for the general model are
in an appendix. Section 6 discusses and tests the model’s empirical predictions. Section 7
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Disagreement
Disagreement models posit that a combination of private information (or private interpre-
tation of public information) and behavioral biases causes otherwise rational investors to
disagree about asset values. Disagreement models are motivated by two failings of standard
asset pricing models with homogenous beliefs. First, standard models (at least in their
simplest forms) are at odds with well-established asset pricing anomalies like momentum
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), post-earnings drift (Bernard and Thomas, 1989), and long-
term return reversion (Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
Second, standard models have no role for trading and thus cannot explain the high turnover
observed in many financial markets. Disagreement is an intuitively appealing rationale for
trade and, depending on what drives the disagreement, also has the potential to explain
pricing anomalies.
Hong and Stein (2007) provide a nice summary and taxonomy of disagreement models.
The first ingredient for these models is some manner of private information. One possi-
bility is that private information comes from gradual information flow as in the gradual
dissemination of information to newswatchers over time in Hong and Stein (1999). Another
possibility is that investors have limited attention and thus process only a subset of available
55
information, possibly for entirely rational reasons related to the cost of attention (e.g., Peng
and Xiong, 2006). A final possibility is that investors see the same information but interpret
it differently, possibly due to heterogeneous priors (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and
Pearson, 1995). Regardless of its source, the end result is equivalent to investors having
access private information.
The second ingredient for disagreement models is a behavioral bias in information
processing. Private information alone does not generate disagreement in standard models.
Instead, market prices aggregate and fully reveal information (Grossman, 1976), which
causes investors to agree about asset values and eliminates motives for trade (Milgrom and
Stokey, 1982). Introducing random asset supply or exogenous liquidity trading (e.g., Hellwig,
1980; Grossman and Stliglitz, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; Kyle, 1985) mitigates
information revelation and creates some disagreement, but trading is still largely pinned
down by assumptions about exogenous trading. For example, in Kyle’s (1985) model exoge-
nous noise trading represents half of total order flow variance. In my moderate variance
calibration of Diamond and Verreccia’s (1981) model liquidity trading is 95% of total trading
volume. To yield more significant disagreement trading, investors must value their own
information more highly than information extracted from market prices. Overconfidence
is a convenient modeling device for achieving this result and is supported by substantial
psychological evidence (see Odean, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; and
DeBondt and Thaler, 1995, for good discussions of overconfidence). Overconfidence can be
modeled in different ways The typical approach is to assume that investors overestimate the
precision of their own signals relative to the signals of other investors.
Dynamic models of overconfidence posit that investors learn to be overconfident based
on past experience. In particular, investors are subject to a self-attribution bias that causes
them to overestimate how much their own skill was responsible for past successes. As
a result, overconfidence is highest following positive returns. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) model this phenomenon. Because
investors hold the market in aggregate, self-attribution bias predicts that overconfidence
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should be high following high market returns. Stock-level overconfidence should be high
following high individual stock returns because owners of the stock just experienced high
returns. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) show that turnover is higher than normal
following high market returns and high individual stock returns, consistent with high
returns increasing overconfidence, which in turn increases trading intensity.
Casual intuition suggests that disagreement trading should enhance liquidity. However,
liquidity has not been a major focus of the disagreement literature and is not explicitly
discussed in most disagreement papers. Exceptions include Odean (1998), Kyle, Obizhaeva,
and Wang (2013), and Baker and Stein (2004). Odean (1998) adds overconfidence to the
Kyle (1985) model of liquidity. When the informed insider receives a noisy signal and
overestimates the precision of that signal, the insider’s overconfidence increases liquidity.
Specifically, the market maker’s price function becomes less sensitive to order flow as the
insider becomes more overconfident. Though they don’t explicitly focus on liquidity, the
duopoly model of Kyle and Wang (1997) produces a similar result with two overconfident
insiders. Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2013) show that overconfidence mitigates price impact
and generates disagreement trading.4 Baker and Stein (2004) also model overconfidence
as increasing liquidity. However, this relationship is an ad hoc assumption based on the
logic that the same behavioral biases that cause investors to overestimate the precision of
their own signals will also cause them to underestimate the informational content of market
prices. None of these papers address how overconfident disagreement changes the impact
of asymmetric information on trading and liquidity.
4Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang’s (2013) model is the closest to my own. The main main difference between
their single period model and my baseline model is that investors in the Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang model
have market power wherease all agents in my model are price takers. Despite the modeling similarities,
Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang address different questions than I do. Their focus is on how market power
and overconfidence combine to give large investors an incentive to smooth trading whereas I analyze how
overconfident disagreement changes the impact of asymmetric information on trading and liquidity.
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2.2.2 Liquidity
The market microstructure literature aims to understand what causes illiquidity in financial
markets. The backdrop is that in Walrasian equilibrium beliefs are independent from prices
and market prices perfectly reflect the demands of all agents. In real financial markets
investors learn from market prices, and prices can deviate from fundamental values creating
costs to trading. Trading costs (illiquidity) come from two main sources. First, not all
agents are active in markets at the same time. Thus, transactions must be facilitated by
market makers. These market makers must cover whatever costs they incur by being
constantly active in financial markets, and they must be compensated for the risk they take
by holding long or short positions in an asset while searching for a counterparty. Market
makers might also extract profits from strategic behavior. The second source of illiquidity is
asymmetric information. Uninformed buyers may worry that they are being exploited by
better-informed counterparties and thereby demand lower prices. Biais, Glosten, and Spatt
(2005) survey the microstructure literature. Vayanos and Wang (2009) propose a unified
model encompassing multiple sources of illiquidity.
My focus is on asymmetric information illiquidity because asymmetric information is
intimately tied to disagreement. Other sources of illiquidity may also be important, but
they are likely to be largely orthogonal to changes in disagreement. The classic models of
asymmetric information liquidity are Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In both
models, market makers see order flow and are unsure whether the order flow comes from
an informed insider or an uninformed liquidity trader. Market makers rationally infer some
probability that order flow reflects information and adjust prices accordingly. Kyle (1985)
describes this process in terms of the impact of order flow on price. Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) highlight that asymmetric information naturally leads to bid-ask spreads. More recent
microstructure research extends these frameworks to consider strategic behavior by market
makers and market design issues. The microstructure liquidity literature generally does
not model overconfidence. Odean (1998) and Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2013), discussed
above, are notable exceptions.
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The microstructure literature typically considers asymmetric information illiquidity in
settings where market makers set prices and bid-ask spreads. However, market makers are
not necessary for the concept of asymmetric information illiquidity. For example, one can
think about illiquidity in the rational expectations framework of Grossman (1976). All agents
receive private signals, observe market prices, and form trading demands. Grossman’s
conclusion is that prices fully reveal the average signal. As a result, there is no disagreement
and no trading. In effect, markets are infinitely illiquid. Hellwig (1980); Diamond and
Verrecchia (1981); and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) introduce uncertain asset supply so
that prices are no longer fully revealing. As a result, agents disagree about asset prices and
trade with one another. Prices finitely react to order flow. None of these models explicitly
considers liquidity, but asymmetric information illiquidity is just as present in them as in
the market maker microstructure models.
2.3 Stylized Facts
I propose three stylized facts about stock, bond, and option markets:
1. Trade and liquidity are positively correlated;
2. Asymmetric information increases trade and decreases liquidity; and
3. High past returns increase trade and liquidity.
These facts are not entirely new, especially with respect to the stock market. For example,
Sadka and Scherbina (2007) show that analyst forecast dispersion (one proxy for asymmetric
information) decreases liquidity. Frazzini and Lamont (2007) show that turnover is elevated
around earnings announcements (another proxy for asymmetric information). Statman,
Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) show that trading increases following high returns. Hong and
Stein (2007) also observe that returns and trading volume are correlated.
I extend these findings and show for the first time that analyst dispersion increases
trading, earnings announcements decrease liquidity, and past returns increase liquidity. I
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also show that the stylized facts are robust across stock, corporate bond, and option asset
classes.
My sources for stock data are CRSP for return and volume data, Compustat for industry
and earnings announcement data, I/B/E/S for analyst earnings forecast data, and TAQ for
intraday trade and quote data. I limit my stock sample to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
stocks with prices above $5 at the end of the previous month. The sample starts in 1926,
but most of my analysis is limited by analyst earnings forecast data, which starts in 1976,
and bid-ask spread data, which starts in 1993 for my favored measure based on intraday
TAQ data. I measure stock turnover as monthly volume divided by shares outstanding.
My primarily liquidity measure is the effective bid-ask spread (ebidask) of Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2000), which I calculate at the transaction level as twice the difference
between a trade’s price and the midpoint of the prevailing quote before the trade. Because
this measure is only available starting in 1993, I also use Amihud’s (2002) illiqit =
|Returnit|
$Volumeit
measure for some analyses.
Bond data comes from TRACE, supplemented by Mergent FISD bond characteristics.
The TRACE data starts in 2002. I limit my sample to investment grade U.S. corporate bonds
and medium term notes without asset backing or security enhancement features that are
at least one year old and have at least one year of maturity left. I also require that a bond
be actively traded (defined as having at least two buy trades and two sell trades) on at
least 15 days during the previous month. I consider only transactions between dealers
and their customers. Turnover is the total par value of all trades in a bond scaled by the
bond’s outstanding par value. Effective bid-ask spread (ebidask) is the difference between
the weighted average prices of a day’s buy and sell trades.5
Option data comes from Ivy DB OptionMetrics, available starting in 1996. My analysis
is at the stock (as opposed to option) level. I define turnover as total option dollar volume
5The TRACE data I use is the enhanced dataset available on WRDS, which identifies whether a trade is
with a customer or another dealer and which side of the transaction the reporting dealer was on. The enhanced
dataset also includes all volume data instead of truncating large trades. This data became available only recently
and appears to be an enhancement over data used in previous studies.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly Time Series
Stock turnover is relative to stock market capitalization. Bond turnover is relative to outstanding bond value.
Option turnover is option contract value relative to stock market capitalization. Bid-ask spreads are all
proportional to the value of the security being traded. Stock and bond bid-ask spreads are intraday effective
spreads. Option bid-ask spreads are end of day quoted spreads.
divided by stock market capitalization. Quoted end-of-day proportional bid-ask spreads are
weighted by dollar volume when averaged to the stock level.
Figure 2.1 plots equally-weighted average monthly turnover and bid-ask spreads for
stocks, bonds, and options. Stock turnover (panel A) averages 14% during the plotted 1993
to 2011 time period and reaches as high as 40% late in the sample. Stock effective bid-ask
spreads (panel B) average 0.4% and decrease over the sample period. Corporate bonds also
have significant trading activity and moderate bid-ask spreads. Bond turnover (panel C)
is typically near the 5-10% range, and average bond effective bid-ask spreads (panel D)
range from 0.5% to 2.5%. In contrast to stocks and bonds, dollar transaction volumes are
relatively small for stock options. Average dollar option volume (panel E) is typically under
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Table 2.1: Turnover Panel Regressions
Results are for stock- and bond-level regressions of log bid-ask spread measures on log turnover. Stock data
is for NYSE stocks with lagged prices greater than $5. Bond data is for actively traded U.S. corporate bonds
without credit enhancements. Option data is for all traded stock options. Bid-ask spreads are proportional
to security value. Stock and bond bid-ask spreads are intraday effective spreads. Option bid-ask spreads are
end of day quoted spreads. Robust clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10%
significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
Stocks Bonds Options
(1) (2) (3)
Log Bid-Ask Log Bid-Ask Log Bid-Ask
Log Turnover -0.134*** -0.090*** -0.174***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
Stock/Bond FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Date Range 1993-2011 2002-2011 1996-2011
1% of stock market capitalization. Average option bid-ask spreads hover around 20% of
contract value. However, these figures are for option contract value as opposed to stock
price exposure. In practice, options often deliver large stock price exposure with minimal
up-front contract value.
2.3.1 Fact 1: Trade and Liquidity are Positively Correlated
Traditional reasoning predicts a strong positive relationship between trading and liquidity.
The two quantities are mutually reinforcing. More noise trading improves liquidity, and
enhanced liquidity attracts additional trading activity. Similar logic follows from my general
disagreement model.
Positive correlation between trade and liquidity is clear in the stock, bond, and option
data. As turnover increases, bid-ask spreads tend to decrease. Table 2.1 reports results for
panel regressions of log bid-ask spreads on log turnover. The regressions include stock,
bond, and time fixed effects. Because turnover and bid-ask spreads are both expressed as
logs, the results can be interpreted as elasticities. The elasticity of stock bid-ask spreads
with respect to turnover is -13%. The equivalent coefficients for bonds and options are -9%
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and -17%, respectively. All three estimates are highly significant.
2.3.2 Fact 2: Asymmetric Information Increases Trade and Decreases Liquidity
While trading and liquidity are positively correlated, they do not always move in the same
direction. In particular, asymmetric information tends to increase trading while reducing
liquidity.
I identify changes in asymmetric information in two ways. First, periods around earnings
announcements are likely to have elevated asymmetric information. Prior to announcements,
private information can be in the form of leaks and insider trading. After announcements,
investors process different pieces of information at different paces using different models,
keeping private information high until the announcement is fully digested and reflected in
prices. Public uncertainty is also high around earnings announcements because asset values
are highly sensitive to the announcements. Second, I follow Sadka and Scherbina (2007)
and use dispersion of analyst forecasts as a proxy for asymmetric information. Analyst
dispersion may represent or cause public uncertainty. Dispersion could also stem from more
private information. My specific measure of dispersion is the standard deviation across
analysts of current year earnings forecasts scaled by the mean forecast. Firms are included
if they are covered by at least two analysts, have a non-zero mean earnings forecast, and
have a December fiscal year end. The December fiscal year requirement ensures that all
stocks have the same amount of time remaining in the current fiscal year.
For my earnings announcement analysis, I scale turnover and bid-ask spreads by
average values over the three calendar months prior to an earnings announcement and
analyze scaled turnover and bid-ask spreads over a 21-day trading window around earnings
announcements. Figure 2.2 plots equally weighted average scaled turnover and bid-ask
spreads in event time around earnings announcements. Day 0 is the announcement day or
first trading day after the announcement. Other days represent trading days relative to the
announcement. 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dashed lines.
Panels A and B plot stock data. Consistent with Frazzini and Lamont (2007), turnover
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Figure 2.2: Turnover and Liquidity Around Earnings Announcements
Turnover and bid-ask spreads are scaled by average daily values over the three calendar months before the
earnings announcement. Solid lines are equally weighted averages. Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.
Day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement.
starts to increase the day before an announcement, spikes to 80% above normal levels on
the announcement day, stays at that level for another day, and then decays. I extend the
analysis of Frazzini and Lamont by also studying bid-ask spreads, which widen around
earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads peak at 13% above normal levels on the day of
the announcement, and are also elevated the day before and after the announcement.
Though not always as pronounced, turnover and bid-ask spreads also tend to increase
around earnings announcements for bonds and options. Panel C shows that bond turnover
peaks at 40% above normal levels the day after an earnings announcement. Bond bid-ask
spreads (panel D) are slightly elevated around earnings announcements, particularly the
day before an announcement. Option volumes (panel E) surge to over 250% normal levels
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Table 2.2: Analyst Dispersion Panel Regressions
Results are for stock- and bond-level regressions of log turnover and log bid-ask spread measures on lagged
(by one month) log dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. Data is limited to NYSE stocks with lagged
prices greater than $5, at least 2 analyst forecasts, and fiscal years that end in December. Bid-ask spreads
are proportional to security value. Stock and bond bid-ask spreads are intraday effective spreads. Option
bid-ask spreads are end of day quoted spreads. Robust clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *
represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
Stocks Bonds Options
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Turnover Bid-Ask Turnover Bid-Ask Turnover Bid-Ask
Lagged Log 0.019*** 0.109*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.145*** 0.036***
Analyst Dispersion (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014) (0.005)
Stock/Bond FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date Range 1976-2011 1993-2011 2002-2011 2002-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011
around earnings announcements, and option bid-ask spreads (panel F) widen to 6% above
normal levels, with a peak the day before the earnings announcement.
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion is a second proxy for asymmetric information.
Sadka and Scherbina (2007) show that in sorts on analyst dispersion, high dispersion stocks
tend to be less liquid. I employ panel regressions to control for firm and time fixed effects
and add a test of the effect of analyst dispersion on trading volumes. I also extend the
analysis to bonds and options. Table 2.2 presents my results. The analyzed variables are
logs so coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. For stocks, the turnover coefficient on
lagged analyst dispersion (column 1) is 1.9% and the bid-ask spread coefficient on lagged
analyst dispersion (column 2) is 10.9%. Bonds and options respond similarly to analyst
dispersion. For bonds, the turnover coefficient (column 3) is 7.7%, and the bid-ask spread
coefficient (column 4) is 7.9%. For options, the turnover coefficient (column 5) is 14.5%, and
the bid-ask spread coefficient (column 6) is 3.6%. All coefficients are highly significant.
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2.3.3 Fact 3: High Past Returns Increase Trade and Liquidity
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) use a market VAR and individual stock-level VARs to
show that market turnover increases following high market returns and individual stock
turnover increases following both high market returns and high individual stock returns. I
add illiquidity to Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink’s market VAR methodology and apply it to
stocks, bonds, and options. The market VAR model is:
Yt = α+
2
∑
k=1
AkYt−k + et (2.1)
where Yt is a 3× 1 vector of detrended log turnover, detrended log illiquidity, and excess
market returns.6 Using two lags is optimal according to the Bayesian information criteria. In
all cases, the market return variable is excess stock market returns. Thus, I am assessing the
impact of stock market returns on future trading and liquidity in stocks, bonds, and options.
For my baseline stock analysis, I use Amihud’s illiq instead of bid-ask spread because it is
available for the full sample instead of just after 1993. For bonds and options I use the same
bid-ask spread measures as before.
Figure 2.3 plots impulse response functions for stock, bond, and option market VARs.
The plots show how one standard deviation unexpected stock market return shocks affect
future realizations of turnover and illiquidity measures.7 Consistent with Statman, Thorley,
and Vorkink (2006), panel A shows that stock turnover responds positively to market returns.
A one standard deviation return shock increases turnover in the next month by about 5%.
Turnover increases slightly in the following month and then decays toward normal levels.
Panel B shows that positive market returns also enhance liquidity. A one standard deviation
return shock decreases illiq by 8% in the next month. Positive stock return shocks also
6Turnover and illiquidity measures are detrended using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. Following
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) and common practice, I use a penalty value of 14,400 for the filter. Also
following Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), I employ a 2-sided filter. The 2-sided filter, which makes use of
future data, would problematic if I was using it for forecasting purposes, but I am not. To verify that my results
are unaffected by the use of future data, I replicated my market VAR with a 1-sided HP filter proposed by Stock
and Watson (1999). Results (which are untabulated but are available on request) were unchanged.
7Other impulse-response combinations are omitted for brevity.
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Figure 2.3: Market VAR Responses to Market Return Impulse
Each VAR includes detrended log market turnover (turn), CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the
risk free rate (rmr f ), and a detrended log measure of market illiquidity (illiq for the stock VAR in the first row,
effective bid-ask spread for the bond VAR in the second row, and quoted bid-ask spread for the option VAR in
the third row). The solid lines are responses to one standard deviation shocks to rmr f after the number of lags
indicated on the horizontal axis. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.
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decrease bond and option bid-ask spreads (panels D and F). Bond and option volumes
(panels C and E) do not significantly respond to past stock returns. The online appendix
reports coefficients for the stock VAR.
In addition to being impacted by market returns, individual stock turnover and liquidity
respond positively to past stock and industry level returns. Using separately estimated stock-
level VARs, Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) show that stock turnover is positively
influenced by both past market returns and past individual stock returns. I employ a
different econometric strategy and estimate a single panel VAR that includes stock-level
turnover, illiquidity, and returns as well as industry returns. The panel VAR specification
allows me to employ stock and time fixed effects, eliminating the need for detrending the
data. Specifically, I estimate:
Yi,t = αt + fi +
2
∑
k=1
AkYi,t−k + et (2.2)
where Yi,t is a 4× 1 vector of log stock turnover, log stock illiq, stock returns, and industry
returns for stock i in month t. αt and fi are 4× 1 vectors of time and stock fixed effects
for each variable. I employ two lags for consistency with the market model. The time
fixed effects control for the effect of market returns as well as any other market-level time
variation. Prior to estimation, I eliminate the time fixed affects by time de-meaning all
variables. The panel fixed effects are a little trickier because stock demeaned lag variables
are not orthogonal to the regression residual. Similarly, directly estimating stock fixed
effects would produce biased and non-consistent estimates for all coefficients. Following
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), I take the first differences of all variables, resulting
in:
Yi,t −Yi,t−1 = (αt − αt−1) +
2
∑
k=1
Ak (Yi,t−k −Yi,t−1−k) + et (2.3)
which can be estimated using using Yi,t−2 and Yi,t−3 as instruments. I include all observa-
tions with at least three lagged observations. When there are breaks in the data. I treat
observations before and after the break as if they were separate stocks. The only remaining
complication is estimating standard errors. The lagged variables directly control for auto-
68
1 3 5
−0.05
0
0.05
A. Stock Return on Turnover
1 3 5
−0.05
0
0.05
B. Stock Return on Illiq
1 3 5
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
C. Industry Return on Turnover
1 3 5
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
D. Industry Return on Illiq
Figure 2.4: Stock Panel VAR Impulse Response Functions
The panel VAR includes stock log turnover, stock log illiq (an illiquidity measure), stock returns, industry
returns, and stock and time fixed effects. The first variable in each panel title is the impulse variable. The
second variable is the response variable. The solid lines are responses to one standard deviation shocks to the
impulse variables after the number of lags indicated on the horizontal axis. The dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals. For brevity only the most relevant impulse response functions are shown.
correlation in the data, but there is likely cross-sectional correlation within time periods.
To account for this I employ bootstrapped standard errors with a bootstrap that randomly
samples (with replacement) time periods. When a time period is drawn, all observations in
that time period are included. This preserves the data’s cross-sectional correlation structure.
Figure 2.4 plots the most relevant impulse response functions of the panel VAR. As
before, the impulse shocks are all one standard deviation. In panel A, turnover is unaffected
by individual stock returns. In the other three panels, past returns forecast increased
turnover and decreased illiquidity. A one standard deviation shock to an individual stock’s
return forecasts a future decline in illiq of 2.7% (panel B). A one standard deviation shock
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to an industry’s return forecasts a 0.7% increase in turnover (panel C) and a 0.4% decrease
in illiq (panel D). Coefficient estimates are reported in the online appendix.
2.3.4 Past Returns and Overconfidence
My preferred interpretation of the past returns evidence is that high past returns increase
overconfidence, which in turn increases trading and liquidity. The connection between
past returns and overconfidence is based on the learning models of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001). Self attribution bias causes investors
to be particularly overconfident following high returns. Because investors hold the market
on average, aggregate overconfidence should track market returns. Similarly, individual
stock returns could affect stock-level overconfidence. To the extent that investors specialize
in certain industries or have industry-specific confidence levels, past industry returns could
also affect stock-level overconfidence.
To test the overconfidence interpretation, I analyze investor-level returns and trading
activity. Self-attribution bias predicts that an investor’s overconfidence will increase fol-
lowing positive returns to his own portfolio. I test this hypothesis using account-level
trading records from a discount brokerage firm (this is the Barber and Odean, 2000, data).
Specifically, I look at how trading intensity responds to market returns, individual stock
returns, and an investor’s own portfolio returns. Using six months of trailing trade data, I
estimate an investor’s portfolio to be the net positions his trade’s over that period would
result in. I set all short positions to zero because shorting is uncommon for retail investors.
The outcome variable of interest is whether buying intensity, measured as the total dollar
value of all buy trades increases between month t and month t+2. The returns considered
are excess returns over the risk free rate in the interim month.
Table 2.3 reports the results. Column (1) regresses increases in overall buying intensity at
the investor-month level on market and portfolio returns. Unconditionally, buying intensity
increases 15% of the time. 1% shocks to portfolio and market returns increase this probability
by 27 and 23 basis points, respectively. Column (2) regresses increases in stock specific
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Table 2.3: Impact of Returns on Buying Intensity
Dependent variables are indicators for an investor increasing his dollar buying activity over a two-month period.
A value of 1 indicates that the dollar sum of all an investor’s buy trades in month t+2 is greater than the dollar
sum of all his buy trades in month t. Column (1) analyzes total buys at the investor-month level. Column (2)
analyzes stock-specific buys at the investor-month-stock level. To be included, the investor must have at least
two buy trades in month t (overall for column (1) and of the specific stock for column (2)). The explanatory
variables represent excess returns over the risk free rate in the interim month (t+1). The portfolio return is the
return to a portfolio consisting of the investor’s cumulative net trades over the six months leading up to month
t. Implied short positions are set to zero. Standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, **
represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance. The analyzed data is discount brokerage trades in
100,000 accounts between 1991 and 1996
(1) (2)
Overall Stock-Specific
Buy Increase Buy Increase
Portfolio Return 0.268*** 0.065***
(0.009) (0.009)
Market Return 0.231*** 0.069**
(0.033) (0.032)
Stock Return 0.046***
(0.007)
Constant 0.151*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001)
Date Range 1991-1996 1991-1996
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buying intensity at the investor-month-stock level on market, portfolio, and individual stock
returns. Individual stock buying intensity increases 4% of the time, and 1% shocks to all
three return variables increase this probability by 5 to 7 basis points. All coefficient estimates
are statistically significant. The results are consistent with past returns increasing investor
confidence, causing investors to trade more aggressively.
2.4 Baseline Model
2.4.1 Setup
I consider a model in which agents have fixed endowments of a risky asset and receive
private signals about the asset’s value. The agents trade the asset in a public market in
which all agents see the market-clearing price. Informed by their private signals and the
observed market price, agents form beliefs about the asset’s payoff and decide how much of
it to buy or sell. The only departure from full rationality is that agents are overconfident
about the precision of their own signals. All agents are identical other than their realizations
of the private signal. Thus, the same agents simultaneously act as informed traders,
behavioral traders, and market makers. The model is a variant of Grossman’s (1976) rational
expectations model in which the one significant change is that agents are overconfident
about the precision of their signals. As in Grossman’s model, the lack of supply variance
or any other noise results in prices that are fully revealing. Nonetheless, overconfidence
induces disagreement and trade.
In the next section, I introduce stochastic endowments. This adds liquidity trading to
the model and makes prices only partially revealing. The baseline model described here is a
limiting case of the more general model. I develop the baseline model separately both for
expositional simplicity and because the baseline model corresponds to a setting in which
trade is entirely generated by informed disagreement. Since my goal is to understand how
liquidity interacts with disagreement trading, this is a natural place to start.
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2.4.2 Assumptions
There are two assets, a risk-free asset in elastic supply that yields 1 unit of consumption
and a risky asset in fixed supply that yields θ units of consumption and has a price of P
(determined in equilibrium), where the risk-free asset is the numeraire. All agents share
a common prior that θ is normally distributed with a mean of µ and precision of τp (i.e.,
θ ∼ N (µ, 1τp )). In addition to the common prior, there are private signals with precision τs
about the asset’s value. The signals are ym = θ + εm, where εm
iid∼ N
(
0, 1τs
)
. τp and τs are
both positive and finite. µ is finite, and it is most natural to think of it as positive.
The economy has N agents divided into M equal groups, each of size NM . Agent i in
group m (i) sees signal ym(i). All agents have a known and certain endowment of
µX
N units
of the risky asset. Thus, each group has an aggregate endowment of µXM and total asset
supply is µX.8 M is greater than one and finite. More than one group is required to create
disagreement and trade. A finite number of groups is required to prevent θ from being
perfectly revealed by the aggregate of the signals. I consider the limiting case in which
N → ∞ to ensure that individual agents have negligible impact on the price of the risky
asset.9 This limiting case is equivalent to a continuum of agents divided into M groups of
equal mass.
All agents have constant absolute risk aversion preferences and risk tolerance of ηN (i.e.,
Ui (ci) = − exp
{
−Nη ci
}
). Thus, aggregate risk tolerance is η. Agents are overconfident
about the precision of their own signals. They believe εm are independent and εm ∼i
N (0, 1ψi,mτs ), where ψi,m = ψ if agent i is a member of group m and ψi,m = 1 otherwise.
Unless otherwise noted, I assume ψ is greater than one and finite (i.e., agents are finitely
overconfident). Agents know all model parameters including the overconfidence of other
8The µX notation is a little unnatural here, but it allows for directly comparable notation in the general
model where total asset supply will be normally distributed with mean µX and variance V.
9This is in contrast to the traditional market microstructure literature (e.g., Kyle, 1985), which models
insiders as risk-neutral monopolists. Risk aversion and monopolistic behavior both have the effect of limiting
asset demands. Incorporating both would unnecessarily complicate the model. Adding market power (as in
Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2013)) increases the amount of overconfidence necessary to induce investors to
trade, decreases trading volumes, and increases liquidity but does not alter the three propositions derived from
the baseline model.
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agents. Agents observe price but do not observe the signals of other agents.
2.4.3 Equilibrium
I consider an equilibrium in which the asset’s price is a linear function of the average private
signal. I.e., I assume:
P = α+ βy (2.4)
where y is the average of the M private signals.
Because price is a 1:1 function of the average private signal, all agents effectively see the
average signal, from which they can extract the average signal of agents in groups other
than their own, y−m(i). Specifically, y−m(i) =
M
β(M−1) (P− α)− 1M−1 ym(i). Using Bayesian
updating, agent i’s posterior beliefs as a function of ym(i) and P are:
Ei[θ|ym(i), P] =
τpµ+ (ψ− 1) τsym(i) + Mτsβ (P− α)
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs (2.5a)
Vari[θ|ym(i), P] =
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)−1 (2.5b)
Given his CARA utility, agent i’s asset demand is:
Di =
Ei[θ|ym(i), P]− P
N
η Vari[θ|ym(i), P]
=
η
N
(
τpµ− Mτs
β
α+ (ψ− 1) τsym(i) −
(
τp +
(
M + ψ− 1− M
β
)
τs
)
P
)
(2.6)
The market clearing price must solve µX = ∑i Di, which results in a price that is a linear
function of y¯. Equating its coefficients with the coefficients of (2.4) yields:
P =
τpµ+ (M + ψ− 1) τsy¯
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs −
µX
η
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
) (2.7)
This result should not be surprising. τpµ+(M+ψ−1)τs y¯
τp+(M+ψ−1)τs is the average posterior expectation
of the agents and µX
η(τp+(M+ψ−1)τs) is the risk premium required to hold asset supply µX
with posterior variance
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)−1 and aggregate risk tolerance η. Compared
to the price that would prevail without overconfidence (ψ = 1), equation (2.7) shows that
overconfidence biases price toward the private signals and decreases the required risk
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premium. For ψ that is small relative to M, both of these effects are modest.
2.4.4 Trading and Liquidity
Each agent’s directed trading volume is his net asset demand, Di − µXN . Aggregate trading
is Vol = 12 ∑m |Tradem|, where Tradem is the net asset demand of group m:
Tradem = ∑
i:m(i)=m
[
Di − µXN
]
=
η
M
(ψ− 1) τs (ym − y) (2.8)
|Tradem| is a folded mean-zero random variable so its expectation is E |Tradem| =
√
2Var(Tradem)
pi .
Expected aggregate trading is:
E [Vol] =
1
2∑m
E |Tradem|
=
η (ψ− 1)
2
√
2
(
1− 1M
)
τs
pi
(2.9)
From equation (2.9) it is clear that trading increases with ψ and τs and is unaffected by τp.
In this model there is no liquidity trading, but the concept of liquidity is still operative.
Analogous to Kyle’s (1985) lambda, I define illiquidity as the price impact of trade resulting
from an exogenous shock. Intuitively, I am interested in how price would respond to
an exogenous buy or sell trade. However, there is no exogenous trading in this model
(nor is there in the real world). Rather, trade is an endogenous response to underlying
shocks received by agents. Illiquidity is the ratio of a shock’s price impact to its impact
on the shocked agents’ trades (i.e., their net asset demand). Because agents only interact
through their trades, this ratio exactly represents the trades’ price impact. A shock affects an
entire group of agents so the relevant net asset demand is the group’s, Tradem.10 Formally,
illiquidity is:
10In the baseline model, the only shock is to a group’s signal so this is the shock I use to define illiquidity.
More generally, one could also consider the impact of group endowment shocks or even shocks to individual
agents. In all cases the resulting illiquidity is the same because in an anonymous market any trade must have
the same price impact regardless of its source.
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λ ≡
dP
dym
dTradem
dym
(2.10)
Taking derivatives of Tradem (eq. 2.8) and P (eq. 2.7) with respect to ym yields:
λ =
M (M + ψ− 1)
η (M− 1) (ψ− 1) (τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs)
=
{
M
(M− 1) η (τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs)
}
+
{[
τs
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
] [
η
M
(
ψ− (M + ψ− 1)
M
)
τs
]−1}
= {S}+ {B} (2.11)
Equation (2.11) shows that a buy trade affects price in two ways. First, it decreases the net
asset supply that must be held by the non-shocked agents. The supply effect (S) is the decline
in the risk premium required by the non-shocked agents.11 Second, the trade increases non-
shocked agents’ posterior expectations. B captures this belief channel. The trade’s impact
on posterior expectations is the informational value of a ym shock,
[
τs
τp+(M+ψ−1)τs
]
, divided
by how aggressively the shocked agents trade on the shock,
[
η
M
(
ψ− (M+ψ−1)M
)
τs
]
.12
Note that trading aggression is proportional to private signal precision and private
signal value is the ratio of private signal precision to total precision. As a result, illiquidity
depends only on aggregate information (τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs), not its component parts.
Public and private information both enhance liquidity. By contrast, overconfidence more
than proportionally increases trading aggression without having much impact on signal
value or aggregate information. Thus, overconfidence enhances liquidity, primarily through
the belief channel.
The above equations and discussion support three propositions about how overconfi-
dence and asymmetric information affect trading and liquidity.
11The non-shocked agents have posterior variance
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)−1 and risk tolerance (M−1)ηM , result-
ing in a risk premium (price reduction) of Supply ∗ M
(M−1)η(τp+(M+ψ−1)τs) .
12Taking the derivative of equation (2.8) with respect to ym establishes that dTrademdym =
η
M
(
ψ− (M+ψ−1)M
)
τs.
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Proposition 1. As overconfidence increases (ψ increases), trading and liquidity both increase.
Proposition 2. As private information becomes more precise (τs increases), trading and liquidity
both increase.
Proposition 3. As public uncertainty increases (τp decreases), trading is unaffected and liquidity
decreases.
Of the three propositions, proposition 2 is probably most surprising because it directly
contradicts the traditional intuition that private information destroys liquidity and causes
markets to break down. The general model develops this contrast in more detail and shows
that private information enhances liquidity whenever the mix of informed and uninformed
trade is insensitive to increases in private information. This is clearly the case in the baseline
model because it only includes informed trade.
Propositions 2 and 3 concern different aspects of asymmetric information. Asymmetric
information can be high because private signals are precise or because there is little public
information. In either case, private information is more valuable and beliefs rely more
heavily on private signals. In combination, propositions 2 and 3 imply that asymmetric
information (weakly) increases trading and has an ambiguous impact on liquidity.
2.5 General Model
2.5.1 Setup and Assumptions
The general model is identical to the baseline model except that endowments are uncertain
and unknown to agents in other groups. Specifically, agent i in group m (i) is endowed with
M
N xm(i) units of the risky asset, where xm
iid∼ N ( µXM , VM) is the total endowment of group m.
The resulting total asset supply is X = ∑m xm ∼ N (µX, V). Agents not in group m know
the distribution of xm, but do not observe xm.
The model is a variant of Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1981) noisy rational expectations
model in which the one significant change is that agents are overconfident about the
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precision of their signals. The main distinguishing characteristic of Diamond and Verrecchia
(1981) compared to other noisy rational expectations models (e.g., Hellwig, 1980) is that
Diamond and Verrecchia consider endowment shocks to modeled agents whereas Hellwig
and others consider direct, unobserved shocks to aggregate asset supply. The Diamond
and Verrecchia approach is more natural because it makes liquidity trading an endogenous
response to underlying endowment shocks instead of modeling liquidity trades as direct
exogenous shocks to external asset supply. Diamond and Verrecchia’s approach is also
analytically convenient because it yields closed form solutions.
Results from the model are presented and discussed below. Derivations are in the
appendix.
2.5.2 Equilibrium
I assume that price is a linear function of the average private signal and aggregate asset
supply:
P = α+ βy− γ (X− µX) (2.12)
Given the price function described by equation (2.12), agent i extracts a noisy signal (Am(i))
for the average private signal of other groups (y¯−m(i)) from observing price, ym(i), and xm(i):
Am(i) =
M
β (M− 1) (P− α)−
1
M− 1ym(i) +
γM
β (M− 1)
(
xm(i) −
µX
M
)
= y¯−m(i) −
γM
β
(
x¯−m(i) −
µX
M
)
(2.13)
Note that Am(i) is independent of ym(i) and xm(i) and Am(i) ∼i N
(
θ, 1τA
)
, where τA is the
precision agent i attributes to Am(i):
τA =
(
1
(M− 1) τs +
(
γ
β
)2 M
M− 1V
)−1
(2.14)
Agent i forms posterior beliefs about the asset’s payoff (θ) using Bayesian updating
with signals ym(i) and Am(i). All agents use their posterior beliefs to determine their asset
demands. Setting total asset demand equal to total asset supply results in a market-clearing
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price that is a linear function of the average private signal and aggregate asset supply just
as I assumed in equation (2.12). The resulting fixed point problem has the unique solution:
α =
(
η2ψ2τpτs + MVτp
)
µ−
(
ηψ2τs +
MV
η
)
µX
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(2.15a)
β =
ψτs
(
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
)
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(2.15b)
γ =
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
η
(
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
) (2.15c)
For many applications, the ratio of γ to β is an important quantity. I define this ratio as:
Γ ≡ γ
β
=
1
ηψτs
(2.16)
To see that the baseline model is a limiting case of the general model, note that as V → 0,
X
p→ µX and P p→ τpµ+(M+ψ−1)τs y¯τp+(M+ψ−1)τs −
µX
η(τp+(M+ψ−1)τs) , the baseline model price.
2.5.3 Price Informativeness
In the baseline model, price fully revealed all relevant information about the asset’s value.
When endowments are stochastic, this is no longer the case. How much less informative is
price?
One measure of price informativeness, used by Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), is the
posterior precision an agent achieves relative to what his posterior precision would be if
he observed all signals. Under full information, each agent has a posterior precision of
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs.13 This is the same posterior precision achieved in the baseline model. In
the general model each agent knows the public prior and observes ym(i) and Am(i), resulting
in posterior precision:
τp + ψτs + τA = τp + ψτs +
(
1
(M− 1) τs + Γ
2 M
M− 1V
)−1
(2.17)
More recently, Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2012) propose measuring price informativeness
13The public prior has precision τp; an agent’s own signal has subjective precision ψτs; and the M− 1 signals
of agents in other groups each have precision τs. Because the signals and prior are all independent, their
precisions are additive.
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from the econometrician’s point of view. Specifically, they measure price informativeness
as the R2 of a regression of price on future asset value. In the general model, P =
α+ βy− γ (X− µX) has a variance of β2
(
1
τp
+ 1Mτs
)
+ γ2V; asset value (θ) has a variance
of 1τp ; and the covariance of price with asset value is
β
τp
, resulting in:
R2 =
τ−1p
τ−1p + (Mτs)−1 + Γ2V
(2.18)
By contrast, if agents saw all private signals (as they effectively do in the baseline model),
the R2 of this regression would be
τ−1p
τ−1p +(Mτs)−1
.
Under both measures of price informativeness, deviations from baseline full revelation
price informativeness are a function of Γ2V = V
η2ψ2τ2s
. As noise (V) increases, price infor-
mativeness decreases. As risk tolerance (η), overconfidence (ψ), and private information
(τs) grow, prices become more informative. Roughly speaking, price informativeness is
determined by the relative levels of informed and liquidity trading. Liquidity trading is
increasing in V. Informed trading is increasing in η, ψ, and τs.
2.5.4 Trading
As in the baseline model, group m’s directed trading volume is its net asset demand. The
difference is that group m’s trading now depends on two random shocks instead of just
one. Specifically, Tradem =
{ η
M
(
ψτs − τAM−1
)
(ym − y)
}− {(1− ηγτA
(M−1)β
)
(xm − x)
}
, where
the (ym − y) term represents informed trading and the (xm − x) term represents liquidity
trading. Informed trading is greater than in the baseline model.14 Agents now have two
motives for informed trade. First, overconfidence (ψ > 1) causes them to overweight their
own signals as in the baseline model. Second, price no longer fully reveals the average
signal, giving agents another reason to trade on their own signal. Liquidity trading is less
than the endowment shocks themselves because endowment shocks are partially offset by
demand changes. Agents realize that endowment shocks affect price and take this into
14To see that informed trade is greater than in the baseline model, note that τA < (M− 1) τs. Thus,
η
M
(
ψτs − τAM−1
)
<
η
M (ψ− 1) τs, the trading coefficient on (ym − y) in the baseline model.
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account when determining their asset demands.15 As a result, liquidity, asset riskiness, and
risk tolerance all influence liquidity trading.
Expected trading volume increases in the variance of group m’s trading:16
Var [Tradem] = {Var [In f ormed_Tradem]}+ {Var [Liquidity_Tradem]}
=
{
η2 (M− 1)ψ2τs
(
η2 (ψ− 1)ψτs + MV
)2
M3 (η2ψ2τs + MV)
2
}
+
{
(M− 1) (η2 (ψ− 1)ψτs + MV)2 V
M2 (η2ψ2τs + MV)
2
}
=
(M− 1) (η2 (ψ− 1)ψτs + MV)2
M3 (η2ψ2τs + MV)
(2.19)
From equation (2.19), it is clear that public uncertainty (τ−1p ) has no impact on trading
volume, just as in the baseline model. Taking derivatives with respect to ψ, one can also
see that overconfidence increases overall and informed trading (again consistent with the
baseline model). Overconfidence can initially decrease liquidity trading if V is large, but as
ψ increases it eventually decreases liquidity trading as well.17 These effects are small. In
practice, overconfidence has very little impact on liquidity trading.
The relationship between private information (τs) and trade is more complicated. Liq-
uidity trading always decreases with τs. When overconfidence is high (ψ > 98 for informed
trade and ψ > 2 for overall trade), informed and overall trading increase monotonically
with τs. When overconfidence is moderate (1 < ψ < 98 for informed trade and 1 < ψ < 2
for overall trade), informed and overall trading increase with τs if τs is large relative to
V.18 Without overconfidence, all types of trading decrease with τs. Essentially, private
15Agents are atomistic and do not have any price impact by themselves (thus no monopoly pricing motive
is present), but endowment shocks are shared by a positive mass of agents. The group’s endowment shock
drives a wedge between price and group’s posterior value, which agents in the group exploit by changing asset
demand in the opposite direction of the endowment shock.
16Specifically, expected volume is E [Vol] = 12 ∑m E |Tradem| and E |Tradem| =
√
2Var(Tradem)
pi just as in the
baseline model.
17Specifically, dVar[Liquidity_Tradem ]dψ < 0 if 1 < ψ <
1
η
√
MV
τs
and is positive for larger ψ.
18Assuming ψ > 1, dVar[In f ormed_Tradem ]dts < 0 i f f ψ <
9
8 and τs <
MV(3−2ψ−
√
9−8ψ)
2η2ψ2(ψ−1) and
dVar[Tradem ]
dts
< 0 i f f
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information always induces trade when there is high overconfidence. Under moderate
overconfidence, private information decreases trade in liquidity trading (high V) environ-
ments but increases trade in disagreement trading (low V) environments. The Akerlof (1970)
logic that private information destroys trade applies when agents are fully rational and in
liquidity trading environments when agents are only moderately overconfident. When trade
primarily stems from overconfident disagreement, the opposite effect prevails, and private
information increases trade.
2.5.5 Liquidity
I employ the same definition and measure of liquidity that I introduced in the baseline
model. Illiquidity is the price impact of a trade resulting from an exogenous shock, formally
measured as:
λ ≡
dP
dym
dTradem
dym
I could just as easily define λ using endowment (xm) shocks instead of information (ym)
shocks. The resulting λ is the same. In either case, the shocked agents interact with the
rest of the market only through their trading demand. Thus, a given shock to trading must
have the same price impact regardless of what motivated the trade. This can be verified
algebraically by taking derivatives with respect to xm instead of ym. Even more generally,
I could consider shocks to individual agents or exogenous trades external to the model.
Regardless, price will always have the same response to a unit trade shock.
Taking derivatives of price and net asset demand with respect to underlying shocks
ψ < 2 and τs <
(2−ψ)MV
η2ψ2(ψ−1) .
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yields:
λ =
{
M
(M− 1) η (τp + ψτs + τA)
}
+
{
η2ψ2τs
η2ψ2τs + MV
}{
τs
τp + ψτs + τA
}{
η
M
(
ψτs − βM
(
τp + ψτs + τA
))}−1
= {S}+ {B1} {B2} {B3}−1 (2.20)
Equation (2.20) expresses lambda as the sum of a supply channel and a belief channel. The
belief channel is further decomposed into the probability that a trade is informed (B1) times
the impact a known shock to ym would have on the posteriors of other agents (B2) divided
by how aggressively shocked agents trade on ym shocks (B3). S, B2, and B3 were present in
the baseline model. As before, S and B2B3 tend to decrease as total information (τp + ψτs + τA)
increases regardless of whether the information is public or private. S and B2B3 also decrease
with overconfidence.
B1 is new and deserves special consideration. First note that B1 = η
2ψ2τs
η2ψ2τs+MV
is the
probability that a trade is informed. Specifically, B1 is the ratio of informed trading variance
to total trading variance (see equation (2.19) to verify this). B1 is increasing in ψ and τs
and represents the channel through which they can destroy liquidity. Private information
and overconfidence increase informed trading as a share of overall trading. When V is
close to η
2ψ2τs
M , this ratio is highly sensitive to ψ and τs. By contrast, for very small or large
V, B1 is close to 1 or 0 and fairly stable. The traditional logic that private information
destroys liquidity applies only when increases in private information have a large impact
on the ratio of informed to total trade. In particular, the traditional logic does not apply
to disagreement trading environments because in those environments trade is primarily
informed regardless of the exact level of private information. Similarly, overconfidence
and private information enhance liquidity in extreme liquidity trading environments. The
appendix formally considers derivatives of λ with respect to ψ, τs, and τp and derives
parameter regions in which the derivatives are positive and negative. The appendix also
shows that private information can enhance liquidity even without overconfidence. The
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basic result hinges on how much trading is informed, not on the presence of overconfidence.
2.5.6 Numerical Examples
To better understand how overconfidence and asymmetric information affect trading and
liquidity, it is useful to consider numerical examples. I use the following baseline parameter
values:
µ = 1
µX = 1
M = 10
τp = 100
τs = 10
ψ = 2
η = 0.1
V ∈ {0.0000001, 0.1, 10}
µ and µX are normalized to one. I consider 10 groups of agents. Prior precision of 100 yields
a public prior standard deviation of 10%. Private precision of 10 makes the private signals
in aggregate as valuable as the public prior. Overconfidence of 2 means that agents attribute
twice as much value to their own signals as they do to the signals of agents in other groups.
Aggregate risk tolerance of 0.1 produces a risk premium of 10% under public information
without supply shocks.
I start by considering a low variance environment (V = 0.0000001), which roughly
corresponds to the baseline constant endowment model. At baseline values, expected
turnover is 12% and λ = 58% (meaning an exogenous trade of 1% of aggregate asset supply
would change the asset’s price by 58 basis points). The first row of Figure 2.5 plots these
quantities as functions of overconfidence, varying ψ from 1 to 10 while holding all other
parameters at baseline values. Panel A shows that trading is approximately zero when
ψ = 1 and trading increases close to proportionally with ψ. When ψ = 2, expected turnover
is 12%. When ψ = 10, expected turnover is 108%. The solid line in Panel B plots λ as
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Figure 2.5: Trading and Illiquidity under Low Variance
Expected turnover and illiquidity (λ) are calculated using values indicated on the horizontal axis for the
parameter in parentheses and low variance baseline values (µ = 1, µx = 1, M = 10, τp = 100, τs = 10, ψ = 2,
η = 0.1, V = 0.0000001) for all other parameters. Vertical lines represent the baseline. Expected total turnover
is a solid line; expected informed turnover is a dashed line; and expected liquidity turnover is a dotted line.
Overall illiquidity is a solid line; the illiquidity belief channel is a dashed line; and the illiquidity supply channel
is a dotted line.
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a function of ψ. As predicted by the baseline model, the market is highly illiquid when
ψ = 1 (approaching infinity as V → 0) and becomes more liquid as ψ increases. When
ψ = 2, λ = 58%. When ψ = 10, λ = 8%. Beyond ψ = 10, λ continues to decrease with
ψ, approaching 0 as ψ → ∞. The dotted and dashed lines in panel B decompose λ into
its supply and belief channels. The belief channel (dashed line) is the dominant source of
illiquidity. The second row of Figure 2.5 repeats the same exercise, varying private signal
precision from 0 to 100. As private signals become more precise, trading increases (panel
C) and illiquidity decreases (panel D). The final row of Figure 2.5 considers public prior
precision. As predicted, turnover is unaffected and illiquidity decrease as τp increases.
Figure 2.6 plots expected turnover and illiquidity as functions of overconfidence, private
information precision, and public prior precision in a moderate supply variance environment.
Baseline parameter values are the same as before except that endowment variance is now
0.1, which corresponds to an aggregate asset supply standard deviation of 0.32, compared
to its mean of 1. These examples capture a market in which trading comes from both
informational and liquidity motives. Panels A, C, and E plot expected total turnover (solid
line), expected informed turnover (dashed line), and expected liquidity turnover (dotted
line). Informed turnover is the turnover that would prevail if agents differed only in their
information shocks (i.e., if xm = x ∀ m). Analogously, liquidity turnover is the turnover that
would prevail if agents differed only in their supply shocks. Note that total turnover is less
than the sum of informed and liquidity turnover because these two types of trade partially
offset one another.
The ψ = 1 starting point of panel A plots turnover in the absence of overconfidence,
which recreates the Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) model. As alluded to earlier in the
paper, liquidity turnover represents 95% of total turnover. As overconfidence (panel A) and
private information precision (panel C) increase, informed turnover increases, driving up
total turnover. By contrast, private information decreases liquidity turnover as τs increases.
Liquidity turnover is fairly insensitive to overconfidence. At first it slightly decreases with
ψ, then it slightly increases with ψ. Both forms of turnover are unaffected by public prior
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Figure 2.6: Trading and Illiquidity under Moderate Variance
Expected turnover and illiquidity (λ) are calculated using values indicated on the horizontal axis for the
parameter in parentheses and moderate variance baseline values (µ = 1, µx = 1, M = 10, τp = 100, τs = 10,
ψ = 2, η = 0.1, V = 0.1) for all other parameters. Vertical lines represent the baseline. Expected total turnover
is a solid line; expected informed turnover is a dashed line; and expected liquidity turnover is a dotted line.
Overall illiquidity is a solid line; the illiquidity belief channel is a dashed line; and the illiquidity supply channel
is a dotted line.
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precision.
As expected, liquidity trading enhances liquidity. The baseline λ decreases from 58%
to 20% when V increases from 0.0000001 to 0.1. The reduction in λ is entirely driven
by the belief channel. Belief and supply illiquidity now have similar magnitudes. Most
interestingly, liquidity trading changes the relationships between ψ, τs, and illiquidity.
Illiquidity is now a hump-shaped function of ψ (panel B) and τs (panel D). Overconfidence
and private information precision initially decrease liquidity before eventually enhancing it.
Panels A and C show why. Initial increases in ψ and τs dramatically increase the ratio of
informed trading to total trading, which increases the probability that any given trade is
informed. At higher levels of ψ and τs this ratio and probability are fairly stable.
Figure 2.7 replicates the moderate variance example under a no-overconfidence (ψ = 1)
baseline. Panel A shows that without overconfidence private information decreases turnover.
This is an illustration of the general result derived above. Overconfidence is a necessary
ingredient for private information to increase trading. Nonetheless, panel B shows that
private information enhances liquidity for τs above 32. Overconfidence amplifies this
liquidity enhancement but is not necessary for the basic result.
Figure 2.8 plots expected turnover and illiquidity in a high supply variance (V = 10)
environment in which trading is primarily liquidity-driven. In this environment, liquidity is
enhanced (the baseline λ is 9.4%, and this is almost entirely from the supply channel). λ
decreases in ψ, τs, and τp (see panels B, D, and F) because only the supply channel is really
in play. Panels A, C, and E show that expected total turnover is high (its baseline value is
378%) and insensitive to ψ, τs, and τp even though ψ and τs increase informed trading.
2.6 Model Assessment
Unlike traditional models, disagreement trading generates significant trading and liquidity
in the baseline model even without exogenous noise. Moreover, disagreement trading is
consistent with the stylized facts developed in Section 2.
First, high turnover is generally associated with high liquidity. This is easiest to see
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Figure 2.7: Trading and Illiquidity without Overconfidence
Expected turnover and illiquidity (λ) are calculated using values indicated on the horizontal axis for the
parameter in parentheses and moderate variance baseline values without overconfidence (µ = 1, µx = 1,
M = 10, τp = 100, τs = 10, ψ = 1, η = 0.1, V = 0.1) for all other parameters. Vertical lines represent the baseline.
Expected total turnover is a solid line; expected informed turnover is a dashed line; and expected liquidity
turnover is a dotted line. Overall illiquidity is a solid line; the illiquidity belief channel is a dashed line; and the
illiquidity supply channel is a dotted line.
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Figure 2.8: Trading and Illiquidity under High Variance
Expected turnover and illiquidity (λ) are calculated using values indicated on the horizontal axis for the
parameter in parentheses and high variance baseline values (µ = 1, µx = 1, M = 10, τp = 100, τs = 10, ψ = 2,
η = 0.1, V = 10) for all other parameters. Vertical lines represent the baseline. Expected total turnover is a solid
line; expected informed turnover is a dashed line; and expected liquidity turnover is a dotted line. Overall
illiquidity is a solid line; the illiquidity belief channel is a dashed line; and the illiquidity supply channel is a
dotted line.
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by comparing the low, medium, and high variance numerical examples. As liquidity
trading increases across the scenarios, trading and liquidity both increase dramatically.
Overconfidence also typically moves trading and liquidity in the same direction.
Second, the disagreement model is consistent with asymmetric information increasing
trade while decreasing liquidity. Proposition (2) of the baseline model predicts that private
information increases trade and liquidity. Proposition (3) predicts that public uncertainty
decreases liquidity while having no impact on trading. Jointly, propositions (2) and (3)
predict that asymmetric information (which consists of private information and public
uncertainty) can only increase trading and has an ambiguous effect on liquidity. Unlike
traditional models, these predictions are consistent with observed empirical evidence.
Third, overconfidence increases trade and liquidity. If overconfidence increases following
high past returns, as self-attribution bias theory predicts, this delivers the prediction that
turnover and liquidity will increase following high past returns.
In addition to conforming with the stylized facts, the model generates new predictions
about how the impact of asymmetric information on trading and liquidity varies with the
type of asymmetric information shock, the level of liquidity trading, and the existing level
of private information. Testing these predications is challenging because they involve unob-
servable quantities, and I have not found a way to separately identify private information,
public uncertainty, and liquidity trading. Fortunately, the model itself provides guidance
for differentiating private information changes from public uncertainty changes. In the
baseline model, private information increases trading, whereas public uncertainty has no
impact on it. Thus, asymmetric information changes with a larger trading impact are more
likely to be driven by changes in private information. The baseline model predicts that
private information enhances liquidity whereas public uncertainty reduces it. Thus, we
should expect asymmetric information to have the least negative impact on liquidity (and
potentially even enhance it) when it has the most impact on trading.
I test this prediction in the data by sorting stocks based on their past turnover responses to
asymmetric information changes. Specifically, I estimate stock-level rolling 5-year regressions
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Table 2.4: Analyst Dispersion Panel Regressions by Lagged Turnover Response
Results are for stock–level regressions of log turnover and log illiquidity measures on lagged (by one month)
log dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. Medium and high turnover responsiveness indicator variables
are based on turnover responsiveness to dispersion changes over the past five years relative to 30th and 70th
percentile breakpoints. Data is limited to NYSE stocks with lagged prices greater than $5, at least 2 analyst
forecasts, and fiscal years that end in December. Robust clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. *
represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Log Log Log Log
Turnover illiq bidask qbidask ebidask
Lagged Log -0.006 0.210*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.111***
Analyst Dispersion (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lagged Log Dispersion 0.024*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
* Medium Turn Response (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lagged Log Dispersion 0.058*** -0.041*** -0.007 -0.011* -0.008
* High Turn Response (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Medium Turn Response 0.031 0.033 0.0002 0.009 0.013
(0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
High Turn Response 0.190*** -0.126*** 0.023 0.007 0.021
(0.026) (0.048) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date Range 1981-2011 1981-2011 1993-2011 1993-2011 1993-2011
of turnover on lagged analyst forecast dispersion, controlling for aggregate dispersion.
Stocks are annually sorted into low, medium, and high responsiveness groups based on
30th and 70th percentile breakpoints. I then replicate my analyst forecast dispersion
panel regressions with interactions between analyst forecast dispersion and past turnover
responsiveness groups.
Table 2.4 reports the results. Column (1) shows that turnover responsiveness to analyst
forecast dispersion is persistent. Low past turnover responsiveness stocks have no turnover
response to analyst forecast dispersion (the coefficient of log turnover on log lagged analyst
dispersion is an insignificant -0.6% for the low responsiveness group). As past turnover
responsiveness increases, this coefficient increases by 2.4 ppt for the medium responsiveness
group and 5.8 ppt for the high responsiveness group. Both results are highly significant.
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The model predicts that as turnover responsiveness increases, illiquidity responsiveness
should decrease. This is what I find in the data. Column (2) presents results for illiq. High
turnover response stocks have a highly significant 4.2 ppt lower illiquidity response to
analyst dispersion compared to low turnover response stocks. Medium turnover response
stocks have about the same dispersion coefficient as low turnover response stocks. Column
(3) to (5) present results for different bid-ask spread measures. The pattern is the same.
As turnover responsiveness increases, bid-ask responsiveness decreases. In part due to
the shorter sample, most of the bid-ask spread results are not significant. The exception
is quoted intraday bid-ask spreads (column 4) for high response stocks, which have a
significant (at the 10% level) 1.1 ppt lower dispersion coefficient compared to low response
shocks.
2.7 Conclusion
Liquidity plays an increasingly important role in asset pricing and macro finance. Yet, we
lack a clear understanding of some of the most basic drivers of liquidity in informationally
sensitive markets. Existing models and intuition suggest that asymmetric information
destroys trading and liquidity. Though less well understood, overconfidence is generally
associated with enhanced liquidity. The theory and empirics supporting these contentions
are not satisfying. In particular, existing models rely heavily on exogenous noise trading,
usually ignore overconfidence, and are unable to explain the empirical reality of large stock,
corporate bond, and option trading volumes that are positively correlated with asymmetric
information.
The disagreement literature posits that overconfidence-driven disagreement provides a
rationale for trade that does not require exogenous noise traders or uncertain asset supply. I
show that overconfidence is also sufficient for generating and thinking about liquidity. In my
baseline model, agents differentially weight their own signals even though prices perfectly
reveal the average signal. This causes them to disagree about the asset’s value and trade.
The market is liquid even without liquidity trading. All of this is within an intentionally
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simple market setup. All agents are homogenous until receiving signals. No outside parties
are needed for noise trading or market making. The same agents simultaneously serve as
informed traders, noise traders, and market makers.
The baseline model rationalizes heavy trading and liquidity despite asymmetric infor-
mation with no exogenous liquidity trading. The model also produces three predictions:
(1) as overconfidence increases (ψ increases), trading and liquidity both increase; (2) as
private information becomes more precise (τs increases), trading and liquidity both increase;
and (3) as public uncertainty increases (τp decreases) trading is unaffected and liquidity
decreases. Consistent with stylized facts about stocks, corporate bonds, and stock options,
these predictions jointly imply that asymmetric information increases trading and to the
extent that past returns increase overconfidence they also increase trading and enhance
liquidity. The predictions also imply that asymmetric information shocks with the largest
trading impact should have the smallest (and potentially even negative) illiquidity impact. I
test this prediction in the data and find that it is true.
The baseline model’s predictions are at odds with some of the recent literature on
financial crises. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2011) document
the collapse of trade in asset backed commercial paper and repurchase agreements during
the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Both of these markets previously facilitated liquidity trading
in instruments that were perceived to be safe and information-insensitive. The authors
reasonably argue that the market collapses were at least in part driven by increases in
asymmetric information. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2009) propose a model of liquidity
in which debt contracts optimally facilitate trade in part by minimizing asymmetric infor-
mation. Consistent with traditional intuition, if the debt contracts become informationally
sensitive trade and liquidity dry up. This narrative of the financial crisis contradicts my
baseline model and is also difficult to reconcile with the liquid trade observed in equity
markets despite significant asymmetric information. My general model provides a way to
bridge this gap. In the face of moderate liquidity trading, adding private information to a
market at first destroys liquidity by increasing the likelihood any given trade is informed.
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Once most trades are already informed, further increases in private information enhance
liquidity.
One aspect of disagreement trading I don’t address is welfare. Overconfidence-driven
disagreement clearly has some negative implications. Unequal risk sharing causes optimistic
agents to hold higher variance portfolios than they would without overconfidence, which
diminishes welfare under the criterion of Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2012). On the
other hand, overconfidence facilitates liquidity, which is likely beneficial. Overconfidence
also makes prices more informative by causing agents to trade on their information more
aggressively.19 Additional work connecting the microfoundations of liquidity and trading
to their welfare implications is necessary to fully understand these trade-offs.
19Though not in my model, overconfidence likely also incentivizes gathering more information. Rubinstein
(2001) makes this point and argues that irrational investors may enhance market rationality by increasing price
informativeness.
95
Chapter 3
Is Real Interest Rate Risk Priced?
Theory and Empirical Evidence
Authored with Alexander Chernyakov
3.1 Introduction
Are expected returns related to covariance with shocks to the real riskfree interest rate?
Put differently, is the real riskfree rate a priced state variable? Since Fama (1970), financial
economists have understood that state variables can be priced if they are correlated with
changes to (1) investor preferences or (2) the consumption-investment opportunity set.1
Because the riskfree rate is an equilibrium outcome that is sensitive to preferences and
consumption-investment opportunities, it is a prime candidate to be a priced state variable.
Previous research primarily focuses on shocks to consumption-investment opportunities.
For example, Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) considers
changing investment opportunities while holding preferences constant. Campbell (1993)
follows the same approach to derive ICAPM pricing as a function of changes to expected
returns. More recently, Bansal and Yaron (2004) initiated a literature on long-run consump-
1Fama (1970) considered consumption and investment opportunities separately. In practice, these two
opportunity sets are typically collapsed by considering a single homogenous consumption good.
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tion growth shocks in which expectations about future consumption growth are priced.
In these frameworks, positive interest rate shocks are generally good news, which makes
long-duration assets valuable hedges, reducing their risk premia.
In contrast, Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2012, hereafter AER) consider
preference shocks to investor patience. In their framework, positive interest rate shocks stem
from impatience and are generally bad news, making long-duration assets more risky and
increasing their risk premia.
We propose a model with both consumption-investment and preference shocks. Expected
consumption growth and time preferences both impact interest rates, and covariance
with these shocks is priced relative to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the
Consumption CAPM (CCAPM). However, the two types of interest rate risk carry different
prices. Relative to both the CAPM and CCAPM, the price of interest rate risk associated
with time preference shocks differs from the price of consumption growth interest rate risk
by a factor of −1ψ−1 , where ψ is elasticity of intertemporal substitution. For ψ > 1, this means
the two different interest rate risk premia have opposite signs. It also implies that time
preference risk premia are very large when ψ is close to 1. We interpret this as evidence
that calibrations with ψ close to 1 and far from the inverse of relative risk aversion represent
implausible preferences.
Empirically, we estimate real interest rate shocks based on a vector autoregression (VAR)
model of nominal interest rates, CPI inflation rates, and other state variables. When sorted
based on interest rate exposure, stocks with high exposure have slightly lower expected
returns, both on an absolute basis and relative to CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three
factor model predictions. This evidence is consistent with risk premia required for time
preference shocks and at odds with risk premia demanded for consumption-investment
shocks. That said, the effects are modest, and the return differences are not statistically
significant.
Moreover, the overall stock market appears to have very little exposure to interest rate
risk. The market’s interest rate news beta is an insignificant 0.11, which would carry a risk
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premium of -8 bps based on our cross-sectional pricing results. This evidence contradicts the
conclusion of AER that interest rate risk (valuation risk) explains the equity premium puzzle.
The main difference between our empirical work and theirs is that we estimate covariance
between excess returns and real interest rate shocks, whereas AER omit this moment from
their GMM analysis. AER’s baseline estimates imply that excess equity returns have a
correlation of approximately -0.92 with interest rate shocks. We estimate this correlation as
0.05 in the data.
3.2 Theory
We consider a model with shocks to consumption growth and time preferences. Thus,
the model violates both of Fama’s (1970) assumption. Interest rate shocks are priced
relative to the CAPM and the CCAPM. The model essentially nests the long-run risk
consumption growth shocks of Bansal and Yaron (2004) with the valuation shocks of AER.
The main result is that consumption growth interest rate risk has a different price than time
preference interest rate risk, and the two risk premia have opposite signs when elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is greater than one.
Our main results are presented and discussed below. Detailed derivations are in the
appendix.
3.2.1 Setup and General Pricing Equations
Following AER, we consider a representative agent with recursive utility function:
Ut = max
Ct
[
λtC
1−1/ψ
t + δ (U
∗
t+1)
1−1/ψ]1/(1−1/ψ) (3.1)
where Ct is consumption at time t, δ is a positive scaler capturing time discounting, ψ
is elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and U∗t+1 =
{
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]}1/(1−γ)
is the certainty
equivalent of future utility with relative risk aversion of γ. The function is defined for ψ 6= 1
and γ 6= 1. This utility function represents standard Epstein-Zin preferences of Epstein
and Zin (1991) and Weil (1989) except that time preferences are allowed to vary over time
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instead of being constant. Time preferences are affected by λt+1λt , which is known at time
t. Using standard techniques for working with Epstein-Zin preferences, AER show that
equation (3.1) implies a log stochastic discount factor of:
mt+1 = θ log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
− θ
ψ
∆ct+1 + (θ − 1) rw,t+1 (3.2)
where
θ =
1− γ
1− 1/ψ (3.3)
Lower case letters signify logs. ∆ct+1 is log consumption growth from period t to period
t + 1. rw,t+1 is the log return on the overall wealth portfolio. This stochastic discount factor
is standard for Epstein-Zin preferences except that time discounting (δ) is augmented by
λt+1
λt
.
We assume that innovations to consumption and expected future consumption are jointly
lognormal and homoskedastic. Similarly, innovations to time preferences and expected time
preferences are jointly lognormal and homoskedastic. Formally,
Et [ct+a] = Et−1 [ct+a] + εca,t (3.4)
Et [λt+1+b] = Et−1 [λt+1+b] + ελb,t (3.5)
with
[{
εca,t
}
a>0 ,
{
ελb,t
}
b>0
]
distributed jointly normally with constant variance (i.e., covt
(
εca,t, ε
λ
b,t+1
)
=
V for all t).2 This implies that excess returns on the wealth portfolio are lognormal and
homoskedastic. For simplicity, we assume that all other excess returns are lognormal as well.
Lognormality and homoskedacticity simplify the model and ensure that risk premia are
constant over time, focusing attention on interest rate shocks. AER specify a more restrictive
stochastic process for λt+1 and assume that expected consumption growth is constant over
time. Similarly, Bansal and Yaron (2004) specify a more restrictive consumption growth
process in their fluctuating growth rates model.3
2Note that λt+1 is known one period in advance so time t shocks to λ expectations start with λt+1.
3Bansal and Yaron (2004) also consider changes to the volatility of consumption growth. We omit these
shocks because they complicate the model without having a first order effect on the riskfree rate, which is our
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The stochastic discount factor of equation (3.2) can be used to price all assets. In
particular, it implies a riskfree rate of:
r f ,t+1 = − log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
+
1
ψ
Et [∆ct+1]− 1− θ2 σ
2
w −
θ
2ψ2
σ2c (3.6)
and risk premia of:
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i =
θ
ψ
σic + (1− θ) σiw (3.7)
σ2w is the variance of excess returns to the wealth portfolio. σ2c = vart
(
εc0,t+1
)
is consumption
variance relative to expectations last period. σic is covariance of asset i’s return with current
consumption shocks. σiw is covariance of asset i’s return with wealth portfolio returns. 12σ
2
i
is a Jensen’s inequality correction for expected log returns using variance of asset i’s return.
From equations (3.6) and (3.7), it is clear that the real riskfree interest rate changes over time
in response to time preferences (λt+1λt ) and expected consumption growth (Et [∆ct+1]) and
that risk premia are constant over time.
3.2.2 Substituting out Consumption (The ICAPM)
Following Campbell (1993), we log-linearize the representative agent’s budget constraint
(Wt+1 = Rw,t+1 (Wt − Ct)) to yield:
rw,t+1 − Et [rw,t+1] = (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=0
ρj∆ct+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρjrw,t+1+j (3.8)
where ρ is a log-linearization constant.4 Because risk premia are constant over time,
Newsh,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)∑∞j=1 ρjrw,t+1+j depends solely on changes to expected interest rates,
which change over time in response to time preferences and expected consumption growth
as described by equation (3.6).5 We use the budget constraint (equation 3.8) and the riskfree
focus.
4Specifically, ρ = 1− exp (c− w) where c− w is the average log consumption-wealth ratio. We use a
monthly coefficient value of ρ = 0.996 in our analysis.
5The h subscript follows the notation of Campbell (1993) to indicate hedging of future interest rates.
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rate decomposition (equation 3.6) to substitute out current consumption covariance from
the risk premia in equation (3.7).
These substitutions yield the following ICAPM:
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσiw + (γ− 1) σih(c) −
γ− 1
ψ− 1σih(λ) (3.9)
Risk premia are determined by covariance with the market and covariance with state
variables related to future interest rates. σih(c) is covariance with consumption growth
shocks to future interest rates. σih(λ) is covariance with time preference shocks to future
interest rates. Together, they add up to covariance with overall interest rate news. I.e.,
σih ≡ covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρjr f ,t+1+j
)
= σih(c) + σih(λ) (3.10)
The risk prices in equation (3.9) are revealing. Market return risk (σiw) is priced by
relative risk aversion (γ) as in other ICAPM models. Also consistent with other ICAPM
models, state variable covariance (σih(c) and σih(λ)) is priced only if γ 6= 1. Yet, the two
components of interest rate risk have different prices. Whereas σih(c) is priced by γ− 1, σih(λ)
is priced by − γ−1ψ−1 . When ψ > 1, the prices have opposite signs, and if ψ is close to 1, time-
preference risk is amplified relative to consumption growth risk. The key distinction between
equation (3.9) and previous ICAPM models like Campbell (1993) is that we consider shocks
to both consumption growth and time preferences. Because Campbell assumes constant
preferences, he omits σih(λ) and treats σih as equivalent to σih(c).
3.2.3 Substituting out Wealth Returns (The Generalized CCAPM)
The budget constraint (equation 3.8) can also be used to substitute out covariance with
wealth portfolio returns to express risk premia in terms of a generalized CCAPM along the
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lines of Bansal and Yaron’s (2004) long run risk model. The resulting pricing equation is:
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσic + (γψ− 1) σih(c) −
γψ− 1
ψ− 1 σih(λ) (3.11)
Consumption risk (σic) is priced by relative risk aversion (γ) as in the standard CCAPM.
Consistent with Bansal and Yaron (2004), interest rate risk is only priced if γ 6= 1/ψ.6 I.e.,
interest rate risk is priced under general Epstein-Zin preferences, but not under power
utility. As in our ICAPM, the most striking thing about equation (3.11) is that the two types
of interest rate risk are priced differently. Once again, time preference interest rate risk
differs from consumption growth interest rate risk by a factor of −1ψ−1 .
Our ICAPM (equation 3.9) and generalized CCAPM (equation 3.11) are at odds with
traditional reasoning about interest rate risk. If one considers only consumption growth
shocks, positive interest rate shocks are good news for investors under typical parameter
assumptions (γ > 1 for the ICAPM and γ > 1/ψ for the CCAPM). Thus, assets that
positively covary with interest rate shocks are risky and require extra risk premia relative
to CAPM and CCAPM pricing. Campbell and Viceira (2003, Chapter 3) use this logic to
argue that long term bonds are valuable hedges against interest rate decreases. If ψ > 1 and
1
ψ−1σih(λ) dominates σih(c), the logic actually goes the opposite way. Investors want to hedge
against interest rate increases, making long term assets (including bonds) risky investments.
3.2.4 Disciplining Parameter Values
The case of elasticity of intertemporal substitution close to one deserves special attention.7
In both the ICAPM (equation 3.9) and generalized CCAPM (equation 3.11), the price of
time preference risk (σih(λ)) is scaled by a factor of
−1
1−ψ . When ψ is close to 1, these risk
prices can have arbitrarily large magnitudes. Are infinite (or even very large) premia for
time preference risk plausible? We believe they are not, and we interpret this as evidence
6Bansal and Yaron (2004) express their version of equation (3.11) in terms of future consumption growth.
This is just a different way of describing the same relationship.
7Because Epstein-Zin preferences in equation (3.1) are not defined for ψ = 1 or γ = 1, we do not consider
the case where ψ exactly equals 1.
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that ψ must be close to 1/γ or far from 1.
Before assessing the plausibility of high time preference risk premia, it it important to
understand why the premia are high when ψ is close to 1. Under Epstein-Zin preferences,
current utility flows are roughly λtC
1−1/ψ
t . When ψ is close to 1, these flows are much more
sensitive to λt than Ct. Yet, the riskfree rate (equation 3.6) is equally sensitive to consumption
growth and time preference changes when ψ is near 1. Thus, the hedging premium for time
preference risk blows up relative to the hedging premium for consumption growth.
Another way to see this is to change notation to consider time preference shocks in the
same units as consumption. Specifically, consider augmented consumption, defined as:
C˜t ≡ λ∗t Ct (3.12)
where
λ∗t ≡ λ1/(1−1/ψ)t (3.13)
With this notation change, equation (3.1) is transformed into standard Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences with respect to augmented consumption. All of Campbell’s (1993) and Bansal and
Yaron’s (2004) results hold with respect to augmented consumption and returns measured
in units of augmented consumption. In particular, the augmented riskfree rate is:
r˜ f ,t+1 = − log (δ) + 1ψEt [∆c˜t+1]−
1− θ
2
σ2w −
θ
2ψ2
σ2c (3.14)
and the risk premium for any asset is given by
Et [r˜i,t+1]− r˜ f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσiw + (γ− 1) σih(c˜) (3.15)
where tildas represent augmented consumption and returns. Using the identities r˜i,t+1 =
ri,t+1 + 11−1/ψ log
(
λt+1
λt
)
and ∆c˜t+1 = ∆ct+1 + 11−1/ψ log
(
λt+1
λt
)
, equations (3.14) and (3.15)
are equivalent to equations (3.6) and (3.9). The time preference risk premia in equations
(3.9) and (3.11) blow up as ψ gets close to 1 because time preferences (λt) have an outzised
impact on augmented consumption through λ∗t = λ
1/(1−1/ψ)
t .
If one accepts that time preference risk premia cannot be infinite, equations (3.9) and
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(3.11) rule ψ that are too close to 1. To generate better intuition for how close ψ can be to 1,
we propose a thought experiment with simple consumption and time preference processes.
Specifically, consider a three period economy with constant perishable consumption endow-
ments of C0 = C1 = C2 = C in each period. Time preferences are known in advance for
periods 0 and 1. For simplicity we assume λ0 = λ1 = 1 and we also assume δ = 1. The only
uncertainty in the economy is period 2 time preferences, which are revealed at time 1. λ2
takes on two possible values, λH or λL with probabilities piH and piL, resplectively. We want
to know how the representative agent values wealth in state L relative to state H.
In the appendix, we derive Arrow-Debreu state prices for the two states and find that
their ratio is:
PL
PH
=
piL
piH
(
1+ λL
1+ λH
)− γ−1/ψ1−1/ψ
(3.16)
Note that these are prices at time 0 for state-contingent payoffs at time 1. Under power utility
with γ = 1/ψ, the price ratio is simply the probability ratio. This is exactly what we should
expect. With power utility, marginal utility of wealth is pinned down by consumption and
current time preferences, which is constant across states. By contrast, state prices are highly
sensitive to future time preferences when 1/ψ differs from γ and is close to 1. We do not
have great intuition for whether −γ−1/ψ1−1/ψ should be positive or negative, but we believe its
magnitude should be small.
To be more concrete, assume piL = piH = 0.5, λH = 1, and λL = 0.9. Table 3.1 presents
the equation (3.16) state price ratio for these parameters at various values of γ and ψ.
Parameterizations with γ > 1 are in Panel A. Parameterizations with γ < 1 are in Panel B.
The upward sloping diagonals of 1’s in both panels represent power utility with γ = 1/ψ.
What are reasonable values for PLPH ? The thought experiement is what you would pay
for an extra dollar in a state in which time preferences will soon fall versus an extra dollar
in a state in which time preferences will remain constant, keeping in mind that current
and future consumption are the same in both states. As a starting point, we propose that
it is difficult to rationalize state price ratios larger in magnitude than the ratio of the time
preference shock itself. In Table 3.1, ratios between 0.95 and 1.05 are in bold italics, and
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Table 3.1: State Price Ratios
This table displays state price ratios from equation (16) at different values of relative risk aversion (RRA) and
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
A. RRA > 1
Relative Risk Aversion
EIS 1.01 1.10 1.25 1.5 2 3 5 10 25
0.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00
0.10 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.92
0.20 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.77
0.33 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.84 0.57
0.50 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.66 0.31
0.67 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.70 0.42 0.09
0.80 1.05 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.70 0.46 0.17 <.01
0.91 1.05 1.00 0.93 0.81 0.63 0.38 0.14 0.01 <.01
0.99 1.00 0.63 0.29 0.08 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
1.01 1.11 1.77 3.84 14.04 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
1.10 1.06 1.11 1.21 1.40 1.85 3.25 10.06 >100 >100
1.25 1.06 1.08 1.12 1.20 1.36 1.76 2.94 10.59 >100
1.5 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.14 1.23 1.43 1.95 4.20 42.28
2 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.11 1.17 1.29 1.59 2.65 12.35
3 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.14 1.23 1.43 2.10 6.67
5 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.12 1.20 1.36 1.87 4.90
10 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.18 1.32 1.76 4.13
25 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.17 1.30 1.70 3.79
B. RRA < 1
Relative Risk Aversion
EIS 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.80 0.91 0.99
0.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
0.10 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
0.20 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05
0.33 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05
0.50 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05
0.67 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.06 1.05
0.80 1.28 1.27 1.24 1.21 1.17 1.13 1.10 1.07 1.05
0.91 1.72 1.67 1.59 1.48 1.36 1.25 1.17 1.10 1.06
0.99 >100 >100 63.74 32.16 13.68 5.82 2.94 1.68 1.11
1.01 <.01 <.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.37 0.66 1.00
1.10 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.87 0.94 1.00 1.05
1.25 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.05
1.5 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.05
2 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05
3 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.05
5 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.05
10 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.05
25 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.05
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ratios between 0.9 and 1.1 are highlighted in italics.8 As expected, ratios in these ranges
require 1/ψ to be close to γ or far from 1. For example, if γ is 5, ψ must be less than 0.44.
With lower relative risk aversion, ψ can be closer to one without posing a problem.
Researchers frequently calibrate models with parameters that imply implausible state
price ratios. For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) calibrate their model with relative risk
aversion of γ = 7.5 and γ = 10 and elasticity of intertemporal substitution of ψ = 1.5.
These parameter assumptions imply a state price ratios of 2.9 (for γ = 7.5) and 4.2 (for
γ = 10). By comparison, AER’s benchmark calibration of γ = 1.0684 and ψ = 1.0275 implies
a somewhat high but much more plausible price ratio of 1.2.
Importantly, our claim is not just that ψ cannot be close to 1 and far from 1/γ in a model
with time preference shocks. Rather, it is that ψ cannot be close to 1 and far from 1/γ in
any model. Calibrations of ψ and γ need to reflect actual preferences,9 and one aspect of
those preferences is how agents value covariance with (real or hypothetical) time preference
shocks. Our argument is similar in spirit to Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki’s (2013) claim
that ψ significantly greater than 1/γ (e.g., as calibrated by Bansal and Yaron, 2004) implies
agents are willing to pay an implausibly large premium in order to resolve risk earlier.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical focus is not to test the model discussed in the previous section but rather
to directly address the question of whether real interest rate risk is priced. This question
is actually a bit at odds with the model in that it implies a single type of interest rate risk
whereas the model shows that their are two different interest rate factors with different
risk prices. Ideally, we would like to separately measure consumption growth and time
8The broader range requires that PLpiHPHpiL falls between
(
λL
λH
)
and
(
λL
λH
)−1
. The narrower range requires that
PLpiH
PHpiL falls between
(
1+λL
1+λH
)
and
(
1+λL
1+λH
)−1
, which is equivalent to the condition that |γ− 1/ψ| ≤ |1− 1/ψ|.
9If one relaxes the requirement that calibrations represent reasonable preferences, the equity premium
puzzle is easy to solve. Simply assume that relative risk aversion is extremely high. The whole point of the
equity premium puzzle is that conventional models cannot explain the equity premium without implausible
risk aversion. Introducing implausible Epstein-Zin preferences is not a solution to this problem.
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preference interest rate risk. Given the unobservability of time preferences and the imprecise
and low-frequency nature of consumption data, measuring aggregate interest rate risk is
probably the best we can do. Moreover, aggregate interest rate risk is of direct interest
because interest rates are highly visible and economically important. Even though we
don’t directly test it, the model does inform how we think about and measure interest rate
risk. Perhaps most significantly, the model predicts that investors care about shocks to
both current and expected future riskfree interest rates. Thus, instead of considering just
covt
(
ri,t+1, r f ,t+2 − Et
[
r f ,t+2
])
, we focus on σih ≡ covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)∑∞j=1 ρjrw,t+1+j
)
.
Our empirical work faces two primary challenges. First, our focus is on real interest rates.
This is the riskfree rate in our model, and it is the relevant quantity for actual economic
decisions. Unfortunately, real interest rates are not directly observed. We overcome this
problem by modeling expected Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation and estimating monthly
real interest rates as the difference between nominal 1-month Treasury bill interest rates and
expected inflation over the next month. For our baseline estimates, we focus on the 1983 to
2012 time period because monetary policy has been more consistent and inflation has been
less volatile during the Greenspan and Bernanke Federal Reserve chairmanships than in
previous periods.
Our second empirical challenge is that interest rate risk involves shocks to expectations.
Thus, we need to estimate interest rate expectations. We do this with a vector autoregression
(VAR) of interest rates, inflation, and other state variables. From the VAR, we extract an
estimate for the time series of (Et+1 − Et)∑∞j=1 ρjr f ,t+1+j innovations, which we in turn use
to estimate σih for various assets.
3.3.1 Vector Autoregression
Our VAR model is:
Yt = AYt−1 +ωt (3.17)
Yt is a k× 1 vector with the nominal 1-month treasury bill log yield and seasonally adjusted
log CPI inflation over the past month as its first two elements. The remaining elements of Yt
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are state variables useful for forecasting these two variables. The assumption that the VAR
model has only one lag is not restrictive because lagged variables can be included in Yt. We
demean Yt before estimating the VAR to avoid the need for a constant in equation (3.17).
We define vector ei to be the ith column of a k× k identity matrix. Using this notation we
can extract expectations and shocks to current and future expectations from Yt, A, and ωt.
Our interest is in the real riskfree interest rate, which we estimate as the nominal 1-month
treasury bill yield less expected inflation:
̂r f ,t+1 = (e1′ − e2′A)Yt (3.18)
Similarly, expected future riskfree rates are:
Et
[ ̂r f ,t+j] = (e1′ − e2′A) Aj−1Yt (3.19)
Shocks to current and expected riskfree rates are:
(Et+1 − Et) ̂r f ,t+1+j = (e1′ − e2′A) Aj−1ωt+1 (3.20)
Most importantly, total interest rate news is:
Newsh,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj ̂r f ,t+1+j
=
(
e1′ − e2′A) ∞∑
j=1
ρj Aj−1ωt+1
=
(
e1′ − e2′A) ρ (I − ρA)−1 ωt+1 (3.21)
where I is the identity matrix.
All that remains is to choose state variables for Yt and estimate equation (3.17). Following
Campbell (1996), we include the relative treasury bill rate, defined as the difference between
the current one-month treasury bill yield and the average one-month treasury bill yield
over the previous 12 months. Similarly, we include the relative monthly CPI inflation
rate, defined the same way. Next, we include the yield spread between 10-year treasury
bonds and 3-month treasury bonds because the slope of the yield curve is known to predict
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interest rate changes. Finally, we include the CRSP value-weighted market return and
the log dividend-price ratio (defined as dividends over the past year divided by current
price), which is known to predict market returns. These variables are useful to the extent
that equity returns are related to expected future interest rates. We considered including
additional lags of these variables by re-estimating equation (3.17) with multiple lags of Yt.
The Bayesian Information Criteria is insensitive to adding lags so we do not include lagged
variables in Yt.
Table 3.2 shows coefficient estimates and standard errors for the elements of A related
to predicting nominal interest rates and inflation. Columns (1) and (2) report results for
the 1983 to 2012 time period, which is our primary focus. Nominal interest rate shocks are
highly persistent with lag coefficient of 0.96. Inflation shocks are much less persistent and
only have a lag coefficient of 0.07. Inflation is increasing in lagged nominal yields. The
VAR explains 95% of the variation in nominal yields over time. Inflation changes are less
predictable with an R-squared of 0.24.
Because our main interest is in the riskfree rate, we plot ̂r f ,t+1 in Figure 3.1. Along with
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Figure 3.1: Riskfree Rate, 1983-2012
The nominal riskfree rate is the yield on a one-month nominal treasury bill. The real risk free rate is estimated
using our VAR analysis. We also report the real riskfree rate estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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Table 3.2: VAR Results
y1 is the nominal log yield on a one-month treasury bill. Inflation is one-month log inflation. Relative y1 and
relative inflation are the difference between current yields and inflation and average values over the past twelve
months. y120 - y3 is the yield spread between 10-year and 3-month treasury bonds. rmrf is the excess return of
the CRSP value weighted market return over the risk free rate. d - p is the log dividend-price ratio, calculated
for the CRSP value-weighted market index using current prices and average dividends over the past twelve
months. Results are for a 1-lag VAR of demeaned y1, inflation, relative y1, relative inflation, rmrf, and d-p.
Coefficients for dependent variables y1 and inflation are reported. The other dependent variables are omitted
for brevity. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5%
significance, *** represents 1% significance.
1983-2012 1927-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y1 inflation y1 inflation
Lagged Variables
y1 0.9639*** 0.1939* 0.9741*** 0.0631
(0.0202) (0.1003) (0.0116) (0.0773)
inflation 0.0314 0.0737 0.0102* 0.7762***
(0.0297) (0.1734) (0.0062) (0.0709)
relative -0.0976** 0.1295 -0.1752*** 0.5909***
y1 (0.0457) (0.1585) (0.0407) (0.1599)
relative -0.0136 0.3268* -0.003 -0.4554***
inflation (0.0281) (0.1767) (0.0056) (0.0837)
y120 - y3 -0.0032 -0.002 -0.0062** 0.0014
(0.0036) (0.0155) (0.0024) (0.0122)
rmrf 0.0013* 0.0083* 0.0008** 0.0061*
(0.0007) (0.0042) (0.0004) (0.0034)
d - p 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0003)
R-Squared 0.95 0.24 0.95 0.32
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our estimated real riskfree rate, we also plot the nominal one-month treasury bill yield and
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s real riskfree rate estimate.10 As we would expect
in a stable inflation environment, real interest rates generally follow the same pattern as
nominal interest rates. Nonetheless, inflation expectations do change over time, particularly
over the past few years. Our real riskfree rate estimate closely tracks the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland’s estimate, which increases our confidence in our methodology.
As a robustness check, we also estimate real riskfree rates and real riskfree rate news
over a longer time period, starting in 1927. Our methodology for the longer time period is
the same as before except that we use the unadjusted CPI because the seasonally adjusted
CPI is only available starting in 1947. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2 report the VAR
results. In the extended time sample, inflation shocks are more persistent (inflation’s lagged
coefficient is 0.78, compared to 0.07 before). The results are otherwise similar to the original
VAR. Figure 3.2 plots nominal and estimated real interest rates from 1927 to 2012. Expected
inflation varies more in the extended sample than it does after 1983. Thus, the real and
10The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s real riskfree rate estimates are described by Haubrich, Pennacchi,
and Ritchken (2008, 2011).
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Figure 3.2: Riskfree Rate, 1927-2012
The nominal riskfree rate is the yield on a one-month nominal treasury bill. The real risk free rate is estimated
using our VAR analysis.
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nominal interest rates do not track each other as closely. Expected inflation is particularly
high in the 1930’s, 1940’s, and 1970’s, and deflation caused real interest rates to exceed
nominal interest rates in the 1920’s.
3.3.2 Cross-Sectional Equity Pricing
If real interest rate risk is priced and stocks vary in their exposure to real interest rate
risk, real interest rate risk should be priced in the cross section of stock returns. This is
not the first paper to connect time series interest rate changes with cross-sectional stock
returns. For example, Fama and French (1993) find comovement between excess stock
returns and excess returns on long term bonds but conclude that bond factors have little
impact on cross sectional stock prices. Petkova (2006) finds that innovations to term spreads
and one month nominal interest rates are correlated with and partially explain size and
value returns. Koijen, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2012) find that high returns to value
stocks relative to growth stocks are explained by covariance with shocks to nominal bond
risk premia whereas returns to treasury bond portfolios of different maturities are largely
explained by differential exposure to the level of interest rates. Our empirical analysis
differs from previous studies because we focus specifically on stock exposure to real interest
rate innovations. Moreover, we sort stocks based on this exposure instead of focusing on
established size and value returns.
To test whether interest rate risk is priced we sort stocks into portfolios according to co-
variance with interest rate news (Newsh,t+1). Specifically, we estimate σih = covt (ri,t+1, Newsh,t+1)
on a rolling basis for all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ common stocks using returns and
VAR Newsh estimates over the past three years, with the requirement that included stocks
must have at least two years of historical data. Value-weighted decile portfolios are formed
monthly by sorting stocks according to those estimates.
Table 3.3 reports market capitalization, average excess returns, and βih =
σih
σ2h
estimates
for each portfolio. The table also reports pricing errors (alphas) relative to the CAPM and
Fama and French (1993) three factor model and factor loadings (betas) for the three factor
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Table 3.3: Real Riskfree Rate News Covariance Deciles
Value-weighted decile portfolios are formed at the end of each month by sorting stocks based on covariance with
riskfree rate news over the past three years. The table reports betas with respect to riskfree rate news, average
size, and average excess returns for each portfolio. The table also reports results for time series regressions of
excess returns on excess market returns (the CAPM regression) and excess market returns, the Fama-French
size factor (smb), and the Fama-French value factor (hml) (the 3 Factor regression). Standard errors for the 10-1
portfolio difference are reported in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, ***
represents 1% significance. The sample is NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ common stocks.
A. 1985-2012
Decile Rf News Market Cap Excess CAPM 3 Factor Factor Loadings (Betas)
Beta ($B) Return Alpha Alpha rmrf smb hml
1 -0.17 0.72 0.63% -0.19% -0.16% 1.27 0.61 -0.06
2 0.07 1.36 0.94% 0.24% 0.30% 1.10 0.22 -0.15
3 -0.04 1.94 0.87% 0.25% 0.23% 1.04 0.07 0.04
4 0.13 2.42 0.65% 0.06% 0.03% 1.00 -0.04 0.09
5 0.00 2.74 0.51% -0.03% -0.05% 0.94 -0.10 0.03
6 0.02 2.76 0.48% -0.06% -0.08% 0.93 -0.14 0.05
7 0.03 2.58 0.54% -0.02% -0.04% 0.97 -0.11 0.03
8 0.15 2.21 0.68% 0.06% 0.08% 1.04 -0.13 -0.07
9 0.14 1.69 0.61% -0.06% -0.04% 1.10 0.01 -0.06
10 0.41 0.85 0.21% -0.62% -0.44% 1.21 0.55 -0.47
10-1 0.58** 0.13** -0.42% -0.42% -0.27% -0.06 -0.07 -0.41***
(0.23) (0.06) (0.33%) (0.34%) (0.34%) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
B. 1929-2012
Decile Rf News Market Cap Excess CAPM 3 Factor Factor Loadings (Betas)
Beta ($B) Return Alpha Alpha rmrf smb hml
1 -0.01 0.17 0.66% -0.05% -0.12% 1.15 0.52 -0.03
2 0.00 0.48 0.66% 0.04% 0.03% 1.04 0.20 -0.06
3 0.03 0.69 0.70% 0.13% 0.12% 0.99 0.08 -0.01
4 0.06 0.86 0.71% 0.15% 0.15% 0.96 0.02 0.00
5 0.01 0.98 0.60% 0.04% 0.02% 0.97 -0.03 0.06
6 0.03 1.05 0.56% -0.01% -0.03% 0.98 -0.03 0.09
7 0.06 1.08 0.58% -0.01% -0.02% 1.03 -0.08 0.08
8 0.06 1.05 0.56% -0.07% -0.10% 1.08 0.00 0.11
9 0.10 0.83 0.61% -0.07% -0.12% 1.15 0.04 0.17
10 0.11 0.38 0.58% -0.18% -0.27% 1.23 0.50 0.03
10-1 0.13 0.21*** -0.09% -0.13% -0.14% 0.07** -0.02 0.05
(0.09) (0.02) (0.18%) (0.18%) (0.18%) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
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model. Panel A reports results for our baseline 1985-2012 time period.11 Riskfree rate news
betas increase across the portfolios, and decile 10’s news beta is a significant 0.58 higher
than decile 1’s news beta. Monthly excess returns are 42 bps lower in the 10th decile than in
the 1st decile, but this return difference is not statistically significant, and there is no clear
pattern to excess returns across the decile portfolios other than a drop in returns in decile 10.
CAPM and 3 Factor alphas follow the same basic pattern. Factor loadings are also similar
across the portfolios. The one exception is that decile 10 has a large negative loading on
the value factor (hml). The bottom line is that there is no evidence that interest rate risk is
priced in the cross section of equities.
Results are similar in the extended 1929-2012 sample, reported in Panel B. Once again,
average excess returns and alpha estimates decrease with interest rate news exposure, but
the differences are not significant. The most striking difference between Panel A and Panel
B is that βih differences across the portfolios are not significant in the extended sample.
This suggests that stock-level interest rate risk was not stable over time early in the sample,
undercutting our ability to form interest rate risk portfolios. This problem appears to be
concentrated in the first few decades of the sample when inflation and interest rates were
most volatile. In later analysis, we examine a 1952 to 2012 sample and find significant βih
differences between the decile portfolios. As in the other samples, these βih differences are
not accompanied by significant return differences.
3.3.3 Equity Premium
Because the market portfolio is a claim to future dividends, it may be exposed to interest
rate risk. Thus, interest rate risk may affect expected equity returns and could explain part
of the equity premium puzzle. The magnitude and direction of this effect depend on the
market return’s covariance with interest rate news and the price of interest rate risk.
AER make the extreme claim that interest rate risk explains virtually all of the equity
11We form the portfolios based on at least two years of historical data, which causes the sample to start in
1985 instead of 1983.
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premium. In their model, assets are priced based on covariance with consumption growth
shocks and time preference shocks, which map directly into interest rate shocks. Consistent
with previous studies, they estimate that equity returns are essentially uncorrelated with
consumption growth. Thus, their explanation of the equity premium is almost entirely based
on interest rate risk. Equities are risky because they have a long duration and are sensitive
to persistent real interest rate shocks. Duration simultaneously explains the upward sloping
yield curve and the equity premium. In the AER benchmark model, equity returns are
highly sensitive to interest rate shocks, with a correlation of approximately -0.92. Moreover,
their benchmark model implies that equity returns have an interest rate news beta of -1.12
Using our estimates of interest rate news, we can directly measure these two moments.
Panel A of Table 3.4 shows results for the 1985 to 2012 time period. Excess market returns
(rmr f ) have a correlation of 0.05 and a beta of 0.11 with respect to interest rate news. These
estimates are close to zero, suggesting that equity returns have little exposure to interest
rate risk. According to the point estimate, the market return is positively correlated with
interest rate shocks, consistent with long run consumption growth shocks and in contrast to
AER’s time preference shocks.
Table 3.4 also reports interest rate correlations and betas for the long-short decile 10
minus decile 1 interest rate risk portfolio and for 1 to 2 year and 5 to 10 year bonds.13
By construction, the long-short interest rate risk portfolio has a positive beta. The bond
portfolios have negative exposures to interest rate news. However, these exposures are small.
Interest rate betas are -0.04 for both portfolios, and the beta is only significantly different
from zero for the short-term bonds.
The final rows of Table 3.4 report average excess returns and average excess returns
divided by interest rate news beta. If interest rate news is the primary risk factor investors
care about, this ratio (the implied price of beta) should be consistent across assets. The point
12The high negative correlation comes from AER’s Table 3 estimate that interest rate shocks are relatively
large and persistent while dividend variance is low. The beta of -1 is implied by AER’s benchmark assumption
that real dividend growth is independent of real interest rates.
13Bond return data is from CRSP.
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Table 3.4: Equity Market and Bond Real Interest Rate Risk
rmrf is the excess return on the CRSP value weighted market portfolio. Decile 10-1 is returns to long-short
portfolio representing the difference between the 10th and first riskfree rate news covariance portfolios, described
in Table 2. 1-2 and 5-10 year bonds represent excess returns to treasury bonds of those durations, as calculated
by CRSP. Correlations and betas with respect to riskfree rate news and average returns are reported for each
return series. The price of beta is defined as average returns divided by beta. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors for the price of beta are calculated using the delta method. * represents 10%
significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
A. 1985-2012
1-2 Year 5-10 Year
rmrf Decile 10-1 Bonds Bonds
Rf News 0.04 0.14** -0.14*** -0.03
Correlation (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Rf News 0.11 0.58** -0.04*** -0.04
Beta (0.17) (0.23) (0.02) (0.06)
Average 0.60%** -0.42% 0.12%*** 0.34%***
Excess Returns (0.25%) (0.33%) (0.02%) (0.09%)
Price of 5.35% -0.72%** -3.14%*** -9.70%
Beta (10.57%) (0.30%) (0.64%) (13.81%)
B. 1952-2012
1-2 Year 5-10 Year
rmrf Decile 10-1 Bonds Bonds
Rf News 0.05 0.12*** -0.40*** -0.12***
Correlation (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Rf News 0.10 0.30*** -0.12*** -0.10***
Beta (0.08) (0.09) (0.01) (0.03)
Average 0.55%*** -0.16% 0.09%*** 0.16%***
Excess Returns (0.16%) (0.19%) (0.02%) (0.06%)
Price of 5.43% -0.54% -0.72%*** -1.57%***
Beta (5.91%) (0.46%) -(0.12%) -(0.13%)
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estimates clearly differ. In particular, the bond returns and cross-sectional interest rate risk
portfolio imply a negative price of interest rate risk whereas market returns imply a positive
price. Unfortunately, betas and average returns are measured too imprecisely to definitively
rule out consistent interest rate risk pricing across the assets.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the same statistics for a longer sample period, starting in
1952 when CRSP bond return data starts. The basic results are all the same.
Our findings suggest that interest rate risk is unlikely to explain the equity premium.
Certainly, there is no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that equities face significant interest
rate risk. How can this be reconciled with AER’s empirical findings? The main difference
between our analysis and AER’s is that AER do not estimate real interest rate innovations.
Their GMM includes the unconditional correlation between equity returns and the real risk
free rate at an annual frequency but omits the more important correlation of interest rate
news with excess equity returns. Our analysis estimates this moment and finds that it is
essentially zero.
3.4 Conclusion
Is real interest rate risk priced? Theoretically, it could be priced in either direction. Empiri-
cally, there is little evidence that real interest rate risk is priced at all.
Our interest rate risk model has two theoretical implications. First, it matters where
interest rate shocks comes from. Interest rate increases stemming from news about future
consumption growth are generally good news to investors whereas interest rate increases
stemming from time preference shocks are generally bad news. Thus, long-run consumption
risk logic implies that long-duration assets are relatively safe whereas time preference risk
logic implies that long-duration assets are relatively risky. A more general lesson is the
importance of thinking in general equilibrium terms. Because interest rates are endogenous,
interest rate risk is not a meaningful concept without specifying what is driving interest
rate shocks.
The second theoretical implication of our model is that Epstein-Zin preferences with
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ψ close to 1 and significantly different from 1/γ imply implausible aversion to future
time preference shocks. If we take Epstein-Zin utility seriously as a description of actual
preferences, this undermines many popular calibrations, such as those proposed by Bansal
and Yaron (2004).
Empirically, stocks sorted on interest rate risk have only small, statistically insignificant
return differences. Moreover, the market return and treasury bond returns have low
covariance with interest rate news. Thus, interest rate risk is unlikely to explain much of
equity or bond return premia even if it is priced to some extent in the cross section. Overall,
our results suggest that interest rate risk is not a major concern to investors.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Modification Algorithm
The LPS dataset lacks an explicit modification flag but contains enough detailed panel
information to identify changes to loan terms over time. My loan modification algorithm
differs in a few details but is essentially the same as the algorithm employed by Adelino,
Gerardi, and Willen (2011b). The purpose of the algorithm is to identify changes to loan
terms that are consistent with modification and do not have other likely explanations. Some
changes are enough to identify a modification on their own. For example, absent errors in
the data, an interest rate change to a fixed rate loan must stem from modification. Other
changes require confirmatory evidence. For example, a principal reduction could be from
a modification or from a prepayment. The size of the reduction, changes in monthly
payments, and other simultaneous modifications all inform whether the reduction stems
from a modification. In all cases, the loans in question are seriously delinquent at the time
of the potential modification, adding to the likelihood that the algorithm is identifying true
modifications. The algorithm separately identifies four types of modifications: interest
rate reductions, term extensions, principal decreases, and principal increases. These
modifications are not mutually exclusive and often take place simultaneously. I consider a
loan to be modified if the algorithm flags it with any of the four modification types.
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A.1.1 Interest Rate Reductions
Interest rate reductions are easiest to identify in fixed-rate loans and adjustable-rate loans
that are still in their introductory fixed-rate period. For these loans, I define an interest
rate reduction as a change that reduces a loan’s interest rate to at least 0.5 ppt below the
previous month’s rate and the loan’s origination interest rate.
For adjustable-rate mortgages, I first compute a fully indexed interest rate for each loan
in each month using LPS data on the loan’s reference index and spread combined with
time-series data on the index rates. For example, a loan that references LIBOR and has a
spread of 2 ppt would have a fully indexed rate of LIBOR + 2 ppt in any month. I abstract
from details on exactly how frequently rates reset and consider any loan to be adjustable
if it is past or within 2 months of the end of its introductory period. To be flagged as an
interest rate reduction, a loan’s interest rate must decrease to at least 0.5 ppt below the
previous month’s rate, the origination interest rate, and the fully indexed rate.
A.1.2 Term Extensions
To be flagged as a term extension, a loan’s remaining term to maturity must increase by
at least 20 months or rise above its initial term to maturity. The term change must also
be contemporaneous with a monthly payment decrease, principal increase, or explicit loss
mitigation flag in the data.
A.1.3 Principal Decreases
To be flagged as a principal decrease, the mortgage must have had outstanding principal
of at least $25K in the previous month, and the principal balance must have decreased by
between 10% and 30% and be accompanied by a payment decrease or term extension. The
10-30% range is used to differentiate modifications from scheduled principal decreases and
prepayments. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2011b) experiment with the 30% cutoff and
find that results are not sensitive to its exact value.
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A.1.4 Principal Increases
To be flagged as a principal increase, principal must increase by at least 1% (0.5% for
option ARM mortgages) and be accompanied by either a payment increase or a term length
decrease.
A.2 Supplemental Figures and Tables
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Figure A.1: Origination Amount by Origination Month
Mean loan origination amounts for sample jumbo and non-jumbo loans.
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Figure A.2: FICO Score by Origination Month
Mean FICO scores for sample jumbo and non-jumbo loans.
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Figure A.3: Loan to Value Ratio by Origination Month
Mean loan to value ratios for sample jumbo and non-jumbo loans.
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Figure A.4: Income Documentation by Origination Month
Percent of sample jumbo and non-jumbo loans with full income documentation.
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Figure A.5: Original Interest Rate by Origination Month
Mean original interest rates for sample jumbo and non-jumbo loans.
129
Table A.1: Additional Robustness Checks
Regressions are the same as Kruger’s (2013) baseline IV regressions (Table 4, columns 2-4) except where noted.
Columns 1-3 of Panel A drop loan characteristic controls. Columns 4-6 of Panel A add back loans transferred to
non-LPS servicers, which were previously dropped from the sample. Panel B control for originination-month
fixed effects using non-jumbo loans without controlling for the interaction between private securitization and
non-jumbo status. R-squared statistics are calculated within MSAs. Clustered (by MSA) standard errors are in
parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance.
A. Regressions without loan characteristic controls (1-3) and with transferred loans (4-6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Foreclose Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.695 0.135 0.052 0.695 0.135 0.052
Privately Securitized 0.055*** 0.030** -0.039*** 0.063*** 0.051*** -0.032***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.009)
Loan Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE No No No No No No
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans No No No No No No
Observations 15,945 15,945 7,893 17,165 17,165 8,556
Adusted R-Squared 0.036 0.011 -0.002 0.079 0.027 0.088
B. Non-jumbo origination month control regressions without securitization*non-jumbo interaction
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Foreclose
Start Foreclose Modify
Mean 0.695 0.135 0.052
Privately Securitized 0.172*** 0.079*** -0.050**
(0.031) (0.018) (0.022)
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Delinquency Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Month FE Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
Origination Months Jan-Aug Jan-Aug Jan-Aug
Include Non-Jumbo Loans Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,160 77,160 35,934
Adusted R-Squared 0.072 0.031 0.060
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 General Model Derivations and Proofs
B.1.1 Solution
I assume that the price function is linear:
P = α+ βy− γ (X− µX) (B.1)
Claim 1. β 6= 0.
Proof. Assume β = 0. Thus, price is uninformative about private signals, and all agents have
posterior beliefs of Ei[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P] = τpµ+ψτsym(i)τp+ψτs and Vari[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P] =
(
τp + ψτs
)−1,
resulting in asset demand Di
[
ym(i), xm(i), P
]
=
Ei [θ|ym(i),xm(i),P]−P
N
η Vari [θ|ym(i),xm(i),P]
= ηN
[
τpµ+ ψτsym(i) −
(
τp + ψτs
)
P
]
.
Solving ∑i Di = X for the market clearing price implies P =
τpµ+ψτs y¯− Xη
τp+ψτs
. Thus, β = ψτsτp+ψτs 6=
0, a contradiction.
Given the price function described by equation (B.1), agent i extracts a noisy signal for
y¯−m(i) from observing price, ym(i), and xm(i):
Am(i) =
M
β (M− 1) (P− α)−
1
M− 1ym(i) +
γM
β (M− 1)
(
xm(i) −
µX
M
)
= y¯−m(i) −
γM
β
(
x¯−m(i) −
µX
M
)
(B.2)
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Note that Am(i) ∼i N
(
θ, 1
(M−1)τs +
(
γ
β
)2
M
M−1 V
)
and Am(i) is independent of ym(i) and
xm(i). Using Bayesian updating with signals ym(i) and Am(i) and substituting P, ym(i), xm(i)
for Am(i) using (B.2), agent i’s posterior beliefs as a function of P, ym(i), xm(i) are:
Ei[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P] =
 τpµ− MτAβ(M−1)α+ (ψτs − τAM−1) ym(i)
+ γMτA
β(M−1)
(
xm(i) − µXM
)
+ MτA
β(M−1)P

τp + ψτs + τA
(B.3a)
Vari[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P] =
(
τp + ψτs + τA
)−1 (B.3b)
where τA =
(
1
(M−1)τs +
(
γ
β
)2
M
M−1 V
)−1
is the precision agent i attributes to Am(i).
Agent i’s asset demand is:
Di =
Ei[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P]− P
N
η Vari[θ|ym(i), xm(i), P]
=
η
N
 τpµ− MτAβ(M−1)α+ (ψτs − τAM−1) ym(i) + γMτAβ(M−1)
(
xm(i) − µXM
)
−
(
τp + ψτs +
(
1− M
β(M−1)
)
τA
)
P
 (B.4)
The market clearing price must solve X = ∑i Di. Thus,
P =
τpµ− 1ηµX − MτAβ(M−1)α+
(
ψτs − τAM−1
)
y¯−
(
1
η − γτAβ(M−1)
)
(X− µX)
τp + ψτs +
(
1− M
β(M−1)
)
τA
(B.5)
Equations (B.1) and (B.5) yield the following system of equations:
α
β
γ

(
τp + ψτs +
(
1− M
β (M− 1)
)
τA
)
=

τpµ− 1ηµX − MτAβ(M−1)α
ψτs − τAM−1
1
η − γτAβ(M−1)
 (B.6)
Claim 2. The unique solution to equations (B.6) is:
α =
(
η2ψ2τpτs + MVτp
)
µ−
(
ηψ2τs +
MV
η
)
µX
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(B.7)
β =
ψτs
(
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
)
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(B.8)
γ =
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
η
(
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
) (B.9)
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Proof. Consider Γ ≡ γβ . We already established that β 6= 0 so Γ is finite. Substituting Γ into
(B.6) and dividing the γ equation by the β equation yields:
Γ =
1
η − Γ τAM−1
ψτs − τAM−1
=
1
ηψτs
(B.10)
Plugging (B.10) into the β equation of (B.6) yields:
β =
ψτs
(
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
)
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(B.11)
Plugging (B.10) and (B.11) into the γ equation of (B.6) yields:
γ =
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
η
(
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
) (B.12)
Finally, plugging (B.10), (B.11), and (B.12) into the α equation of (B.6) yields:
α =
(
η2ψ2τpτs + MVτp
)
µ−
(
ηψ2τs +
MV
η
)
µX
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
(B.13)
B.1.2 Trading
Using equation (B.4),
Tradem ≡ ∑
i:m(i)=m
[
Di − MN xm
]
=
{
η
M
(
ψτs − τAM− 1
)
(ym − y)
}
−
{(
1− ηγτA
(M− 1) β
)
(xm − x)
}
(B.14)
All other trading derivations are in the main text of the paper.
B.1.3 Liquidity
Recall that illiquidity is defined as:
λ ≡
dP
dym
dTradem
dym
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Taking derivatives of P (eq. B.1) and Tradem (eq. B.14) with respect to ym and plugging in γ
from (B.9) and Γ from (B.10) yields:
λ =
−γ( N
M
) ( η
N
) ( γMτA
β(M−1) + γ
(
τp + ψτs +
(
1− M
β(M−1)
)
τA
))
− 1
=
M
(
η2ψ2τs + MV
) (
η2ψ (M + ψ− 1) τs + MV
)
η (M− 1) (η2 (ψ2 − ψ) τs + MV)
(
η2ψ2τs
(
τp + (M + ψ− 1) τs
)
+
(
τp + ψτs
)
MV
)
=
{
M
(M− 1) η (τp + ψτs + τA)
}
+
{
η2ψ2τs
η2ψ2τs + MV
}{
τs
τp + ψτs + τA
}{
η
M
(
ψτs − βM
(
τp + ψτs + τA
))}−1
= {S}+ {B1} {B2} {B3}−1 (B.15)
Consistent with the baseline model, limV→0 dλdψ < 0, limV→0
dλ
dτs < 0, and limV→0
dλ
dτp < 0.
From (B.15) one can see that dλdτp < 0 for all V. However,
dλ
dψ and
dλ
dτs are not always negative.
Their signs are determined by complicated functions of the parameters. Considering limiting
cases is instructive. We have already seen that dλdψ and
dλ
dτs are negative in the limit as V → 0.
Both are also negative in the limit as V → ∞. For interim values of V (i.e., positive, finite V),
dλ
dψ and
dλ
dτs can be positive or negative. Both follow a similar pattern. As ψ→ 0 or τs → 0,
λ→ M
(M−1)ητp , which is solely a supply impact – it includes no belief price response.
1,2 dλ
dψ
and dλdτs initially have the same sign as η
2τp−V (i.e., sign
[
limψ→0 dλdψ
]
= sign
[
limτs→0 dλdτs
]
=
sign
[
η2τp −V
]
). As ψ and τs increase, they eventually decrease λ, driving it to approach
zero as ψ→ ∞ or τs → ∞.
1Though I restrict my attention to overconfidence (ψ > 1) in other parts of the paper, it is useful to generalize
and consider underconfidence (ψ < 1) here to get a full picture of the relationship between λ and ψ.
2The total risk tolerance of agents not receiving the shock is (M−1)ηM and their posterior variance is τ
−1
p .
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B.1.4 Liquidity without Overconfidence
Private information precision can enhance liquidity even without overconfidence. When
ψ = 1 (which reproduces the model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)), illiquidity is:
λψ=1 =
M
(
η2τs + MV
) (
η2τs +V
)
η (M− 1) (η2τs (τp + Mτs)+ (τp + τs)MV)V (B.16)
and its derivative with respect to private information precision is:
dλ
dτs ψ=1
=
M
(
η6τpτ
2
s + η
4τs
(
2τp −Mτs
)
MV + η2
(
τp − 2τs
)
M2V2 −M2V3)
η (M− 1) (η2τs (τp + Mτs)+ (τp + τs)MV)2 V (B.17)
The V → 0 limit is uninteresting because without endowment shocks or overconfidence,
illiquidity is infinite.
As V → ∞, λψ=1 → M(M−1)η(τp+τs) and
dλ
dτs ψ=1
→ −M
(M−1)η(τp+τs)2
< 0. Under infinite
supply variance, liquidity trading swamps informed trading so trades carry no information.
Thus, only the supply channel is operative, and the supply illiquidity channel always
decreases as information (public or private) increases.
For interim values of V, λ starts off as solely a supply effect: limτs→0 λψ=1 = M(M−1)ητp .
As τs increases, the supply illiquidity channel decreases, but the belief illiquidity channel
increases at least initially. For large V, the decreasing supply channel is more powerful.
For small V, the increasing belief channel is more powerful. Specifically, limτs→0 dλdτs ψ=1 =
M(η2τp−V)
ητ2p (M−1)V . For large τs, only the belief channel is operative, and limτs→∞ λψ=1 =
η
(M−1)V .
Note that this is a positive constant whereas limτs→∞ λ = 0 when ψ > 1. The belief
channel consistently increases with τs when V is small, but when V is large, τs eventually
decreases the belief channel, thereby decreasing overall illiquidity as well. Specifically,
sign
[
limτs→∞ dλdτs ψ=1
]
= sign
[
η2τp −M2V
]
. Another point of interest is to compare illiquid-
ity at the two limits of τs:
limτs→∞ λψ=1
limτs→0 λψ=1
=
η2τp
MV .
The overall relationship between private information and illiquidity without overcon-
fidence is as follows: For high supply variance (V > η2τp), private information decreases
illiquidity; for low supply variance (V < η
2τp
M2 ), private information increases illiquidity;
and for moderate supply variance ( η
2τp
M2 < V < η
2τp), illiquidity is a hump-shaped function
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of private information. Within the moderate case, τs decreases illiquidity overall when
V > η
2τp
M and increases illiquidity overall when V <
η2τp
M .
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B.2 Supplemental Tables
Table B.1: Stock VAR Results
turn and illiq are detrended log turnover and illiq (a measure of illliquidity), respectively. rmrf is the excess
return of the CRSP value weighted market return over the risk free rate. turn and illiq were detrended using a
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter with a penalty value of 14,400. Reported results are for a 2-lag VAR of turn,
illiq, and rmrf. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. * represents 10% significance, ** represents 5%
significance, *** represents 1% significance. Turnover and illiq are equally weighted averages. Sample includes
all NYSE stocks with lagged prices greater that $5 from 1926 to 2011.
(1) (2) (3)
turn illiq rmrf
Lag 1
turn 0.4835*** -0.1083** 0.0137
(0.0392) (0.0437) (0.012)
illiq -0.0634 0.4329*** 0.0225**
(0.0392) (0.0507) (0.011)
rmrf 0.8625*** -1.5128*** 0.1133*
(0.1905) (0.1687) (0.0612)
Lag 2
turn -0.0059 0.081** -0.0049
(0.0432) (0.0383) (0.0094)
illiq -0.0043 0.2444*** 0.0167
(0.0366) (0.045) (0.0103)
rmrf 0.3903** 0.0793 0.0161
(0.1849) (0.164) (0.054)
Constant -0.0076 0.0089 0.0053***
(0.007) (0.0067) (0.0018)
R-Squared 0.38 0.52 0.05
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Table B.2: Stock Panel VAR Results
turn and illiq are monthly stock-level log turnover and illiq (a measure of illliquidity), respectively. ret is the
monthly individual stock returns. ret_ind is the monthly return on the stock’s industry. Industries are defined
using the 10 industry groups on Ken French’s website. Reported results are for a 2-lag VAR of turn, illiq,
ret, and ret_ind. Bootstrapped standard errors controlling for cross-sectional correlation are in parentheses. *
represents 10% significance, ** represents 5% significance, *** represents 1% significance. Sample includes all
NYSE stocks with lagged prices greater that $5 from 1951 to 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
turn illiq ret ret_ind
Lag 1
turn 0.2295*** -0.1645*** 0.0214* 0.0007
(0.0312) (0.0333) (0.0125) (0.0035)
illiq -0.1209 0.2187*** 0.025 0.0006
(0.0803) (0.0696) (0.0226) (0.0055)
ret 0.0558 -0.2166** -0.1021*** -0.0001
(0.0935) (0.0873) (0.0278) (0.0066)
ret_ind 0.1776*** -0.1159 0.1119** 0.0515
(0.0638) (0.074) (0.0486) (0.0713)
Lag 2
turn -0.0196 0.0192 0.008 0.0004
(0.0204) (0.0199) (0.007) (0.0019)
illiq -0.041 0.0626** 0.0139 0.0005
(0.0343) (0.0297) (0.0097) (0.0024)
ret -0.0116 -0.0036 -0.0325*** -0.0018
(0.025) (0.0249) (0.009) (0.0021)
ret_ind 0.084** -0.0388 0.0054 -0.0212
(0.0403) (0.0463) (0.0293) (0.0413)
Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Setup and General Pricing Equations
The representative agent has the augmented Epstein-Zin preferences described by equation
(3.1):
Ut = max
Ct
[
λtC
1−1/ψ
t + δ (U
∗
t+1)
1−1/ψ]1/(1−1/ψ)
where U∗t+1 =
{
Et
[
U1−γt+1
]}1/(1−γ)
is the certainty equivalent of future utility. Optimization
is subject to budget constraint:
Wt+1 = Rw,t+1 (Wt − Ct) (C.1)
where Wt is wealth at time t and Rw,t+1 is the return on the overall wealth portfolio, which
is a claim to all future consumption.
AER use standard techniques from the Epstein-Zin preference literature to show that
the preferences represented by equation (3.1) imply the log stochastic discount factor (sdf)
presented in equation (3.2):
mt+1 = θ log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
− θ
ψ
∆ct+1 + (θ − 1) rw,t+1
This sdf should not be surprising. It is just the standard Epstein-Zin sdf with time-varying
time discounting (i.e., δλt+1λt instead of δ).
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Using 0 = Et [mt+1 + ri,t+1] + 12
(
σ2m + σ
2
i + 2σmi
)
(the log version of 1 = Et [Mt+1Ri,t+1]),
we calculate the expected return for any asset as:
Et [ri,t+1] +
1
2
σ2i = −θ log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
+
θ
ψ
Et [∆ct+1] + (1− θ) Et [rw,t+1]
− 1
2
(
θ
ψ
)2
σ2c −
1
2
(1− θ)2 σ2w +
θ
ψ
(θ − 1) σwc
+
θ
ψ
σic + (1− θ) σiw (C.2)
The 12σ
2
i on the left hand side of equation (C.2) is a Jensen’s inequality correction for log
returns.
The risk free rate is of particular interest:
r f ,t+1 = −θ log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
+
θ
ψ
Et [∆ct+1] + (1− θ) Et [rw,t+1]
− 1
2
(
θ
ψ
)2
σ2c −
1
2
(1− θ)2 σ2w +
θ
ψ
(θ − 1) σwc (C.3)
Differencing equations (C.2) and (C.3) yields the risk premia of equation (3.7):
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i =
θ
ψ
σic + (1− θ) σiw
which is exactly the same expression as in standard Epstein-Zin models. Substituting
Et [rw,t+1] from equation (3.7) into equation (C.3), yields equation (3.6):
r f ,t+1 = − log
(
δ
λt+1
λt
)
+
1
ψ
Et [∆ct+1]− 1− θ2 σ
2
w −
θ
2ψ2
σ2c
which is the same as standard Epstein-Zin models except that δ is replaced by δλt+1λt .
C.2 Substituting out Consumption (The ICAPM)
Following Campbell (1993) we log linearize the budget constraint to yield equation (3.8):
rw,t+1 − Et [rw,t+1] = (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=0
ρj∆ct+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρjrw,t+1+j
where ρ = 1 − exp (c− w) is a log-linearization constant (c− w is the average log
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consumption-wealth ratio). Rearranging equation (3.8), we can express current consumption
shocks as:
∆ct+1 − Et [∆ct+1] = rw,t+1 − Et [rw,t+1]
+ (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρjrw,t+1+j
− (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj∆ct+1+j (C.4)
So far, we have only made use of modified Epstein-Zin preferences and the budget
constraint. We now use assumptions about consumption and time preference innovations
for the first time. Due to our homoskedacticity assumption, risk premia (equation 3.7) do
not change over time, and the riskfree rate (equation 3.6) only changes in response to time
preference and consumption growth innovations. Thus, innovations to expected returns can
be decomposed as:
(Et+1 − Et) rw,t+1+j = (Et+1 − Et) r f ,t+1+j
= (Et+1 − Et) log
(
λt+j
λt+j+1
)
+
1
ψ
(Et+1 − Et)
[
∆ct+j+1
]
(C.5)
for j ≥ 1.
Substituting equation (C.5) into equation (C.4) yields:
∆ct+1 − Et [∆ct+1] = rw,t+1 − Et [rw,t+1]
−
(
1− 1
ψ
)
(Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj∆ct+1+j
+ (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj log
(
λt+j
λt+j+1
)
(C.6)
Substituting out consumption shock covariance (σic) from equation (3.7) yields risk
premia as a function of covariances with market returns and innovations to future time
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preferences and consumption growth:
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσiw
+ (γ− 1) 1
ψ
covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj∆ct+1+j
)
+
θ
ψ
covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj log
(
λt+j
λt+j+1
))
(C.7)
Equation (3.9) expresses this as:
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσiw −
γ− 1
ψ− 1σih(λ) + (γ− 1) σih(c)
where
σih(λ) = covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj log
(
λt+j
λt+j+1
))
(C.8)
and
σih(c) =
1
ψ
covt
(
ri,t+1, (Et+1 − Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρj∆ct+1+j
)
(C.9)
are the two different types of interest rate news covariance.
C.3 Substituting out Wealth Returns (The Generalized CCAPM)
We can also use the budget constraint to substitute out wealth portfolio return covariance
(σiw) from equation (3.7) by rearranging equation (C.6) and using it to decompose σiw,
thereby yielding equation (3.11):
Et [ri,t+1]− r f ,t+1 + 12σ
2
i = γσic + (γψ− 1) σih(c) −
γψ− 1
ψ− 1 σih(λ)
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C.4 Disciplining Parameter Values
In a three period setting with λ0 = λ1 = δ = 1, Epstein-Zin Utility (equation 3.1) can be
expressed as:
U0 = max
C0
C1−1/ψ0 +
(
E0
[
max
C1,C2
{
C1−1/ψ1 + λ2C
1−1/ψ
2
} 1−γ
1−1/ψ
]) 1−1/ψ
1−γ

1/(1−1/ψ)
(C.10)
The Euler equation for an Arrow-Debreu security that pays off in state s is:
PsC
−1/ψ
0 =
[
piL
(
C1−1/ψ1 + λLC
1−1/ψ
2
) 1−γ
1−1/ψ
+ piH
(
C1−1/ψ1 + λHC
1−1/ψ
2
) 1−γ
1−1/ψ
] γ−1/ψ
1−γ
∗ pis
(
C1−1/ψ1 + λLC
1−1/ψ
2
) 1/ψ−γ
1−1/ψ ∗ C−1/ψ1 (C.11)
where Ps is the state price for state s, pis is the probability of state s, and λs is the value of
λ2 in state s.
Under our assumption that C0 = C1 = C2 = C, equation (C.11) reduces to:
Ps = pis (1+ λs)
1/ψ−γ
1−1/ψ
[
piL (1+ λL)
1−γ
1−1/ψ + piH (1+ λH)
1−γ
1−1/ψ
] γ−1/ψ
1−γ
(C.12)
Equation (C.12) immediately implies the state price ratio given by equation (3.16):
PL
PH
=
piL
piH
(
1+ λL
1+ λH
)− γ−1/ψ1−1/ψ
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